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Introduction and Overview
“The worth of a State, in the long
run, is the worth of the individuals
composing it.”
John Stuart Mill (1859)
On Liberty
The question of how public services should be provided is among the most sensitive
political topics of the moment. How effectively to deliver public services ? Who is the
best able to provide a given public service ? These important questions do not refer
to the size of the State, that is, the mostly ideological debate — often a dialogue of
the deaf — between the promoters of Less State and the supporters of the Welfare
State. On the contrary, it is mostly based neither on more, nor less State, but rather
on better State. In other words, the question is not to know whether a service should
be provided; assuming that the services are provided, the key issue is to know how to
provide it in the best manner.
The general issue of how public services should be provided generates a multi-
tude of questions. One of the crucial questions is the so-called make-or-buy decision,
which is at the heart of our thesis. Some other questions include the choice of the
partner (see Athias and Chever (2015) for an overview of the related literature. See
also Athias and Nunez (2015).), the price regulation (Cost-plus vs. Price cap remu-
neration schemes (Laffont and Martimort, 2009)), the trade-off between contractual
rigidity and flexibility (Athias and Saussier, 2007; Athias and Saussier, 2010), or the
11
institutional environment (Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 2009). Once decided that a
given public service should be provided, there exist many ways of providing it, and
the issue of choosing between these modes gave rise to an extended literature since the
years 1970s. Fig 1 shows an overview of the various ways of providing public service.
The traditional in-house provision of the good or the service — that is provision made
by public sector employees, under the supervision of a public authority — is only one
of these modes, albeit it is the most frequent.
An alternative between in-house provision and contracting-out with the private
sector is the so-called contracting-in, which describes the case where the public author-
ity, instead of delegating the delivery of the service to the private sector, chooses to del-
egate it to the public sector. Contracting-in can take different forms (Athias, 2013a).
First, it can consist in the creation of public agencies, that is, firms that belong (to-
tally or in majority) to the public authorities. This is the case in Switzerland of
the SBB – CFF, as well as the Swiss Post. At the local level, many cities created
so-called Services Industriels, which are public entities in charge of the delivery of
gas, electricity, and/or water. These public firms enjoy a large autonomy; however,
the public sector keeps a large control on them, as it keeps the power to take all
the strategic decisions (as the majority or unique shareholder), as well as to choose
the members of the direction and of the board of administrators. Agentification has
strongly developed since the year 1970s in the wake of the New Public Management.
Another frequent form of contracting-in is the joint production of services by several
jurisdictions. This case mostly occurs at the local level, as it allows local governments
to reach a better productive efficiency (taking profit from economies of scales) while
keeping the delivery in the hands of the public sector.
Another way of providing public services is to contract-out the provision to one
or several private firms. Doing so, the public authority delegates the provision to
the private sector, but still keeps a quite large control on the provision, insofar the
authority can stipulate in the contract essential characteristics of the provision (e.g the
price, the quantity, or the quality of the service). Contracting-out may allow a public
authority to benefit from some of the advantages of private provision (economies of
scale, a better know-how) while keeping a control on the provision in order to ensure
that political or social goals (e.g redistribution) are satisfied. The authority has
also the ability to choose between several ways of financing the service — by direct
payments of user fees by the consumers, or by the State, which will allow to finance it
through taxes (according to the principle of the ability-to-pay), and hence to satisfy
redistributive goals. We shall refer to the case of middle-term contracts which describe
a mission to fulfil in rather general terms as Performance contracts, whereas Delivery
contracts — the most frequent — are short-term contracts that give the firm less
latitude. Contrary to privatization, there is no transfer of ownership. It is essential
to note that in all of these cases, we consider the operation of the infrastructures and
the delivery of the service, and not the building of the infrastructure,
Under the contracting-out alternatives, the one which involves the most the pri-
vate sector is the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP), which is a long-term contracts
12
Figure 1: Modes of provision for public services
Adapted from Huet and Saussier (2003)
in which a public authority delegates to one private firm the different phases (Design,
Build, Finance, and Operate) involved in the development of a public service associ-
ated with an infrastructure . This allows a bundling that incites the private partner
to minimize the costs not only in the building stage — which may lead to increased
costs in the operation stage — but in all stages. In Switzerland, only one PPP exists
nowadays, namely the administrative center Neumatt in Burgdorf BE, built in 2012.
Another kind of hybrid forms between make and buy is the lease arrangements.
In these contracts, the public sector builds and finances the infrastructure necessary
to deliver a public service, and delegates the delivery to the private sector, that is,
it allows a private firm to exploit an infrastructure that belongs to the public sector.
This is often the case for network industries as electricity, gas, or water supply, as
well as for sport venues.
Outside from this framework, a provision through the market can also, under cer-
tain conditions, allow to satisfy the conditions of efficiency and redistribution defined
by Musgrave (1959). Indeed, when the provision of a good can be provided efficiently
by the market, but that this equilibrium is not conform with the redistributive equity,
the second welfare theorem states that any other Pareto-optimal equilibrium can be
obtained through a transfer mechanism, although this will affect the equilibrium con-
sumptions of all available goods. A redistributive policy affecting only one given good
may consist for the public authorities in subsidizing the offer (grants, e.g for cultural
activities) and/ or the demand (vouchers)1.
1As the public authority is no more involved in the provision, we shall not consider this case in
this thesis.
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The questions related to the provision of public services and the way these services
are provided are very long-standing, and the answers given to these questions strongly
varied through the centuries.
The existence of public services dates back — at least — to the classical antiquity.
According to the famous Roman historian Livy (Titus Livius), the Roman Senate cre-
ated 440 B.C. the Cura Annonae (“care for the grain supply”) and the corresponding
public office of the Praefectus Annonae. Indeed, the surrounding countryside was not
able to fulfil all the needs of the population of Rome; thus, the constitution of this
public service allowed the Senators to limit the risks of a famine, by ensuring the deliv-
ery of grain from the other regions of Italy (Campania, Sicily), as well as North Africa
(Egypt). One and a half century earlier, around 600 B.C., Tarquin the Elder built the
first sewage system, the Cloaca maxima, to remove the waste of the City to the river
Tiber. 312 B.C., Censor Appius Claudius Caecus — well-known for having given his
name to the Via Appia, the most important Roman road — built the first aqueduct,
Aqua Appia, in order to ensure the supply of water to the City of Rome (Rosen, 1993).
During the first century B.C., Emperor Augustus expended massively the number of
public services, and created the Cura viarum (maintenance of the roads), the Vigilum
praefectura (a service of fire protection and maintenance of the public order), the Ur-
bis praefectura (a local police), the Cura operum publicum (maintenance of the public
buildings), the Cura aedium sacrarum (maintenance of the religious edifices), and the
Cura aquarum (protection and maintenance of the aqueducts). At the end of the first
century A.D., there were no less than 240 workmen who worked for the water service
alone (Homo, 2014). Is it also under Augustus that the first postal system (cursus
publicus) has been created, albeit it was intended for official purposes only. Over the
centuries, the Roman Emperors have been active in continuing the development of
the public services, developing in particular the aqueducts and sewerage networks and
the therms, as well as the urban police.
We can hence observe that, at these times, the provision of public services was
mainly in the hands of the public authorities, and that these service were provided
by public servants. In other words, in the antiquity, most of the public services
were provided through what we should call nowadays in-house provision. However
the private sector was not totally absent from the delivery of public services. It is
also during the antiquity that the first concessions have been awarded : the Roman
Emperors stipulated long term contracts (ius perpetuum, ius emphyteuticum) that
allowed individuals to build and exploit public utilities as therms, aqueducts, or post
relay stations (Bezanc¸on, 2004). This greatly favoured the development of these in-
frastructures across the Empire. Most of these public services disappeared, for several
centuries, with the fall of the Roman Empire in 476.
During the middle ages, the consequence of the feudal system was that the pro-
vision of most “public services” resulted from an exchange of services between the
lords and their peasants and serfs, with the former ensuring the security of the fief
and rendering justice, and the latter farming the lands. In this context, it is not clear
whether this relationship must be considered as a public provision — what the hierar-
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chical relationship between the lord and the peasants may suggest — or as a private
provision, as a kind of (at least moral) contractual relationship existed between the
lord and the (free) peasants.
During both the middle ages and the Renaissance, many tasks that are now con-
sidered as public services were in the hands of the Church and/or charitable foun-
dations; it was the case, for example, of the education. In Switzerland, the reformer
John Calvin made the elementary school compulsory in Geneva in 1536. Many of the
protestant cantons (Berne, Vaud, Zurich) followed this example during the 16h and
17th Centuries. In the Catholic cantons, the religious orders (in particular the Je-
suits) developed for their parts schools intended primarily for the children of wealthy
families. On the other hand, in the domain of health, several hospitals have been
created thanks to the donations of rich patrons. This was the case for example of the
hospital of Berne, founded in 1354.
At the end of middle ages (since the 12th Century), noblemen and bourgeois orga-
nized the provision of some services in the cities, as water supply, or the building of
ramparts. Concessions were awarded for the exploitation of mills and ovens, but also
roads and bridges. These concessions became more frequent at the Renaissance, for
example for waterways arrangement and the digging of canals as the Canal Craponne
in 1554 (Athias, 2007). The Bridge St-Michael in Paris, built in 1378 and swept away
by the current in 1404 or 1407, illustrates the cooperation between the public author-
ities and private individuals: the authorities financed the construction of the bridge
in selling concessions to a couple, which was allowed to build houses on the bridge.
However, concessions were not limited to public utilities, as the following example
illustrates: in 1672, King Louis XIV charged the Court Composer Jean-Baptiste Lulli
to develop a Royal Academy of Music and Opera, and to to finance it by performing
representations for the public (Bezanc¸on, 2004).
Public services experienced a very strong development since the beginning of the
18th Century. After the industrial revolution, the new-born industries, along with
the sharp increase of the population, generated a large amount of new needs. These
needs were in particular linked with network industries: transportation (railways),
clean water, public lights, electricity, gas, a.s.o. However the public authorities lacked
both the know-how and the financial means to develop all these networks: as Paquier
(2004) notes, the building of a gas network for a city like Geneva represented an
investment corresponding to the annual budget of the municipality. In addition, the
public authorities were not in a position to support the huge risks associated with the
development of these new industries. By contrast, the Elites enjoyed important means
and were seeking opportunities of fruitful investments. This lead the authorities to
award concessions to private firms in order to develop these new services.
In France, the concession to develop the railway between the coal mines of St-
Etienne and the fluvial harbour of Andre´zieux on the river Loire, the first railway
in continental Europe, has been awarded in 1823. In Switzerland, the first railway
between Zurich and Baden, the so-called Spanisch-Bro¨tli-Bahn, has been built in 1847
by the private company Schweizerische Nordbahn. In 1852, the two chambers of the
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Swiss Parliament voted a Rail Law and decided — against the opinion of the Federal
Council (the Swiss Federal Government), who wanted a centralized State provision —
to keep the competence of developing the rail network in the hands of the Cantons, who
in turn awarded concessions to private firms. Indeed, the Cantons — who already
had delegated in 1848 a large part of their power to the Federal State in several
domains (e.g the post, the armed forces) — were not ready to cede again another
important part of their power. However, the first decades of development of the rail
network in Switzerland was a complete financial fiasco, due to the fact that all these
companies (the smallest of which exploited a line of less than 4 kilometers) developed
their network in parallel without coordination, and even without connection to each
other, which lead to tremendous inefficiencies2. In addition, these difficulties have
been aggravated by the Long Depression that followed the financial crisis of 1873.
The consequence was that, between 1852 and 1884, the shareholders of the private
rail companies accumulated losses of about 375 millions of Swiss Francs. This lead
the Confederation to take-over the five biggest rail companies as well as four smaller
companies in 1898, for the huge amount of 1.3 billion Swiss Francs, which corresponds
to about 60 percent of the GDP at the time (Duc, 2010). This gave birth, in 1902, to
the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB – CFF).
Urban transports also began to be developed in the 19th Century, both in Switzer-
land (first tramway in Geneva in 1876 and in Zurich in 1882) and abroad (New York
Tramway in 1832, Paris Tramway in 1853, first electric tramway in Sarajevo in 1885,
London Underground in 1863, Paris Me´tropolitain in 1900 a.s.o.).
Apart from the development of network infrastructures, other public services also
have been developed during the 19th Century, starting with public education — from
the primary and secondary schools up to the Universities3 — that was previously
mainly in the hands of the Church. The elementary education becomes compulsory
in all Swiss Cantons in 1874. Similarly, the authorities (in Switzerland, the Cantons)
took control of the public health, and built (or took-over4) several public hospitals.
The same difficulties that the Swiss rail network experienced during the 19th
Century also emerged in other countries and for other networks (gas, electricity). This
inefficiency of competition — due to the existence of parallel networks in a situation of
decreasing marginal costs that call for a natural monopoly — as well as the difficulty to
regulate a private monopoly lead most countries to nationalize the network industries,
mostly during the first half of the 20th Century: France nationalized its rail network
in 1938 and its electricity and gas network in 1946, Germany nationalized rail in 1919,
Italy nationalized rail in 1924 and electricity in 1962, U.K. nationalizes rail in 1948
and electricity and gas in 1949. The same happened at the local level regarding water
delivery — and in Switzerland gas delivery, which is a local/cantonal competence —
2Bilan, September 18th 2013,“Les CFF font partie de l’ADN de la Suisse”.
3Until the 19th Century, the only University in Switzerland (apart from the religious based
Academies of Berne, Zurich or Lausanne, which were transformed into Universities during the 19th
Century) was that of Basel. (Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse: Instruction publique)
4For example the Government of Canton Vaud bought in 1806 the former Hoˆpital Notre-Dame
— a charitable hospice founded in the 18th Century — and transformed it into a public cantonal
hospital.
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already during the second half of the 19th Century. In many Swiss cities (e.g. Geneva
and Lausanne), this gave birth to the so-called Services Industriels, that is, public
entities in charge of the delivery of gas, electricity, and/or water (Paquier, 2004).
The second wave of a sharp development of public services in industrialized coun-
tries dates back to the period that immediately followed World War II, until the 1973
Oil crisis. This period, known in France as “Les Trente Glorieuses” (“The Glorious
Thirty”), was marked by a rapid economic growth, a high natality (the so-called baby
boom), a high prosperity, and the sharp development of the households’ consumption.
The good economic health, along with the availability of financial means, allowed
all countries to increase their public spendings and to develop the public services as
well as the welfare State. Among the new public services that have been created or
strongly developed during this period, we may mention in particular public radio and
TV broadcasters, as well as motorways. In most cases, these services were provided
in-house, albeit some countries (e.g France) preferred to award concessions to develop
motorways.
In France, the implication of the State in the economy largely exceeded the frame-
work of public services, that is, services provided in the public interest: after World
War II, the French Gouvernment nationalized not only public services as electricity
(1946) and air transportation (1945), but also coal mines companies (1944), the four
biggest banks (1945) and the eleven biggest insurance companies (1946), as well as
the automobile manufacturer Renault (as a sanction for having collaborated with the
enemy during the German occupation). After the “Trente Glorieuses”, the Govern-
ment nationalized in 1982 several firms both in the financial sector (banks) and in
the industrial sector (e.g. the manufacturer of glass and mirrors St-Gobain, the steel
company Usinor or the chemical and pharmaceutical company Rhone-Poulenc). In
the same vein, the U.K. nationalized steel in 1967, the British Leyland Motor Corpo-
ration in 1974, and aerospace building as well as shipbuilding in 1977. In 1979, the
nationalized industries represented 9 percent of the GDP (Parker, 2002).
Hence, between the end of the 19th Century and the years 1970’s, a large part
of the supply of public services was ensured by the State. However, since the end
of the “Trente Glorieuses”, the necessity of the implication of the public sector in
the provision of public services, as well as its ability to provide public services in
the most efficient manner, have been put into question. Public administration has
been perceived as an inefficient, slow and heavy bureaucracy, by contrast with the
presumably efficient private sector. This gave birth to two types of (complementary)
practices, namely reducing the size of the State in transferring responsibilities to the
private sector (using privatizations), and trying to improve the efficiency within the
public sector (New-Public Management).
The prelude of the wave of privatization in Europe and in the World dates back
to the years 1960’s and 1970’s. Wright (1993) points out that isolated privatizations
occurred in Ireland (privatization of the Dairy Disposal Company in 1972), in the U.K.
(British Petroleum, 1977), in Germany (many privatizations in the years 1960’s), as
well as in France and in Italy. However, the real major wave of privatizations began
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around 1980. Still according to Wright, between 1984 and 1991, the Governments of
100 countries sold the equivalent of 250 billion dollars of public firms, among which
50 billion USD in 1991.
In the U.K., Margaret Thatcher — Prime Minister (Conservative) from 1979 to
1990 — considered privatisation as “fundamental to improving Britain’s economic
performance” and “one of the central means of reversing the corrosive and corrupting
effects of socialism”. She initiated a large wave of privatizations, which has been
completed by her successor John Major. Privatizations concerned a large set of public
services. Telecommunications have been privatized in 1984, gas in 1986, water in 1989,
electricity in 1991, and railways between 1995 and 1997. When the Conservative
John Major handed over power to Tony Blair (Labour), the nationalized industries
represented a mere 2 percent of GDP, whereas this share was of 9 percent in 1979
(Parker, 2002).
In France, the Government of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac re-privatized in 1986
and 1987 a large part of the firms that had been nationalized under successive Gov-
ernments. Other privatizations have been conducted in 1993 under Prime Minister
Balladur, i.e. when the right-wing parties took back the power.
The rest of Europe, as well as many countries in the World, also experienced mas-
sive privatizations, as in Finland (since 1987), Germany (since 1990), Portugal (since
1990), Austria (since 1993) or Italy (since 1993). However, the relative importance
of privatizations strongly varies from one country to another: the value of privatized
firms ranges from almost zero in Germany to more than 9 percent of the GDP in the
U.K. In a famous speech5, Margaret Thatcher stated: “So popular is our policy that
it’s being taken up all over the world. From France to the Philippines, from Jamaica
to Japan, from Malaysia to Mexico, from Sri Lanka to Singapore, privatisation is on
the move, there’s even a special oriental version in China. The policies we have pio-
neered are catching on in country after country. We Conservatives believe in popular
capitalism — believe in a property-owning democracy. And it works!”
In the middle of a storm of privatizations, Switzerland seems to be the eye of the
hurricane. We may assign two reasons for this fact. First, contrary to the U.K. or
France, Switzerland did not nationalize complete sectors of its industry in the pre-
vious decades: logically, this means that there was less scope for re-privatizations6.
Secondly, the citizens and the Parliament refused some projects of privatizations that
were desired by the Federal Council or the Cantonal Governments. The Swiss Parlia-
ment renounced in 2006 to divest the majority of the capital of the telecommunications
operator Swisscom, mainly for fear of losing a referendum. The voters of Canton Vaud
refused the privatization of the Cantonal Bank in 2001. Without going as far as pri-
vatizing, Switzerland however followed the EU and liberalized the telecommunication
market in 1998, and a large part of the postal marker in 2011. The Swiss electricity
market is also partly liberalized since 2009, but the Government decided in 2016 to
postpone the complete liberalization, that was initially supposed to be achieved in
5Speech to Conservative Party Conference in Bournemouth, Hampshire, October 10, 1986
6The same argument also explains the rather small volume of privatizations in some other coun-
tries, for example Germany.
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2018.
In 2006, the European Union adopted the Bolkenstein Directive whose aim was to
create a single market for services within the Union, and to ensure the free movement
of services, guaranteed by the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the four freedoms defined
in the European Single Act (1987). Already before the Bolkenstein Directive, the
EU began to liberalize the markets of electricity (since 1997), postal services (1997),
telecommunications (since 1998), and gas (since 2000).
As we have just seen, the choice of an organizational mode, make-or-buy is a concern
for the public authorities for many centuries. However, it is only recently that this
question has been addressed by researchers, and that a theoretical framework arose.
Behind this question of make-or-buy, arises the more general question of contractual
relationships. Three main theories of the contracts, initially developed in the years
1970’s in an industrial framework, have been applied to the public sector and attempt
to answer to the questions related to the delivery of public services. These theories
are the Incentive Theory, the Incomplete Contract Theory, and the Transaction Cost
Theory. As we will show in Chapter 1, despite some fundamental differences, there
are also many important similarities and parallels between the TCT and the ICT.
However, whereas the question of make-or-buy is — directly or indirectly — a concern
for both the Incomplete Contract Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory, the former
is essentially formal and has mainly given rise to theoretical literature and to case
studies (e.g. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), whereas the latter provides analytical
tools that make it the most appropriate to the purpose of a quantitative empirical
study like ours7.
The Transaction-Cost Theory (TCT) shows that, in a framework where the agents
behave opportunistically and have a bounded rationality, and when the environment is
uncertain, every contractual relationship generates transaction costs (cost to stipulate
the contract, as well as costs to monitor its execution), and that these transaction
costs make the buy less profitable when compared to in-house provision (make), all
other things being equal. A central prediction of the TCT is hence that two opposing
forces interact: on the one hand, services that are asset specific or difficult to measure
— that is, services whose contracting would generate high transaction costs — will
be less likely to be contracted with a private firm. On the other hand, economies of
scale foster contracting-out. The relative strength of these forces hence determines
whether in-house provision (make) or contracting-out (buy) is the most appropriate
in a given case (Williamson, 1985).
The TCT describes a pure economic trade-off based on efficiency considerations.
However, in the case of the make-or-buy decision of a public authority, we can observe
that the choices made in practice may differ from efficiency considerations and from
optimal choices. Indeed, the preferences of the authorities may also be subject to
political considerations, namely the private benefits to politicians of keeping service
7As Williamson (2000) notes : “Gross, Hartman and Moore makes very limited contact with the
data whereas [...] Transaction Cost Economics is an empirical success story.”
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provision inside the government (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; Lo´pez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Indeed, in keeping the provision in-house, policy-makers
can hire political friends or relatives (cronyism, nepotism), or bias the public poli-
cies in order to favour prospective electors (clientelism, patronage). In line with
the Public Choice literature on bureaucracy (Wildavsky, 1964; Warren, 1975; Tul-
lock, 1965; Niskanen, 1971) and rent seeking (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Tul-
lock, 1967; Boycko et al., 1996), this view holds that factors that increase the political
benefits from in-house provision make private provision less likely.
A mixture of both views is given by Levin and Tadelis (2010): Services that are
characterized by high transaction costs of contracting and services that are ranked
high by city managers in terms of resident sensitivity to quality are less likely to be
privately provided. Empirical studies have corroborated the significance and impor-
tance of these efficiency and political dimensions to explain provision mode choices
for public services. For instance, Levin and Tadelis (2010) find that a one standard
deviation increase in contracting difficulty is associated with about 40 percent less
private contracting.
As the choice of how public services are provided (conditional on delivering the
public service anyway) is neither a question of “more or less state” nor a question
of redistributive policy, the literature has shown none interest and concern about the
effect of cultural background on this economic decision : as we have seen above, by
now, the theoretical and empirical literature has only considered technical dimensions
(transaction costs and political considerations) in order to explain Governments make-
or-buy decisions. However, the Figure 2 highlights that, at a given size of the State,
that is, for a given level of public expenditure, the share of public employment differs
widely across countries of similar levels of economic development. This means that
two countries with similar levels of public spending can have very different degrees of
public sector involvement in the provision. Some countries may provide public goods
and services directly through the civil service (which corresponds to the in-house
provision or contracting-in described above), and others can hire both infrastructure
development and service provision with the same or different private operators. This
corresponds to the different forms of contracting out presented above. For instance,
the ratio of public over private employment normalized by public spending per capita
is more than three times bigger in France than in Germany. It could be that the
observed differences are related to economic conditions such as the economic cycle or
the current industry structure. But it could also be that the more important drivers
have little to do with economic conditions.
The fact that the impact of culture has never been taken into account is a major
shortage of the make-or-buy literature. Hence, it is an important research issue to
complete this literature in trying to understand which factors explain these across-
country differences. Addressing this issue is the main goal of the present dissertation.
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Figure 2: Public over private employment, by public spending p.c.
Source. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2000).
Public spending in USD $ constant 2000. PPP.
Parallel to the question of make-or-buy addressed by the economic literature, a vast
public-administration literature emerges about Public Service Motivation. This liter-
ature (Rainey, 1982; Perry and Wise, 1990; Perry, 1996) postulates that agents who
work for the public sector are motivated by genuine concern for the public interest. As
they internalize the fact that their work generates a positive externality for the Society,
they are expected to be more committed to their work, and hence more efficient. By
contrast with the literature on bureaucracy (Wildavsky, 1964; Warren, 1975; Tul-
lock, 1965; Niskanen, 1971) and rent seeking (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Tul-
lock, 1967; Boycko et al., 1996) who suggest that public provision is by its very nature
less efficient than private provision, the Public Service Motivation (PSM) literature
suggests on the contrary that the matching (person-organization fit) between highly
public service motivated employees and an organization (the public sector) whose
goals and practices correspond the best with their aspirations might make the public
sector more efficient than private firms.
Apart from institutional (organizational culture, economic development) and indi-
vidual (age, education, or gender) determinants, a part of the recent PSM literature
(Vandenabeele, Scheepers and Hondeghem, 2006; Vandenabeele and de Walle, 2008;
Kim, 2009; Kim, 2015) highlights the importance of cultural factors in explaining
across-country differences in terms of public motivation. Among these features, the
research identifies in particular the religion (dominant religion, degree of religiosity),
the individualist or collectivist nature of the Society, risk aversion, or the relative
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importance of performance and welfare.
Surprisingly however, albeit the make-or-buy literature and the PSM literature ad-
dress in fine the same question of the relative efficiency of public and private provision
of public services, there exist currently no connections between both of these research
fields: the make-or-buy literature limits itself to the study of the trade-off between
different technical factors whereas the empirical PSM literature focuses only on the
public sector, without considering the private sector as a counterfactual. The fact
that these two strands have never been connected yet may probably be explained by
the fact that the make-or-buy literature is essentially an economic literature whereas
the PSM literature is more connected with the public administration literature.
We consider that the total absence of connections between the make-or-buy liter-
ature and the PSM literature is a crucial gap that needs to be filled. An important
goal of this thesis is hence to build a bridge between these two research
fields — between the economic literature and the public administration
literature — and to investigate for the first time how public service moti-
vation may influence the organizational choices for the provision of public
services.
We show that culture is an important determinant of organizational
choices, that could explain a large part of the differences observed across
countries in terms of implication of the private sector in the delivery of
public services, and that differences in terms of public service motiva-
tion are the connection between cultural values and organizational choices.
Demonstrating this result is a major contribution of this thesis.
Switzerland is a very interesting laboratory in order to answer to these questions
for several reasons.
The first interesting features of Switzerland are its territorial structures. Switzer-
land is composed of 26 States (Cantons), divided in 184 districts that are further
divided in 2584 municipalities (in 2010). Compared to other European countries,
Switzerland is one of the countries where the municipalities are the smallest, with a
median size of 1’152 inhabitants and 26.7 percent of municipalities having less than
500 inhabitants.
Studying the particular case of the Swiss municipalities is interesting as these ac-
count for about 22 percent of the public expenditure, and 38 percent of the employees
of the public sector (Koller, 2008). Among the municipal expenditure, personal ex-
penditure account for 31.3 percent and the purchase of goods and services for 21.6
percent. However, whereas the municipalities account for a substantial part of the ex-
penditure of the public sector, their autonomy is quite limited, as a large share of the
expenditure (in particular social expenditure) are fixed by the State (Daﬄon, 2000b).
Nevertheless, even when the municipalities have to provide a given service, the mu-
nicipality still has the choice of the mode of provision.
An important feature of Swiss municipalities is that it is frequent in these munic-
ipalities — especially the small and medium ones — that local executive members
22
are elected as independents (or on non-partisan lists) rather than as representatives
of political parties8. This mitigates the impact of ideological choices. In the case of
the make-or-buy decision, this should reduce the impact of political determinants.
The legislative power at the local level can take different forms. In some mu-
nicipalities, particularly the big ones, the legislative power is exerted by an elected
parliament whereas in the majority of the small and medium-sized municipalities this
power is directly exerted by all the citizens (“full assemblies”). However, even in
municipalities with elected parliaments, citizens may vote on some issues, through
popular initiatives and referenda: if within a given period, a given number of citizens
request it, the authority has to submit a project — e.g. the construction of a building,
the modification of a municipal law, or a tax increase — to a vote of the citizens.
Both the small size of the municipalities, the extended democratic rights, and the
weak importance of political parties at the local level provide the citizens with a large
power of control on the functioning and the decision making of the municipality.
Due the the federalist structure of the country, the Cantons have very extended
powers. For this reason, Switzerland has been used as a laboratory in many studies
on fiscal federalism (Kirchga¨ssner and Pommerehne, 1996; Feld, 2000; Bru¨lhart and
Jametti, 2006, e.g). Regarding the make-or-buy decision, this feature is also interest-
ing insofar the legal environment regarding the delivery of public services is mainly
set at the cantonal rather than federal level. Hence, municipalities in different cantons
face a very different framework. This constitutes an important issue to address: in
order to find real causal evidence, it is essential to take the cantonal heterogeneity
into account. However, municipalities of a same canton face the same institutional
and economic environment, which opens the door for within-canton analyses. In par-
ticular, the Cantons have the power of deciding the quantity and the quality of the
provided public services (e.g the size of classes in schools and the formation of the
teachers). Bru¨lhart and Jametti (2006) highlight the large homogeneity of Swiss mu-
nicipalities9, this homogeneity observed at the Country level is even stronger within
the municipalities of a same canton.
Finally, this country hosts four languages that corresponds to very different cul-
tures. These cultural areas can be defined very precisely. The borders between the
language areas, with the exception of the Romansh area, are quite sharp, as Fig. 3
shows. In year 2000, 72.5 percent of Swiss citizens were German-speaking, 21.0 percent
French, 4.3 percent Italian and 0.6 percent Romansh. Amongst the 26 States (Can-
tons), 4 are French-speaking10, one is Italian-speaking and 17 are German-speaking.
Three states are officially bilingual French-German (Bern, Fribourg and Valais) and
one is trilingual (the Graubu¨nden state: Romansh, German and Italian).
8According to Geser, Meuli, Horber-Papazian, Ladner and Steiner (2012), 39.6 percent of the
15’000 Swiss local executive members are not member of any political party, and 4.8 percent are
members of political groups that only exist at the local level. The proportion of non partisan
executive members reaches 80 percent in municipalities smaller than 500 inhabitants.
9“There is little spending specialization across municipalities: most municipalities are ‘general
purpose’ governments, with largely similar spending duties”(Bru¨lhart and Jametti, 2006).
10The Jura state is officially a French-speaking State, even if one of its municipalities is German-
speaking.
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Figure 3: Administrative Language, by Municipality
Source. Own conception, Data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
Language is an important vector of culture, as it captures the vertical and hori-
zontal transmission of values Bisin and Verdier (2000; 2001). The vertical channel to
the extent that the native language to which we are exposed during childhood and
adolescence is likely to be an important predictor of our values during adulthood. The
horizontal channel in the sense that language is central to any type of social inter-
action. People sharing a common language are more likely to form a social network,
and then, to share common values and common cultural traits.
The so-called Roestigraben — the language barrier between the French-speaking
and German-speaking areas — is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, it
is a well-known fact that this language border is also a cultural border. Hence, partic-
ularly in Switzerland, the language of a municipality or an individual is an excellent
proxy for its cultural identity. Secondly, the Roestigraben is a sharp border, insofar the
fraction of French-speaking municipalities falls from almost 100 percent to 0 percent
within a distance of 5 kilometers across the border (and vice versa for administratively
German-speaking municipalities). In addition, whereas the language border used to
be quite moving until the 19th Century, it has known almost no move during the
20th Century: at the French-German border, no municipality has changed its official
language since 1952. Thirdly, the largest part of the French-German language border
does not correspond to important geographical borders, unlike the German-Italian
language border which corresponds to a mountain massif. Last but not least, large
parts of the language border run within the bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg, and
Valais. This feature is particularly interesting, as it makes it possible to adopt a
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within-canton identification strategy so as to compare municipalities facing the same
cantonal legal and institutional framework (territorial structures, policies, degree of
municipal autonomy, distribution of tasks between the Canton and the municipalities
a.s.o.).
In order to exploit the interesting features of the language border, we shall base
our identification strategy on a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). The aim of
this method is to exploit a cut-off in a running variable in order to determine whether
there exist a jump of the outcome variable at this cut-off. The running variable can
be the time, in which case the cut-off corresponds to an event (a political decision, a
medical act, a.s.o.) whose causal impact on the outcome variable has to be verified.
As it will be the case in our study, the running variable can also be spatial, for example
the distance from a particular point or border. The observations on the one side of
the cut-off can be used as a treatment group and the observations on the other side
will constitute a counterfactual. RDD is hence a very interesting tool, as it allows
to compare observations that are very similar to each other: observations that are
close from the cut-off are expected to differ only by the presence of the treatment.
As it is a quasi-experiment, RDD is an almost perfect substitute when it is not
possible (for technical or ethical reasons) to randomly assign a treatment. In addition,
compared to other non-experimental approaches, the validity of an RDD approach is
conditional to quite few assumptions (Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw, 2001; Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). For this reason, RDD is nowadays considered as one of the best
methods to provide causal inference. Hence, the RDD identification strategy we use
in the second part of this thesis is really state of the art11.
Albeit the idea of exploiting discontinuities emerged in the literature the years 1960
(Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960), this idea has not been exploited in the empirical
literature until the end of the years 1990’s, with the studies of Angrist and Lavy (1999)
on the impact of financial aids on educational outcomes, and Black (1999) on the
impact of school district boundaries on the willingness to pay for better schools. In the
last two decades, the use of RDD analysis expanded sharply in several domains, among
others economics (labour economics, development economics, behavioural economics,
economics of health), finance, medicine, epidemiology, sociology, and political science.
In Switzerland, the first paper that use the Roestigraben as identification strat-
egy are Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer and Zweimu¨ller (2016), which aimed to measure
the impact of culture on unemployment, Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer and Zweimu¨ller
(2011), who showed that culture is a major determinant of the demand for social in-
surance, and Eugster and Parchet (2013) on the impact of culture on tax competition.
As no data existed regarding the provision of public services in Swiss municipalities,
we self-constructed an original dataset that aimed to provide information on the mode
of provision chosen by the municipalities for a set of services, as well as on important
11See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a comprehensive discussion of spatial regression discontinuity
design.
25
Table 1: The 22 services
Office cleaning Sewage treatment
Snow-cleaning Child day-care centres
Road-clearing School canteen
Road maintenance Specialized services in school
Parking control Maintenance of school buildings
Refuse collection Security in public spaces
Solid waste disposal Local parks and gardens
Animal carcases removal Cemeteries
Street lights Trimming of trees
Drinking water distribution Forests
Maintenance of water facilities Public transport
characteristics regarding these services (contractual difficulty, residents’ sensitivity,
uncertainty). We considered 22 services ranging from very simple ones (public works
and office cleaning) to more complex ones (safety, education). The list of these services
is reported in Table 1. These services have been selected after discussions with several
specialists and public officials, who identified them as the most relevant at the local
level. We collected data on the contracting choices of Swiss municipalities by a web-
based survey, that asked city administrators (municipal secretaries) to identify the
mode of provision their municipality had chosen to provide each of the 22 services
we were interested in. We chose to survey municipal secretaries as they are the best
suited to provide us with precise and non ideological information, by contrast with
policy makers. In addition, contrary to most local politicians, municipal secretaries
are professionals, and are hence best able to provide us with reliable information.
We obtained responses from 399 municipalities in all Cantons, among which 56.4
percent are German-speaking and 43.6 percent are French-speaking. We also asked
the municipal secretaries to assess the level of uncertainty and residents’ sensitivity
in their municipality for each of the considered services, as well as the strength of the
competition of the market if they decided to contract-out.
In addition, we ran a restricted survey — sent to ten city administrators — in
order to capture variables which are not expected to vary from one municipality to
another, that is contracting difficulty, and the weight accounted by each service in the
budget of an average municipality.
The results of these two surveys allowed us to constitute a unique dataset regarding
the provision of public services in Swiss municipalities. The creation of this database
is also a major contribution of this thesis. The constitution of this database received
support from the Swiss National Science Foundation.
Considering the elements discussed above, this thesis has two primary aims. First,
we want to determine to what extent the classical, technical determinants of the make-
or-buy decision are verified in the Swiss case. Most importantly, as we have identified
above several specific features of the Swiss context that may influence the make-or-buy
decision (small municipalities, well-established tradition of inter-municipal collabora-
tion, extended political rights for the citizens), we want to measure to what extent
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these features actually affect the make-or-buy decision.
The second — and most important — aim of this thesis is to highlight the role
of culture in organizational choices and in the mode of provision of public services,
as well as to quantify it and to assess its relative importance compared to technical
considerations. The third goal is to explain the cultural impact. We highlight that
PSM is the missing piece that connects culture and make-or-buy: the third important
goal of the thesis is hence to demonstrate the causal link between PSM, culture,
and the make-or-buy. This will contribute to enrich the literature in explaining —
for the first time — the existence of systematic differences that can be observed
in organizational choices across countries, or across the cultural regions of a same
country, as we will show in the case of the language areas in Switzerland.
This thesis has also very important policy implications. Indeed, as we
show that culture is an important factor regarding organizational choices,
and that cultural differences in PSM affect the efficiency of public provi-
sion, the consequence is that some policies — in particular privatizations
— that work quite well in some countries may have very negative conse-
quences when applied indiscriminately to some other countries. What is
optimal for one country is not necessarily optimal for all countries. This
may call into question the activity of some international organizations,
which aim to apply the same receipts in all countries. This may also ex-
plain why some policies, for example the New Public Management, lead
to very different results across the countries.
The main limitation of this thesis is that, albeit our study has a strong internal
validity, the fact that our study focuses on the Swiss case limits its external validity.
For this reason, interesting paths for further research will be to generalize these results.
This dissertation is divided in two parts. The outline of the thesis will be as follows.
The first part of the thesis will be devoted to the classical analysis of the make-
or-buy decision. The aims of this part are to set out the conceptual framework that
is currently used to analyse the make-or-buy decision, and to use this framework in
the specific case of Switzerland, in order to highlight the importance of culture in
explaining the organizational choices.
In Chapter 1, we aim to provide the theoretical framework for the make-or-buy
decision, and show why, among the different theories of contracts, the Transaction
Cost Theory is the best able to answer to the make-or-buy question. To do this,
we shall present the state-of-the-art of the various theories of contracts, and on their
applications to the particular case of public services. We shall present successively the
three main contractual theories. In addition to the Transaction-Cost Theory that we
have already presented above, we also consider the Incentive Theory, and the Incom-
plete Contracts Theory. The Incentive Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holm-
strom and Milgrom, 1991; Laffont and Martimort, 2009) tries to determine how a
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Principal can induce an Agent to behave in his interest, in a world with asymmetric
information, either ex-ante (adverse selection) or ex-post (moral hazard). The corner-
stone of this theory is to specify contractual rules in a way that makes it profitable
for all parties to act in a way that satisfies the interest of the Principal, and that
allows to solve conflicts of interest between the parties of a contract. The Incomplete
Contract Theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) aims for its part to provide a formalization of the intuitions
of the TCT and to determine the optimal structure of ownership, and in particular
who should have all rights that are not specified in the contract (residual rights), that
is, who will receive the benefits of the non-contractual efforts. Finally, we shall high-
light the specificities of the make-or-buy decision for public services, which includes:
(1) specificities of the public sector (internal organization, bureaucracy, weaker abil-
ity to manage some risks; (2) specificities of the public deciders (ideological bias,
rent-seeking, political agenda); (3) specificities of public services (complexity, need
for continuity and for adaptability). Finally, we shall conclude the presentation of the
state-of-the-art by a review of the empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision of
public authorities, highlighting the construction of the explanatory variables of make
or buy used in the empirical analysis presented in the second chapter.
In Chapter 2, we build up on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1 in
order to analyse the determinants of the make-or-buy decision in Swiss municipalities.
As there were no existing data on the organizational choices of Swiss municipality, we
constructed an original database on the provision of public services in Swiss munici-
palities. This database contains the organizational choices made by 399 municipalities
in all Cantons for the provision of a set of 22 public services. Our empirical approach
is based on a multinomial logit model and aims to identify the determinants of the
mode of provision for each of the 22 services in each of the 399 municipalities. We
observe that the technical determinants identified by the previous literature also mat-
ter in the Swiss case. In line with the TCT, we observe that contracting difficulty,
uncertainty, and residents’ sensitivity affect the organizational choices, but that the
specific small size of Swiss municipalities make them less sensitive to transaction costs
considerations.
We also address in this chapter the issue of individual heterogeneity. In a multicul-
tural (multilingual) country like Switzerland, it is possible to assess whether cultural
differences influence organizational choices. In order to address this issue, we use
an original identification strategy based on the analysis of mispredicted outcomes,
that is, pairs municipality – service for which we observe a private provision whereas
the model suggests a public one (“False-Private”), and pairs for which we observe a
public provision whereas the models predicts private provision (“False-Public”). Af-
ter running standard estimations combined with a within-state estimation strategy,
we determine the expected outcome (public or private) for each pair municipality –
service. We then run regressions in order to explain the mispredictions. We show
that the language is an important predictor of mispredictions: in pairs for which the
expected outcome is Private, municipalities in the French area are 33 percent more
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likely to choose public provision (that is, to be “False-Public” mispredicted) than
municipalities in the German area. This analysis highlights the necessity to integrate
the cultural dimensions in the make-or-buy analysis, which will be done in the second
part of this thesis. However, albeit this analysis suggests that culture may affect the
organizational choices, its internal validity is rather limited, insofar it does not prove
that the cultural effect measured is really causal. This shows that a more robust anal-
ysis is necessary in order to be certain that the observed effect actually corresponds
to a cultural gap. This is what we are going to do in the second part of the thesis.
The goals of the second part of this thesis are first to determine the causal impact
of culture on organizational choices for public services, and secondly to understand
how this happens, that is, to find the channels of transmission.
In Chapter 3, we exploit the Roestigraben in order to verify the existence of
a causal relationship between culture and the make-or-buy decision for public ser-
vices. As discussed above, the Roestigraben — the language barrier between the
French-speaking and German-speaking areas — is particularly interesting to provide
a robust causal analysis, insofar it is also a sharp cultural border, as highlighted by
Bu¨chi (2000). Furthermore, large parts of the this border run within bilingual can-
tons which makes it possible to adopt a within-canton identification strategy so as to
compare municipalities facing the same cantonal legal and institutional framework.
For this reason, we shall restrict the database used in the first part of the thesis to
the municipalities that belong to one of the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fri-
bourg, and Valais. Our sample consists in 142 municipalities, among which 84 are
German-speaking and 58 are French-speaking. As in the first part, we shall consider
22 services. Our identification strategy is based on a Regression-Discontinuity Design
(RDD) approach using the Roestigraben as a cutoff.
Our analysis shows that culture (language) is a major determinant of the organi-
zational choices: French-speaking municipalities at the language border are about 60
percent less likely to contract-out a given service than adjacent municipalities on the
German side of the border (counterfactual municipalities). By contrast, we do not ob-
serve any differences in terms of public contracting. Using a Difference-in-Differences
approach, we show that the size of the effect of culture does not vary within each side
of the border. These results are robust to the choice of the bandwidth (20, 25, 30,
and 40 km bandwidths with a linear trend, as well as 40 km with a quadratic trend).
As a robustness check, we merge the categories in-house and public contracting and
run Logit regressions (still RDD) in order to compare public and private provision.
We also run an ordered logit analysis. Both of these analyses confirm the results
obtained with our baseline multinomial logit model. We also show that the cultural
determinant does not introduce a bias in the choices made by public authorities.
Considering accounting data on the expenditure of Swiss municipalities, we then
show that In-House provision is more efficient on the French side of the language
border: a 10-percent increase of the number of services provided in-house leads to a
reduction of the differential in terms of public spending per capita when contracting
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of about 10 percentage points. We also show that contracting (public or private)
increases the public spending differential between the French- and German-speaking
areas. These results, that are in-line with the analysis of the determinants of the
organizational choices, suggest that the difference of organizational choices at the
language border might by explained by mission-matching.
In Chapter 4, we present a review of the literature regarding Public Service Mo-
tivation (PSM). This literature review highlights some points that are particularly
important for the purpose of this thesis. First, the PSM literature shows that culture
is an major determinant of PSM, which may explain across-country differences in the
level of PSM and, in the Swiss case, the differences between the language regions. Sec-
ondly, the literature highlights the importance of a good matching between the mission
and values of the organization and the PSM of the employees. Finally, we identify
several limitations of this literature, in particular the empirical one. First, measuring
PSM is a delicate task. Most of the empirical literature is based on the constructs
developed by Perry (1996), who distinguishes four dimensions of PSM: Attraction
to Policy Making, Commitment to Public Interest, Compassion, and Self-Sacrifice.
However, these constructs are very difficult to transpose to different countries in a
way that allows cross-country comparisons. The questions used to construct the PSM
measures may be interpreted in a very different manner from one country to another,
due to cultural differences as well as difficulties to translate the questions without
slightly changing their signification. Secondly, PSM is always measured in absolute
terms. This means that it does not disentangle the pure public component of PSM
and a general propensity to behave in a civic manner. In the PSM literature, the
main goal of the PSM constructs is to define what constitutes PSM. By contrast, we
are more interested by the level of PSM for the purpose of our study..
Finally, in Chapter 5, we test whether PSM is indeed the transmission channel,
using an original strategy to capture PSM. To do so, we use data from the Swiss
Household Panel (SHP)12. These data represent 2790 individuals, on two years (2011
and 2014). Our data consist in a set of 6 questions capturing civicness. In each of
these questions, the respondents were asked to what extent they considered a certain
uncivic behaviour to be justified. Three questions allows us to construct a measure of
civicness when the public sector is concerned13. However, these questions do not only
capture the specific civicness towards the public sector, but have also a component of
civicness in general, that manifests itself irrespective of whether the public sector is
concerned or not. For these reason, we use three other questions in order to construct
a measure of the preferences towards civic-minded behaviour in general14. Finally,
we define PSM as the difference between these two measures (public sector civicness
minus general civicness). This allows us to have a clean, unbiased measure of PSM.
12The SHP is a panel study which interviews, each year, the members of the same sample of
households on a large range of topics. Starting in 1999, it constitutes a very interesting longitudinal
database on the values and the living conditions in Switzerland.
13Is it justified cheating on tax declaration / avoiding a fare on public transport / claiming State
benefits to which you are not entitled?
14Is it justified lying in own interest / keeping found money /failing to report damage to parked
vehicle?
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Our analysis shows that French-speaking respondents exhibit a significantly higher
PSM than German-speaking respondents, even after controlling for standard individ-
ual characteristics (which include in particular age, education, religion, gender, and
political ideology). We infer that this impact of culture on organizational choices is
explained by the fact that culture determines the prevalence of motivated agents that
are aligned with public, mission-oriented organizations.
The questions to which the thesis attempts to answer, the approaches adopted,
the data used, and the main results obtained are summarized in the following table.
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Table 2: Summary of the questions, theoretical approaches, data and results of the
thesis
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Part I
Classical Technical Considerations
33
Chapter 1
Contract Theories and
Make-or-Buy for Government
Services – Literature Review
In the make-or-buy trade-off, what is the make? What is a firm? What are its
boundaries? Why do firms exist in the real world? Even though the classical and neo-
classical economists paid a large attention to the way to produce goods as efficiently as
possible, it is not before the seminal article of Coase (1937) that this question received
some attention. Moreover, it was not until the mid-1970s that the scholars began to
investigate deeply the nature, the role, and the boundaries of the firm. Furthermore,
as noted by Garrouste and Saussier (2005): “despite the important literature on the
subject, this question remains an empirical as well as a theoretical challenge”.
The goal of this chapter is to provide the theoretical framework for the make-or-
buy decision, that will be used in the rest of this thesis. The make-or-buy question
implies that there exist a difference between make and buy, which means that there
exist a difference between firms and the market.
Before the emergence of the contractual theories that we shall present in this
chapter, the literature did not consider the existence of the firm. Indeed, the classical
smithian division of labour provided no sufficient reason per se to justify the existence
of firms. Let us take as an example the famous pin factory described by Smith:
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“One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it,
a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to
make the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on is a
particular business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by
itself to put them into the paper; and the important business of making
a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations,
which in some manufactures are all performed by distinct hands, though in
others the same man will sometime perform two or three of them.” Smith
In Smith’s point of view, the eighteen operations which make up the manufac-
turing process of a pin are carried out in a unique firm. However, it would also be
possible — and equivalent — to imagine that the first man draws out the wire, sells
it to another worker who straights it before selling the straight wire to somebody else
who cuts it, and so forth. In that case, the labour is still divided, but it is divided
between independent craftsmen instead of employees of a firm, which encompasses
the whole manufacturing process. The benefits of the specialization can be achieved
in the process we have just described as well as in Smith’s factory. Having said that,
the question of why firms do exist still remains. Neither did the neoclassical microe-
conomic theory (Walras, Jevons, Marshall, Pareto, among others) consider explicitly
the concept of firm. In this case, the firm is considered as a production function, that
is, a black-box that transforms substitutable inputs (mainly labour and capital) into
outputs. The objectives of the theory of production is hence to maximize the profit
in choosing the right quantity of output to produce and the adequate combination of
inputs to produce it. In this model, there is no place envisaged for a trade-off between
internal production (make) and contracting (buy). Indeed, under the very restrictive
assumptions of the neo-classical theory (in particular rational agents, and complete
information), it is strictly equivalent to produce a good or to buy it from another
agent with an identical production function.
In this chapter, we shall present the state-of-the art of the three main theories
of contracts, that is, the Incentive Theory, the Transaction-Cost Theory, and the In-
complete Contracts Theory. We shall show that neither the Incentive Theory nor the
Incomplete Contracts Theory explain the difference between firms and market. Hence,
they do not allow to answer to the question of make-or-buy. Indeed, the Incomplete
Contracts Theory considers the firm as a legal fiction, a node of contractual relation-
ships. This means that, in this theory, a firm is totally equivalent to the market. The
firm is a market like any others. The Incomplete Contracts Theory focuses on the
ownership of the residual rights. The importance here is the hierarchical relationship
between the agents, which can arise both within a firm and in an contractual relation-
ship. These theories are however still relevant in the analysis of make-or-buy, insofar
the organizational choices also imply contractual issues. By contrast, the very aim of
the Transaction Cost Theory is to answer to the make-or-buy question.
In addition, when it turns to the make-or-buy decision for public services, many
additional considerations have to be taken into account. First, contrary the case of
the make-or-buy decision of a firm, the productive efficiency of the make and the buy
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can differ. Indeed, the private sector may be more efficient due to a better know-
how, or because it benefits from economies of scale. The competition in the private
market can also increase the efficiency of the buy. In addition, the buy allows a better
allocation of the risks. Issues related to inherent inefficiencies of the public sector
(bureaucracy) have also to be considered.
Furthermore, the make-or-buy decision can be biased by other considerations than
efficiency, for example ideology, political agenda, or rent-seeking.
Finally, public services have some specific features that also affect the make-or-
buy decision. They are often complex and difficult to contract-out. They generate an
important need for continuity, which make the threat of sanctions less credible.
The remainder of this chapter will be as follows. In the first section, we shall
present the Incentive Theory. In the second section, we shall consider the Transaction
Cost Theory. The third section will be devoted to the Incomplete Contracts Theory.
In Section 1.4, we shall provide a synthesis of these three contractual theories, in order
to highlight why the Transaction-Cost Theory is the only one that allows to answer
to the question of make-or-buy. In Section 1.5, we shall shed light on the specificities
of the provision of public services, which explain why the organizational choices may
diverge from the choices suggested by the efficiency considerations. Section 1.6 will
survey the empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision of public authorities, and
Section 1.7 will conclude.
1.1 The Incentive Theory
The first important theoretical strand we are going to present is the Incentive theory.
Whereas the Transaction-Cost theory presented below is centred on behavioural issues,
the corner stone of Incentive theory is on information. The Incentive theory aims to
understand how resources are produced and allocated under informational constraint,
that is, in presence of an imperfect, asymmetric information. In practice, the key issue
is then to set up the best set of rewards and performance measures, so as to motivate
the agent to act in a way that maximizes the interest of the Principal (Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1991).
Laffont and Martimort (2009) date the starting point of the Incentive theory to
the division of labour and exchange. For them: “It is no wonder that Adam Smith
encountered incentive problems in his discussion of sharecropping contracts.” How-
ever, it was not until the years 1970s that these issues have been properly addressed
theoretically, in particular in the seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The
basic framework of the incentive theory is an agency relationship, where the Principal
delegates one or several tasks to an Agent. The analysis of Jensen and Meckling takes
place within a firm whose ownership and control are separated. However, such a rela-
tionship exists for example between an employer and her employees, between a seller
and a buyer, or between a lawyer and his client. Provided that both the principal
and the agent are rational utility maximizers, it follows that the agent will act in
a way that satisfies her own interest, which does not necessarily correspond to the
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interest of the Principal. In a world with perfect information, the Principal is able
to force the agent to act in an appropriate way, by using mechanisms of sanctions
and rewards. On the contrary, when the agent has private information — information
that the principal does not have, e.g. on his production costs, on his effort, or on the
quality of the goods he sells — “it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent
at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s
viewpoint” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This creates three kinds of agency costs,
namely the costs for the Principal to monitor the activities of the Agent, the agent’s
bonding expenditure (i.e. the compensation paid to the agent in order to incite him
to act in the Principal’s interest), and the residual loss.
This problem is particularly important in the case of public goods. Indeed, in a
competitive market, yardstick competition makes it often possible to reveal the hidden
information (Laffont and Martimort, 2009). On the contrary, this is more difficult for
public services, due to their very nature.
An important assumption of the neo-classical economics is that firms try to maxi-
mize their profit, whereas individuals (that is, consumers) try to maximize their util-
ity. Firms are assumed to maximize their profit considering their production function.
In other words, what matter are the inputs and the outputs, in quantitative terms,
but not the way the inputs are transformed into outputs. For Laffont and Martimort
(2009): “by treating the firm as a black box, the [neo-classical] theory remains silent on
how the owners of firms succeed in aligning the objectives of its various members like
workers, supervisors, managers with profit maximization”. The essential contribution
of the incentive theory is hence to open the black box of the firm, and to understand
what happens when the agents that compose the firm have diverging interests and
are in a position to extract a rent from behaving in their own interest.
The so-called theory of teams (Marschak and Radner, 1972) considers an asym-
metric information, but still benevolent agents whose objectives are aligned with those
of the firm. The workers do not try to capture an informational rent, and incentives
still do not matter. By contrast, if the agents are opportunistic but the information
is complete, it is possible (and not costly) to constraint the agents’ behaviour. Hence,
the problem arises when there are both an asymmetric information and diverging
goals: “Conflicting objectives and decentralized information are thus the two basic
ingredients of incentive theory” (Laffont and Martimort, 2009).
Contrary to the Transaction Cost Theory presented below, which assumes that
economic agents are boundedly rational, the incentive theory keeps the neo-classical
assumption of a perfect rationality of the individuals: albeit the future is uncertain,
the agents are expected to be able to identify all possible evolutions of the situation,
as well as their respective probabilities. However, whereas the Principal has a perfect
knowledge of the game, he lacks the knowledge of the choices actually made by the
Agent. In other words, the incentive theory assumes an asymmetry of the informa-
tion that can consist in a lack of knowledge on either the characteristics of the Agent
(adverse selection), or her behaviour (moral hazard). This asymmetry of information
creates an informational rent for the Agent. Hence, the goal of the incentive theory
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is to determine by what means the Principal can incite the Agent to reveal the pri-
vate information he has and/or to act in a manner that maximizes the Principal’s
utility. “The incentive theory helps to understand to what extent the contract allows
to solve conflicts of interest between the organization as a whole and the individuals
who compose her” (Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2005).
A possible solution to the puzzle of asymmetric information (second best optimum)
is to share the informational rent, in order to incite the agent to share his private
information. The principal can present a finite set of contracts, while anticipating that
the agent will choose the contract that maximizes his own utility (that is, the principal
acts as a Stackelberg leader). In this case, problems arising from renegotiation can be
avoided. This however presupposes that there exists a legal framework that allows to
enforce the contract, and that the principal is able to evaluate the agent’s response
function (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).
A generalization of the principal-agent framework is sketched by Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991), who study the case of an agent who has to perform several different
tasks, or one single task with several dimensions. In this context, Holmstrom and
Milgrom show that an incentive scheme based on performance may lead the agent
to make too much effort for the observable task, and to provide a suboptimal level
of effort for the unobservable task or dimension. This could lead the cure (that is,
the incentive scheme) to be worse than the disease. As an example, they mention
the case of a teacher who has to provide his students some qualifications that are
measurable in tests (“basic skills”), and some other that are not measurable (e.g
creativity, curiosity): such an incentive scheme may lead the teacher to pay too much
effort on the former at the expense of the latter. Another case is that of an agent
who has to operate an infrastructure (owned by the principal) in order to produce
an output (measurable task) but simultaneously has to maintain and improve this
infrastructure (unmeasurable task). The operator is incited to overuse the asset in
order to maximize his production, without considering its final value. This highlights
the importance of ownership in an agency relationship, an issue that will be analysed
deeply by the property rights theory (see below in Section 1.1). For the authors:
“This result may explain a substantial part of the puzzle of why incentive clauses are
so much less common than one-dimensional theories would predict”.
The Incentive Theory is mostly normative and has been the subject of quite few
empirical verifications. Empirical literature include Lazear (2000), who considers the
impact of performance pay on workers’ productivity in a car windshields manufacture.
They show that the replacement of hourly wages by piece-rate pay lead to an increase
of the productivity of 44 percent. About one half of this effect is due to incentive
effects, the other half to a positive workers selections (more productive workers have
been hired). However, an adverse effect on quality has been observed. This last
point is in line with the model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991): as the task had
an observed part (the quantity) and an unobserved part (the quality), the agents
sacrificed the latter for the former.
Another empirical study in line with Holmstrom and Milgrom’s multi-tasking
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model is that of Brickley and Zimmerman (2001), who consider the case of the intro-
duction of a new incentive scheme in a top-tier business school at Rochester Univer-
sity in the 1990’s. This incentive scheme consisted in linking the wage of the faculties
with a set of measures of the quality of the teaching they provided. Consistently with
Holmstrom and Milgrom’s expectations, this lead to an improvement of the quality
of teaching, at the expense of the research output.
By its very nature, the Incentive theory still does not explain the make-or-buy
decision, as it does not consider that there is a difference between make or buy.
On the contrary, it limits itself to find a way to improve the efficiency, for a given
organization. In other words, the issues raised by the Incentive theory are subsequent
to the make-or-buy decision. Even though differences in the difficulty of providing the
right incentives dramatically affects the relative efficiency of different organizational
choices, which in turn should influence the make-or-buy decision, this important issue
has not been considered by the incentive literature. As noted by Malin and Martimort
(2000): “Incentive theory has nothing to say about such things as the distribution
of authority within an organization, the limits of the firm, the separation between the
public and the private spheres of the economy, and more generally nothing to say about
organizational forms and designs”.
1.2 The Transaction Cost Theory
1.2.1 Coase: Why do firms exist ?
In the previous sections, we have seen that neither the neo-classical economics nor
the incentive theory ask the very question of the existence of the firm. On the contrary,
this question is at the heart of the Transaction Cost theory, whose foundations are
however older than the incentive theory.
In his seminal paper, Coase (1937) asks three questions, namely: why do firms exist,
what is a firm, and which trade-offs determine the boundaries of the firm. Doing so,
he lays the foundations for what is to become the Transaction Cost Theory. He
introduces the concept of transaction costs as a means to explain the existence and
the boundaries of the firm. The cornerstone of this approach is that, as there exist
frictions in physical systems, there also exist frictions in the market. These frictions
— transaction costs — make it costly to recourse to the market price mechanism, and
hence explain why it is profitable to integrate some activities in a formal structure, that
is, a firm. The advantage of hierarchy is that is allows to avoid the transaction costs.
Indeed. in a firm, the authority of the entrepreneur replaces the price mechanism
as a coordination mode: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X,
he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do
so.” Coase (1937). Every time a hierarchical superior orders a subordinate to do
something, he has not to negotiate, or to write a specific contract for this task, which
would generate transaction costs. Neither has he to anticipate the future evolutions
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of the situation: if the situation changes, he can simply change his orders and impose
them to the subordinate, to the extent that it corresponds to the employment contract.
According to Coase, transaction costs can be explained by several factors. First,
relaxing the assumption of full and relevant information, the functioning of the market
price mechanism (i.e. the buy) is costly, as it incurs a cost for the agents to get the
relevant information they base their decisions on. Secondly, there are significant
costs related to the process of negotiating a contract at each stage of the production.
Moreover, these costs tend to increase along with uncertainty. Even in a world without
uncertainty, the complexity of the available information is so huge that the agents are
not able to use it appropriately; this issue is known as bounded rationality and will
receive further attention by Simon (Simon, 1955; Simon, 1961; Simon, 1978). Finally,
enforcing a contract is also costly, as each party has to monitor the activity of the
other one.
However, if the buy generates transaction costs, the make also incur specific costs,
that are internal to the firm. These governance costs are the costs related to the
management of the firm, to the control of the efforts and the performance of the
subordinates, but also the risks that the entrepreneur, who has bounded rationality,
makes mistakes and takes bad decisions. As Coase (1937) notes: “it may be that as the
transactions which are organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors
of production in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best
use of the factors of production”, and concludes that “firm will tend to be larger the
less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistake.”
Hence, there is a trade-off between the integration (the firm, make) and the de-
centralization (the market, buy). Both coordination mechanisms are costly, and what
determines the choice between market and integration will be the relative level of these
two kinds of costs. For a given task, if the bureaucratic costs (the costs that occur
within the firm) exceed the transaction costs (the costs of the market mechanism), it
is profitable to integrate the activity in the firm. Otherwise, it is profitable to let the
market performing this task.
Albeit Coase built the theoretical foundations of a transaction cost based analysis
of the firm, thus opening the black box of the firm, it was only in the years 1970’s
that the literature explored the very nature of the transaction costs and of their
determinants. This analysis is crucial, as the determinants of the transaction costs
are in fine determinants of the make-or-buy decision.
1.2.2 Williamson: The Transaction-Cost Theory
Underlying hypotheses
Coase’s framework has been broadly extended by Oliver Williamson1, whose frame-
work relies on human (behavioural) and environmental issues. The former are based
first on bounded rationality and secondly on the concept of opportunism, i.e. a partic-
ular form of personal interest seeking characterised by a component of deceit, which
1Above all Williamson (1975), Williamson (1981) and Williamson (1985).
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can take the form of theft, cheating and/or lies, but also on mechanisms of adverse
selection and moral hazard (Williamson, 1985).
Bounded rationality is not a problem per se when the world is certain. Indeed,
bounded rationality is a limit in the ability of an individual to tackle the complexity
of the environment. When the world is certain, the individuals do not reach the
boundaries of their rationality (Williamson, 1975; Saussier and Yvrande-Billon, 2007).
By contrast, the presence of uncertainty and bounded rationality leads the con-
tracts to be incomplete. Once again, the fact that a contract is incomplete is not a
problem as long as the agents are benevolent: assuming boundedly rational but benev-
olent agents, is is not necessary to stipulate a perfect contract, since parties will not
take profit from contractual loopholes but will fill in of contractual omissions without
seeking an undue advantage. By contrast, assuming opportunistic but unboundedly
rational agents, it won’t be costly to fix binding rules in perfect contracts, that is, to
tie the hands of opportunistic contractors. In other words, bounded rationality makes
contractual complexity costly whereas opportunistic behaviour makes it necessary.
However, the existence of a competitive market may allow to reduce these transaction
costs, as it makes it possible to replace a contractor that behaves opportunistically,
but also to use benchmarking or yardstick competition to compensate the bounded ra-
tionality. Hence, the fourth condition for the existence of transaction costs is the small
number relationship. Small number relationship leads the contractual relationship to
be specific, so that it is costly for one party to end up the contract. The consequence
is that it is not possible to sanction a party for behaving opportunistically. It is only
when these four conditions are present — bounded rationality, uncertainty, oppor-
tunism, and small number relationship — that transaction costs arise, and that it
may be profitable to internalize rather than resorting to the market.
Determinants of transaction costs
The next step of the analysis is then to operationalize these four factors and to identify
the very determinants of transaction costs. Two main determinants are relevant,
namely uncertainty, and asset specificity.
A higher level of uncertainty on the future evolutions of the world makes it im-
possible to stipulate a complete contract. Hence, this concept is closely related with
the assumption of bounded rationality: if the world is uncertain, but the agents are
perfectly rational, they are still able to evaluate all possible (contingent) evolutions
of the world and to write a complete contract, so as to constraint the actions of the
other party, whatever the state of nature. Uncertainty creates a typical principal-
agent problem, relying on asymmetric information, namely the difficulty of measuring
the outcome and assessing it. Uncertainty may cause contracting difficulties in so
far it allows opportunistic agents to take profit from information asymmetries or
from the result of changing circumstances. As a result of this, the transaction-cost
theory expects every factor leading to an increasing uncertainty to foster the make
decision, ceteris paribus. It follows that the more difficult it is for the principal to
specify precisely ex ante in the contract relevant and measurable properties of the
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outcome, the higher will be the incentive to adopt a dishonest behaviour (Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972). Moreover, a weak measurability also means that ex post con-
trol mechanisms will be costly, while at the same time being necessary because of
opportunism. As a consequence, measuring difficulty is a parameter which facilitates
opportunistic behaviour, and thus increases transaction costs.
Whatever the ease or difficulty of measurement, the most important factor which
facilitates opportunism in situations of small number relationship is the so-called hold
up problem (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 1985).
This problem occurs when a party would incur a significant loss if the other party
withdrew from the contract. In that case, the latter would be able to behave oppor-
tunistically, putting pressure on the former to obtain some advantages and threaten-
ing it to terminate the contract if it does not accept to renegotiate the conditions.
This ex post asymmetry in bargaining power can occur when one party has done
an important investment in specific assets, that is to say human or physical cap-
ital whose productivity would be significantly lower when used for purposes other
than those initially intended. In this way, this investment will be a sunk cost for
the firm which has made it. Asset specificity may include the following components
(Williamson, 1981; Williamson, 1985):
1. Site specificity manifests itself when the production requires the use of one
or several assets which cannot be relocated, or might only be relocated with
exorbitant costs, and when the distance between the asset and the consumer or
another infrastructure matters. That is the case for example when successive
stages of production are concentrated in a limited area.
2. Physical asset specificity means that a physical asset, albeit possibly mobile,
has properties specially designed for the purpose stated in the contract, meaning
that the productivity gains due to those properties will be lost when using
the asset for any other purposes. An example is specific purpose software or
machines.
3. Human asset specificity means that employees developed specialised skills
acquired by a training or by the experience but cannot use those skills when
making another job. This concept of industry- or firm-specific human capital is
very common in labour economics.
4. Dedicated assets are assets which are technically non specific, but were created
for the production of a given good or service. If the production of this good
or service were stopped, there would be a production overcapacity causing this
asset not to be used any more, or to be used with a lower productivity. It is the
case if an asset, for example a plant, is constructed or expanded to satisfy the
demand of a unique customer.
5. Temporal specificity (Williamson, 1999b) occur when the different stages of
the production process have to be synchronized.
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6. Brand name (Williamson, 1993a) include the added value of all non-material
elements that increase the value of the asset, as for example a good reputation.
Asset specificity constitutes barriers to entry and/or to exit which that lock the
parties in a bilateral dependency that may allow one of the parties to capture a quasi-
rent. Including safeguard clauses (contractual or not) may however limit the risk
of such opportunistic behaviour based on asset specificity. Safeguard clauses consist
in credible commitment and credible threats (“unilateral efforts to preempt an ad-
vantage” (Williamson, 1985)) that makes it profitable for the parties not to behave
opportunistically. As an example of credible threat, the parties may stipulate a con-
tractual penalty clause which deters a party to rescind the contract before its term2.
On the contrary, credible commitments aim to create a relationship of trust and rely
on “a contract in which a promisee is reliably compensated should the promisor prema-
turely terminate or otherwise alter the agreement.”(Williamson, 1996, p.377). Such is
the case, for example, when both parties have invested in a specific asset: both have
an incentive to maintain the contract until its term, and even to renew it, because
both would incur sunk costs if the contract were terminated prematurely. With such
an exchange of hostages, the contractual relationship moves from unilateral to bilat-
eral dependency, in other words from a virtual monopsonistic market to a bilateral
monopoly. Obviously, this however opens the field for strategical games. Safeguard
clauses may also include bonuses for good performance, means of dispute resolution
(e.g arbitration), or mechanisms of adaptation in case of unforeseen circumstances.
An alternative to safeguard clauses is the neoclassical contract (relational con-
tract), whose goal is not to specify the transaction per se, but to specify how the
contract will evolute. In the case of a neoclassical contract, a relationship of trust
comes from the fact that the parties always acted fairly and honestly in the past,
allowing the control mechanisms to be loosen, and thus the transaction costs to be
reduced. In that case, as the identity of the parties matter, both parties would suf-
fer from the termination of this trust-based contractual relationship. In this regard,
the neoclassical contract can be considered as an hybrid solution between hierarchy
(vertical integration) and market.
The empirical literature confirms the importance of these factors in the make-or-
buy decision of firms3. In a study of a sample of tasks and components of a naval
shipbuilder, Masten, Meehan and Snyder (1991) show a large impact of temporal
specificity on the make-or-buy decision, but also a significant impact of human capital
specificity. In addition, they show that outsourcing the production of a component
that ought to be internalized (misalignment) leads to an increase of up to 70 percent
of the organization costs.
Grady (1988) in the case of railroads in the 19th century in New Jersey, and Levy
and Spiller (1994) in the case of telecommunications, show that credible commitment
2However, in that case the bargaining advantage of the buyer still remains at the term of the
contract. Long-term contracts can allow him to amortize the sunk costs, but they are also subject
to more uncertainty (and bounded rationality), which in turn increases the transaction costs.
3See Masten and Saussier (2000) for a survey of empirical research on the way asset specificity
influences the contractual design.
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allows the agents to engage in a contractual relationship despite the existence of
specific assets. In the same vein, Joskow (1985; 1987) show that firms in the coal
industry — an industry marked by a strong site specificity, as well as physical capital
specificity — prefer to stipulate longer contracts (rather than having to renegotiate
frequently new contracts) when asset specificity is high.
Using data on the organizational choices of the automobile manufacturers Ford and
General Motors in 1976 for 113 automotive components, Monteverde and Teece (1982)
show that components that are specific to one manufacturer are more frequently inte-
grated within the firm. They conclude that “General Motors and Ford are more likely
to bring component design and manufacturing in-house if relying on suppliers for pre-
production development service will provide suppliers with an exploitable advantage.”
Limits of the TCT
Several limitations of the TCT can be highlighted. First, the hypothesis of oppor-
tunism, which is central in TCT, has been called into question, among others by
Ghoshal and Moran (1996), who consider that the opportunism assumption made by
Williamson is extreme, as it attributes too much weight on a rather phenomenon that
is too seldom to justify the existence of transaction costs. Ghoshal and Moran (1996)
suggest that:“By incorporating opportunism as an attitudinal variable, which is con-
ceptually separate and distinct from its behavioural manifestation, the predicted power
of the theory can be broadened to cover more firms and different types of market.”
The concept of bounded rationality has also been criticized. For Dow (1987),
there is a hiatus between the between the fact that bounded rationality is a necessary
assumption to explain transaction costs, and the fact that rational choices are made
regarding the contracts and governance structures. In addition, as we have seen
above, the TCT considers that bounded rationality is not a problem when there is
no uncertainty. However, this hypothesis is restrictive, as bounded rationality may
also have effects in a world that is certain, but very complex (Saussier and Yvrande-
Billon, 2007). This can be illustrated by the game of chess: albeit the environment is
certain, its huge complexity makes the bounded rationality of the players relevant.
Finally, TCT does not allow to explain the existence of some alternative orga-
nization forms, such as network organizations. In this kind of organizations, the
coordination mechanism is neither the price (as in the buy), nor hierarchy (as in the
make), but mutual trust. The economic exchange turns to a social exchange. An
example of such networks is the Keiretsu conglomerates, which are a very important
part of the industry in Japan. In these networks, the involved firms have incentives to
maintain the relationship, not because it would be costly for them to end a contract,
but because there is a more general, social interest that dominates and that fosters
the search for compromises rather than disputes.
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1.3 The Incomplete Contract Theory
The incomplete contracts theory has been built on the basis of the Transaction Cost
Theory. According to Grossman and Hart (1986), its goal is to formalize the intuitions
depicted of the TCT, and to provide an answer to the open question of why it is
profitable to organize the transaction inside the firm4: “In particular, given that it is
difficult to write a complete contract between a buyer and seller and this creates room
for opportunistic behavior, the transactions cost-based arguments for integration do
not explain how the scope for such behavior changes when one of the self-interested
owners becomes an equally self-interested employee of the other owner.”
As an essential strand of the Incomplete Contracts Theory, the property rights
theory aims to explain the existence and the boundaries of the firm by an optimal
allocation of the ownership on assets. Ownership over an asset can be defined as:
“the residual control rights [i.e. the rights that cannot be specified in the contract]
over that asset: the right to decide all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent
with a prior contract, custom, or law” (Hart 1995). The firm is hence defined as a set
of (non-human) assets. Three theoretical contributions built the foundations of this
theoretical strand, namely Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and
Hart (1995).
The theoretical model of Grossman and Hart (1986) considers two firms, one of
which sells a good to the other one. Both firms can realize a specific non-verifiable
investment that increases the global surplus. However, the fact that a firm realizes
this investment or not is not contractualizable ex-ante. The timing of the game is the
following: (1) the contract is signed; (2) each firms decides its level of investment; (3)
the contract can be renegotiated without costs (4) each firm realizes its production;
(5) the surplus is shared according to the way stipulated in the contract. The goal
of the model is hence to determine the optimal contract, studying the impact of the
different possible structures of ownership on the investments and hence on the total
surplus5.
The first-best optimum corresponds to the maximization of the total surplus (the
surplus of both firms), which would be obtained if the levels of investment as well
as the actions of both firms were contractualizable. Grossman and Hart show that
this first-best optimum cannot generally be obtained, unless both investments only
have a minimal impact on the surplus. When this is not the case, each firm chooses
a level of investment that maximizes its own surplus, which leads to non-optimal
investments at the Nash equilibrium. The ownership structure leading to a second-
best equilibrium depends on the impact of each investment on the total surplus. When
the investments realized by both firms have a quite similar impact on the surplus, the
4In the same vein, Williamson (1993b) argues that: “The need, plainly, was to develop formal
models of incomplete contract. That got under way with the publication of the path-breaking paper
by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart”
5As an example, Grossman and Hart mention an electricity generating plant, buying the coal
extracted from a mine. The mine can realize an investment that makes it possible to remove some
impurities from the coal, which in turn increases the yield of the electricity plant. As there exist a
large variety of impurities, it is not possible to write a contingent contract on the quality of the coal.
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second-best optimum is obtained when the firms are not integrated. When on the
contrary the investment of one firm has a significantly stronger impact than the other
on the surplus, it is socially profitable that the former has the property rights6.
The figure 1.1 illustrates the predictions of the GH model (MacLeod, 2014). The
x-axis shows the relative importance of the specific investments of two agents, namely
the Principal (P), and the Contractor (C). This relative importance is measured by
the parameter λ: λ = 1 means that the principal’s investment (Asset 1) is the only
relationship-specific investment, whereas λ = 0 means that the contractor’s invest-
ment (Asset 2) is the only relationship-specific investment. The y-axis measures the
welfare. The top dotted line represents the Coasean efficient solution in absence of
transaction costs. The three other curves WNI(λ), WP (λ), and WC(λ) show the re-
spective payoffs in the Grossman-Hart framework under non-integration, and under
ownership by each of the agents. This figure shows that it is profitable that the
residual control rights belong to the agent whose investment is the more specific to
the relationship when the differences are substantial: at λ1, the contractor has more
relationship-specific assets that the principal, in this case, the residual control rights
should belong to the contractor (C-integration). By contrast, at λ3, the contractor
has less relationship-specific assets that the principal, in this case, the residual con-
trol rights should belong to the principal (P-integration). Finally, when the relative
importance of both investments is close (as it is the case at λ2), it is profitable not to
integrate.
Hart and Moore refine this analysis, allowing the ownership to be shared between
several agents, and considering the impact of ownership (i.e. the identity of the
owner) on the employees’ incentives. Their model consists in a set of assets, and a set
of individuals who can (but have not to) make a specific, non-verifiable investment
(e.g in human capital) at time 0. At time 1, the agents form coalitions to use the
assets they own. At the end of the game, the surplus is shared between the members
of the coalitions. The authors show that when only one agent makes an investment, he
should own all the assets; similarly, an agent who makes no investment should own no
asset. Another important result is that the control over an asset should not be shared
between several agents. An agent should own the assets to which he is indispensable,
that is, assets that do not increase the value of investment in a coalition the agent
does not belong to. Finally, complementary assets should belong to the same agent
or coalition.
The property right literature considers that the governance of a firm is quasi
identical to that of the market. For Hart and Moore (1990), the difference is that
a firm that hires workers to perform a task (that is, a firm that integrates the task,
make) can fire the only workers who do not their job properly, whereas if it stipulates
a contract with another firm (non-integration, buy) it has no choice but firing the
entire contractor firm.
Some criticisms have been addressed to the Incomplete Contracts Theory. Maskin
and Tirole (1999) and Maskin (2002) call into question the existence of transaction
6For a numeric example, see Aghion and Holden (2011).
46
Source: MacLeod (2014)
Figure 1.1: Predictions of the model of Grossman and Hart (1986)
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costs sufficiently important to create contractual incompleteness. For them, even
boundedly rational agents are sufficiently rational to make these transaction costs
irrelevant. It should be sufficient for the agents to be able to specify ex-ante at
least the payoffs of each contingency, without having to consider the possible physical
contingencies. In other words, the so-called irrelevance theorem7 states that a contract
over the payoffs of each state of the world is feasible, and is equivalent to a complete
contingent contract (see also Sappington and Stiglitz (1987)).
Tirole (1999) notes the lack of a clear definition of incomplete contracts in the
literature: “While one recognizes one when one sees it, incomplete contracts are not
members of a well-circumscribed family; at this stage an incomplete contract is rather
defined as an ad hoc restriction on the set of feasible contracts in a given model”. He
also notes that “By lack of a better definition, we will say that a contract is incomplete
if it does not exhaust the contracting possibilities envisioned in the complete contracting
literature.”
Finally, Williamson (2000) criticizes the fact that the Theory of Incomplete Con-
tracts only considers maladaptations that result from ex-ante investments, while ne-
glecting inefficiencies arising in the execution of the contract.
In addition to these fundamental criticism, another frequent criticism against the
Incomplete Contracts Theory is that its propositions are much difficult to test than
those from the Transaction-Cost Theory (Whinston 2003). For Williamson (2000):
“GHM makes very limited contact with the data whereas [...] TCE is an empirical
success story”. Among the few exceptions, we find the study of Hart et al. (1997)
(see below in Section 1.5) on private prisons in the United States, and the article of
Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2014) on paving contracts.
1.4 Synthesis
In the previous subsections, we discussed the different contract theories. Table 1.1
shows a synthesis of the theories presented above. The starting point was the neo-
classical theory of production which supposes perfect, symmetric information, un-
boundedly rational agents and considers the firm as a black box.
The incentive theory relaxes the hypothesis of symmetric information and allows
the existence of ex-ante (adverse selection) or ex-post asymmetries (moral hazard), yet
the agents are still expected to be perfectly rational. The firm is now a “legal fiction”,
that is, a node of contractual relationships between the Principal and the Agent. The
issue is then to determine a menu of contracts or a remuneration scheme as well as
performance measures that force the agents to reveal their private information, and
to behave in the interest of the principal. However, the Incentive Theory does not
provide a definition of the firm, nor does it explain its boundaries. As noted by Malin
and Martimort (2000): “Incentive theory has nothing to say about such things as the
7“If parties can assign a probability distribution to their possible future payoffs, then the fact that
they cannot describe the possible physical states (e.g, the possible characteristics of the good to be
traded) in advance is irrelevant to welfare. That is, the parties can devise a contract that leaves them
no worse off than were they able to describe the physical states ex ante.” (Maskin, 2002)
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distribution of authority within an organization, the limits of the firm, the separation
between the public and the private spheres of the economy, and more generally nothing
to say about organizational forms and designs.”
By contrast, the cornerstone of the transaction-cost theory is the so-called make-
or-buy decision, that is, the delimitation of the boundaries of the firm. Amongst all
theories of the firm we presented, the transaction-cost theory is the only one who
considers the firm as a real (hierarchical) structure. As in the incentive theory, the
TCT considers that the information is asymmetric. However, the TCT goes a step
further, and considers that the information is also incomplete (uncertainty), and that
the agents are boundedly rational. In addition, two other conditions are necessary for
transaction costs to occur, namely agents’ opportunism, and small number relation-
ship. This results in a trade-off between centripetal forces (transaction costs) that
foster integration, and centrifugal forces (economies of scale, lower governance costs)
that foster contracting-out.
Finally, the incomplete contract theory keeps the TCT hypotheses of bounded
rationality and incomplete information, albeit the information may be symmetric.
However, as in the Incentive theory, the firm does not exist as a structure. In the
incomplete contracts theory, the firm is a set of intangible (non human) assets. The
goal of the incomplete contracts theory is hence to determine which party of the
contract should own these assets, that is, have the residual rights (all rights that are
not specified in the contract) on these assets.
Albeit the bases of the Transaction-Cost Theory and of the Incomplete Contracts
Theory are somewhat different (Kreps, 1996; Tirole, 1999), they do not necessarily
exclude each other. On the contrary, Williamson (2000) argues that: “It is notewor-
thy that Grossman and Hart (and related papers of this kind) work from transaction
cost economics premises — albeit with terminological differences. Thus Grossman and
Hart employ the terms noncontractibility and nonverifiability rather than bounded ra-
tionality. And they refer to ‘relationship-specific investments’ rather than asset speci-
ficity. Unanticipated state realizations, and the need to adapt thereto, are what pose
contractual strains in their model. So uncertainty makes an appearance”.
1.5 Specificities of the make-or-buy Decision for
Public Services
Albeit the three contract theories presented above have originally been developed in
the private sector, most of their concerns can easily be transposed to relationships
involving the public sector. In particular, transaction cost issues are as much relevant
in the case of the make-or-buy decision of a public authority for a public service as
they are in the case of the make-or-buy decision of a firm. Contractual hazards are
still the cornerstone of the make-or-buy decision (Williamson, 1979). In addition to
the framework of the contract theories presented above, which is valid both in the
private and in the public case, the analysis of the make-or-buy decision for public
services is influenced by some factors that are more specific to the very case of the
49
Table 1.1: The theories of contracts
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public sector.
1.5.1 Specificities of the Public Sector
The first important issue that is relevant for the make-or-buy decision for public
services is the specificities of the public sector and its internal organization. Several
characteristics of the public sector affect the efficiency of the make, and hence may
foster the buy.
First, the economies of scale and the lack of know-how that contribute to justify
the buy in an industrial context are usually stronger in the case of public service,
particularly at the regional and local levels. Indeed, public administrations are all-
purpose structures, who deliver a very large amount of very different services. In this
case, it is very difficult to be able to reach productive efficiency in such a large number
of domains. By contrast, private firms are more specialized in a smaller number of
tasks, which allow them to acquire a better know-how, as well as to generate economies
of scales.
Secondly, the private sector is generally best able to manage (and to pool) some
risks than the public sector. Competition in the private sector also allows to make it
more efficient than public local monopolies.
Another specific feature of the public sector is the fact that its activities are more
under scrutiny than the activities of the private sector. Political opponents and inter-
est groups, but also the citizens, maintain a strong monitoring of the activities of the
government and of the whole public sector. In particular, contracts between the public
sector and the private sector (Spiller, 2008; Moszoro and Spiller, 2012; Moszoro and
Spiller, 2014) — and even more public–public contracts (Moszoro and Spiller, 2014)
— are more strongly monitored than private–private contracts. As Beuve, Moszoro
and Saussier (2015) note: “Public contracting [...] is characterized by formalized,
standardized, bureaucratic, and rigid procedures, partly because politics must be se-
cured against third-party opportunism.”. In a study on 396 private–private and 141
private–public car park contracts signed between 1985 and 2009 in France, Beuve et
al. (2015) show that political contestability lead the arrangements between the public
and the private sector to be more rigid that pure private contracts.
Finally, another feature of the public sector is bureaucracy. In a general sense,
Weber (1922) defines bureaucracy as an organizational mode characterized primarily
by impersonality (duties are related to the position instead of the persons), hierarchy,
division of labor, contractual relationships, a selection of officials based on techni-
cal qualification, fixed salaries, full-time employment, promotions in the hierarchy
according to the achievements, a separation between office property and personal
property and finally a strong discipline. Bureaucracy, from the perspective of Weber,
is supposed to be an ideal, rational organizational mode. The bureaucracy and the
associated hierarchy may be considered as a means of reducing principal-agent prob-
lems, by constraining the choices of the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Whereas
Weber supposed the bureaucracy to improve the rationality and the efficiency of an
organization, Crozier (1963) distinguishes the bureaucracy–rational organization and
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the bureaucracy–dysfunction. The latter is a consequence of the so-called bureaucratic
vicious circles8. One vicious circle, sketched out by Gouldner (1954), occurs when the
presence of strict controls provokes a lower motivation of the officials, which in turn
triggers stricter controls. Thus, the Weberian bureaucracy induces a strong rigidity
of the management, which works against the objective of efficiency, slowing down
the decision-making. Furthermore, the bureaucratic organization suffers from poor
incentives to be efficient, as sketched out by Wildavsky (1964) and Warren (1975):
bureaucratic systems, especially in public administrations, are subject to perverse in-
centives in their budgetary process. Indeed, the officials are incented to use every year
the totality of their budget, knowing that if they do not so, the budget of the follow-
ing year is susceptible to be cut back. This may lead to unnecessary expenditure. In
addition to the drawbacks of an highly bureaucratic system, the public bureaucracy
induces even lower incentives to be efficient, as it relies on a promotion scheme which,
contrary to the ideal Weberian model, is not (only) based on performance but also,
and mainly, on seniority. As a result, the provision of public services by State officials
is supposed to be inefficient, as the public administration is by nature highly bureau-
cratical. However, even assuming that New Public Management measures increase
the efficiency of public provision, and thus reduce the propensity to contract-out, this
effect may be mitigated by the fact that the municipalities that privileges contracting-
out for ideological reasons are to a certain extent the same that establish NPM policy.
In addition to the transaction costs related issues presented above, another source of
inefficiency may come from the lack of competition of the private market. A large
empirical literature supports the intuitive fact that the degree of competition of the
private market is a key issue affecting the relative cost-efficiency of public and private
procurement. Numerous studies show that in the best case, a non-competitive mar-
ket, even if it is regulated, does not provide the service at a lower cost than a public
provider (Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Logan, 1985; Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1986; Kay and
Thompson, 1986; Parker, 1995; Wallsten, 2001; Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2008).
In the worst case, the private mono- or oligopolist is clearly less cost-efficient than the
public provider. As sketched out by Werkman and Westerling (2000): “The most im-
portant influence on the performance of an enterprise from the standpoint of efficiency
is competition – not public or private ownership”. Brown and Potoski (2003) included
this factor in their analysis of the size of the cities and their urban status, regardless
of the service. However, the degree of competition also depends on service character-
istics: even small rural municipalities may have access to a very competitive market
for certain services, whereas some other services face a monopolistic market even for
large cities. This is particularly important in Switzerland, due to the smallness of the
distances between municipalities.
8“A bureaucratic organization is an organization which is based on the existence of a series of
rather stable vicious circles, which develop from the climate of impersonality and centralization.”
(Crozier, 1963, p.237)
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1.5.2 Specificities of public deciders
When translating the make-or-buy framework from the industry to the public sector,
the personality of the deciders becomes a critically important issue. In the case
of the make-or-buy decision for a firm, it is reasonable to assume that there is a
convergence of goals between the decider and the firm. When the decider is a political
authority, this assumption becomes heroic. For Stigler (1971, p.3): “[P]olitics is an
imponderable, a constantly and unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of the most
diverse nature, comprehending acts of great moral virtue [...] and the most vulgar
venality.”. Finally, Spiller (2008) considers that: “A fundamental difference between
private and public contracts is that public contracts are in the public sphere, and
thus, although politics is normally not necessary to understand private contracting, it
becomes fundamental to understanding public contracting”.
Ideology-driven decision making
The first source of deviation between the social optimum and the decisions taken by
the authority comes from the fact that elected politicians may base their decisions not
only on pragmatic efficiency considerations, but also on their ideological point of view.
In this context, we still assume that politicians are benevolent social planners who
do not move away deliberately from general interest objectives, but whose analysis of
the pros and cons of policies is distorted by their political opinions. This can lead
them to contract out public services despite significant risks and drawbacks, or on the
contrary to refuse to contract-out a service albeit this would increase the efficiency
and the social welfare. Consequently, the ideological bias may act towards public
provision (make) as well as towards contracting out (buy).
Rent seeking
The cornerstone of rent seeking theories rely on relaxing the assumption that civil
servants and policy makers are benevolent agents who seek selflessly to serve the
interests of the citizens. On the contrary, Public Choice advocates (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Niskanen, 1971) assume that elected politicians are selfish profit max-
imisers whose goal is to capture a rent while ensuring their reelection. From that
perspective, policy makers may be alienated from contacting out public services, in so
far they would lose the ability to hire political friends or relatives (the so-called crony-
ism or nepotism) or to use public policies to favour prospective electors (clientelism or
patronage). This is supposed to cause policy makers to seek to maximize their sphere
of influence (Boycko et al., 1996), which may induce a bias towards public provision
(Lo´pez-de-Silanes et al., 1997). The bias induced by rent-seeking may however also
play in favour of contracting-out: policy makers may decide to contract-out in order
to favour a particular firm, either for clientelism, or to receive bribes.
Finally, rent-seeking may be connected with the political agenda. As policy-makers
want to be re-elected, they have incentives to develop new infrastructures, rather
than to maintain existing infrastructures, as new realizations have usually a positive
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impact on the image. This may lead the authorities to build white elephants, that is,
infrastructure whose costs (building, maintenance, or operation) clearly exceed their
social utility (Engel et al., 2009).
1.5.3 Specificities of public services
Finally, the last specificity of the make-or-buy decision for public services is the very
nature of these services.
First, public services may be very complex. Most of the time, a public service
consists in several tasks, that are more or less independent from each other. This
complexity significantly increases the contractual difficulty. An example is provided
by the study of Hart et al. (1997) in the case of prisons in the United States. Whereas
the vast majority of prisons are publicly owned and provided, the number of private
prisons has strongly increased during the years 1980s and 1990s, with a forty-fold
increase of the capacity between 1985 and 1994. Private prisons generate huge cost
reductions (about 10 percent per prisoner), mainly by hiring under-qualified warders.
The corollary is that private prisons experience more problems than public ones, in
terms of injuries to staff and prisoners, as well as uses of force. This suggests that
prisons fit in with the hypotheses of the model presented above (incomplete contract,
cost reduction at the expense of quality). Consistently with the fact that contracting
should be preferred for less complex tasks, the authors observe that private prisons
are mostly youth correctional facilities, where the adverse effects of cost reduction
on quality are the lowest, and almost never high security prisons. By contrast, some
public services may be quite easy to contract-out. Garbage collection is a good ex-
ample: contrary to the case of prisons, it is unlikely that a cost reduction in the
qualification of workers will affect significantly the quality of the service. It follows
that contracting-out is more appropriate in this case.
Another characteristic of public services is the need for continuity. This gives an
important power to a private contractor This impact is increased by the fact that
the nature of public service is often very sensitive. For some services (e.g health),
the consequences of an interruption of the delivery could have dramatic consequences.
This makes the use of sanctions less likely, and hence decreases the credibility of
threats.
In addition, the fact that contracts regarding the provision of public services are
usually long-term contracts generate a need for adaptability, which in turn makes it
impossible (and inefficient) to write rigid complete contracts. However, this need for
flexibility also generates higher contractual risks (Athias, 2009; Athias, 2013b).
Finally, Williamson (1999a) develops the concept of probity to tackle the issue of
sovereign tasks. Indeed, contrary to Wilson (1989), who considers that some tasks
should be performed by the public sector, “[not because] the Government is cheaper or
more efficient, but because it alone embodies the public authority”, Williamson shows
that the rationale for the government to fulfil these tasks also relies on efficiency
considerations. To do this, he uses a transaction-cost approach to explain why public
procurement is the best way to pursue sovereign tasks. He illustrates this approach
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with the case of Foreign affairs. For Williamson, the main element that created
transaction costs in this case is the need for probity. Albeit probity is important in
all kinds of transactions, it becomes particularly crucial in the case of Foreign affairs.
Indeed, the consequences of a lack of probity in the fulfilling of these tasks would
be particularly severe. For this reason, no pecuniary penalty would be sufficient to
mitigate the risk of a lack of probity (e.g. inexcusable incompetence or betrayal).
Hence, contracting-out for such tasks would lead to transaction costs so huge that
public procurement is the only efficient way to provide these services.
In another vein, Hart et al. (1997) adapt the property rights framework to public
services. They show that, when the quality is noncontractible, the private providers
tend to over-reduce the costs, since they do not take into account the fact that reducing
the costs leads to lowering the quality.
1.6 Empirical analysis of the make-or-buy decision
of public authorities
We have seen above that the Transaction-Cost theory was, among the three theories
of the firm, the one which was best suited for an empirical analysis of the make-or-buy
decision of firms. For the same reasons, the TCT is also the most appropriate for an
empirical analysis of the make-or-buy decision of public authorities. For these reasons,
the largest part of the empirical literature considers either TCT determinants and/or
Public choice determinants.
1.6.1 Transaction Cost Determinants and Efficiency Consid-
erations
Williamson (1976) aims to study the consequences of franchise bidding as a means
for providing a good that has characteristics of a natural monopoly. Studying the
supply of cable television services (CATV) in the years 1970’s, he shows that the
recourse to franchise bidding to provide these services is highly problematic, insofar
these services have characteristics (complexity of the service, strong uncertainty on
the future demand, as well as on the future evolutions of technology) that are ex-
pected to generate high transaction costs. In the particular case of the contract for
the provision of CATV services in the city of Oackland, California, the city faced a
strongly opportunistic behaviour of the private firm that won the bid, and had to
accept to renegotiate several points of the contract. Whereas the study of Williamson
considered the ex-post consequences of transaction costs on contracts for the pro-
vision of public services, the first empirical study to apply a TCT approach to the
(ex-ante) determinants of the make-or-buy decision of public authorities is that of
Pouder (1996), who paid attention to specific assets and contracting difficulty (task
difficulty, quality assessment). Their identification strategy consisted in regressing (for
10 services in 88 U.S. local governments) the share of the service that is privatized as
a function of explanatory variables measuring asset specificity, contracting difficulty,
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and uncertainty9 as well as institutional variables (municipality control variables as
the share of unionised employees, the fact that local managers are professionals and
the fact that the municipality is member of a Conference of Municipalities), plus a
set of control variables. Pouder’s results show significant effects in line with the TCT
regarding specific assets. The results regarding contracting difficulty are for their
part not conclusive. Furthermore, this study mixes up specific human capital with
high skills (which encompass both general and specific human capital), and physical
specific assets with specialized equipment (which might be redeployed, contrary to
specific assets). Finally, the use of OLS regression with a percentage — and thus
truncated — dependent variable may provide biased results.
In a study based on a sample of 64 services in 1449 U.S. cities, Brown and Potoski
(2003) use a multinomial-logit approach to explain the determinants of the choice be-
tween internal production and four possibles modes of contracting (joint contracting,
contract with other Governments, contract with private firms and contract with non-
profits). As in Pouder’s study, asset specificity and contracting difficulty (here proxied
by service measurability) are measured using survey data: 75 randomly selected U.S.
mayors and city managers had to evaluate, for each of the 64 considered services, the
levels of asset specificity and service measurability (on a Likert-scale), after having
read a short description of these two concepts. Like Pouder, Brown and Potoski found
a negative relationship between the asset specificity related to a given service and the
propensity of the cities to contract out with private firms the provision of the service
in question. Moreover, they show that higher difficulties in measuring the quality of a
service fosters a production by the public sector through an increase in the propensity
to stipulate contracts with other governments.
Me´nard and Saussier (2000) study the contractual arrangements made in 2109
Water Supplying Units (WSU) in France between 1993 and 1995, covering more than
70 percent of the total population. This study does not only aim to distinguish
make and buy, but also to distinguish between types of contractual arrangements
that give more or less power to the private sector, namely lease contracts (in which
a private operator operates a publicly owned infrastructure and bears the operation
risks, whereas the public authority still bears the financial risks) and concessions
(in which the operator realizes the investments, and hence bears both risks). Some
important features made the conditions of the delivery very different from one WSU
to another. First, some WSUs had underground water, whereas the other had surface
water. Secondly, the quality of the water strongly varied from one WSU to another.
Underground water as well as bad quality water generate needs for specific assets.
Whereas it was expected than bad quality sources should lead to less contracting-out
9These variables have been constructed using a questionnaire sent to a panel of 19 respondents
(local government managers, faculty members, management PhD students, and experts on local
government). Asset specificity has been captured by four Likert-scale variables: specified human
skills, specialized equipment, supplier competition, and supplier availability. Uncertainty has been
captured by three Likert-scale variables: task difficulty (difficulty to describe and specify the task)
, quality assessment (difficulty for the local manager to define the quality of performance), and
knowledge of service (knowledge and experience of the local manager about what is required to
perform each service).
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(due to higher asset specificity), Me´nard and Saussier observe on the contrary that
bad sources lead to resort to contracting forms that give more power to the private
sector. They explain this result by the fact that local jurisdictions have not the
required know-how to manage such complex cases. The efficiency gains hence more
than compensated the transaction costs. The fact that a source is underground has
for its part no impact.
In their study of municipal water services in France, Chong, Saussier and Silverman
(2015) show for their part that the threat of contracting back-in the services — that is,
not renewing the contract at its end — allows larger municipalities (the most attractive
clients) to avoid opportunistic behaviours (excessive prices) from the franchisees. This
partially explains why private provision is more expensive than public provision, and
why this differential is larger in municipalities with less than 10’000 inhabitants.
Finally, in a study on the provision of water services in more than 5’000 French
municipalities, Chong, Huet, Saussier and Steiner (2006) show that the characteristics
of these services (weak competition for the field, possible collusion between operators,
possible renegotiation, corruption) lead the prices of provision to be systematically
higher in the case of PPPs than with in-house provision.
1.6.2 Public Choice Determinants
In a study based on 12 services in U.S. counties, Lo´pez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) focused
on the so-called Clean Government Laws (purchasing standards, merit system, prohi-
bition of political activities for civil servants), labour market laws, budget constraints,
as well as ideological issues (fraction of county votes for Republican governor). Using
a probit regression approach (private contracting against in-house provision) and a
multinomial-logit regression (private contracting and no provision against in-house
provision), they find that clean government laws foster contracting out of public ser-
vices. However, they acknowledge that these results are not sufficient to conclude that
clean government laws actually act as a deterrent to political patronage and crony-
ism. The positive correlation between clean government laws and the propensity to
contract-out may also be explained by the fact that these laws in fact increase the cost
of the public procurement, making it less competitive against private procurement.
In their study of the delivery of water services in 734 municipalities in Andalusia
(Spain), Picazo-Tadeo, Gonza´lez-Go´mez, Wanden-Berghe and Ruiz-Villaverde (2012)
aim for their part to refine the analysis of ideological motivations, firstly in taking
into account the political variables when the decision of contracting-out was taken,
instead of when the study was run, secondly in taking into account not only the polit-
ical party which was in power in the municipalities, but also the fact that this party
was in majority or in minority. In addition, they observe the effects of a misalignment
between the political parties in power in the municipality and in the provincial gov-
ernments, that is, if the right parties were in power in the municipality and the left
parties were in power in the provincial government, and vice-versa. They also con-
sider political cycles. This study shows that municipalities governed by center parties
(center-right or center-left) are more prone to contract-out than municipalities gov-
57
erned by right-wing and left-wing parties. This result suggests that the policies of
center-right and center-left parties converge for electoral motives, that is, to be able
to control the center of the political chessboard. This impact does not depend on
whether the governing party has the majority or not. They also show that political
cycles matter: they observe that the probability of contracting-out is bigger in the
second half of the term of office, meaning that the process of contracting-out is mostly
initiated during the first half of the term. This study however lacks from controlling
of the municipal characteristics. As they consider only one service (water delivery),
it would have been useful to take into account technical and geographical parameters
that affect the water distribution, in order to capture the complexity of the task of
delivering water in a particular municipality. These technical determinants may bias
the analysis of political determinants: supposing that in a particular region, the ge-
ographical constraints make the delivery of water particularly complex, and that at
the same time most municipalities of the same region vote for the same party (which
is something quite frequent), the impact of the omitted geographical constraints may
be spuriously captured by the political variable, hence biasing the results.
In their meta-analysis of 32 studies on local government choices for the provision of
public services, Bel and Fageda (2009) note for their part that, in small municipalities,
direct interactions between elected officials and the citizens have a bigger impact than
ideology per se and conclude that there is no evidence for a systematic impact of
ideology on privatization decisions at the local level. They show that the impact of
ideology is more important in bigger municipalities. In the Swiss case that interests
us, these elements are important, as a large fraction of local executive members are not
members of any political party, which means that the argument of direct interactions
between the officials and the citizens will have a great importance, which means that
ideological factors will be expected to have very few impact in the Swiss case. Finally,
Bel and Fageda are rather critical about the empirical strategy used by most studies,
as most studies consider the same geographical area (among the 32 studies considered,
24 concerned the U.S.) at the same period (the years 1980s and 1990s). These studies
hence lack of external validity.
1.6.3 Levin and Tadelis (2010), a Comprehensive Study of
Transaction-Cost and Public Choice Determinants
Whereas Brown and Potoski (2003) focused their analysis of the make-or-buy decision
of public authorities on efficiency considerations, mainly based on the transaction cost
theory, and Lo´pez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) and Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2012) focused on
political considerations, Levin and Tadelis (2010) is the first empirical study on the
make-or-buy decision of public authorities to consider both dimensions.
In order to sketch the hypotheses that will be tested in their empirical study, Levin
and Tadelis construct a theoretical model. The basic framework of this model is that
of a principal (city administrator) who delegated to an agent the delivery of one unit
of a public service. If the principal care about the quality of the service q and the
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costs of provision k, the Principal’s net benefit will be defined as V (q, s)− k, where s
is the principal’s sensitivity to the quality. The principal’s benefit increases with the
quantity Vq(q, s)¿0), the marginal benefit is decreasing in the quantity (Vqq(q, s)¡0),
and a higher sensitivity increases the impact of quality (Vqs(q, s)¡0). The quality is
given by q = (ρ + e)t where ρ > 0 is the baseline productivity, e ≥ 0 is the agent’s
effort intensity, and t ≥ 0 is the time spent by the agent on his job. The agent has
an endowment of T units of time, which can be spent on working (without effort) on
the labour market for a wage r per hour. He also receives a fixed wage w from the
principal. The agent’s utility is: w + (T − t)r − c(e)t.
A contract can contain 3 variables: a minimum amount of time tˆ that must be
spent on job, a minimum quality qˆ, and a wage wˆ that is paid only if the time and
quality standards are fulfilled, that is, if t ≥ tˆ and q ≥ qˆ.
The authors make the assumption that there are transaction costs d(qˆ, m), to
implement qˆ, with m capturing the contracting difficulty, there are no transaction
cost if no standard is specified (d(0,m) = 0). The transaction costs increase in m
(dm > 0) and in qˆ. By contrast, the implementation of tˆ generates almost negligible
transaction costs.
The authors show that an optimal contract either specifies the quality standard
or a time requirement, but not both, and that for any quality level provided, the
payment to the agent in an employment contract (time constraint) is higher than in
a performance contract (quality standard).
Based on these two lemmas, Levin and Tadelis show that: (1) if contracting dif-
ficulty m increases, the principal will be more likely to use an employment contract
(make); (2) if in addition the marginal cost of increasing the is positive then an in-
crease in the sensitivity to the quality s will make the principal more likely to use
an employment contract. These propositions are tested in the empirical part of their
study.
This empirical analysis is based on a cross-section of 64 services 1,043 U.S. cities.
As the dependent variable, three possible modes of provision are considered: in-house
provision (the service is provided by public employees), private contracting (the service
is provided by one or several firms), and public contracting (contracting with another
public authority).
The first important explanatory variable considered by Levin and Tadelis (2010) is
Contracting difficulty. Based on a survey of 23 city managers, this variable combines
three dimensions: the difficulty of performance measurement, the need for flexibility
(i.e. the necessity of future renegotiations), and the difficulty in replacing contrac-
tors (which increases the potential for a hold-up by an opportunistic contractor). In
line with the transaction-cost theory, cities are expected to be less likely to contract
privately services for which it is harder to specify, enforce, or adjust performance
standards, i.e. services whose contracting creates high transaction costs. As small
cities are expected to be less efficient in a traditional in-house procurement (due to
economies of scale), it follows that small cities are expected to be more prone to
contract with other public authorities. However, as they have a lower access to the
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market, they also are expected to contract less with private authorities. These two
reasons also lead the authors to assume that small cities are less responsive to con-
tracting difficulties.
This paper also considers the sensitivity of the residents to the quality of the
services, assuming that cities will be less likely to contract for services when the
residents are very sensitive to their quality. This hypothesis relies on the assumption
(in line with the theoretical model) that contracting necessarily lowers the quality.
The form of government is also expected to be a determinant of the make-or-buy
decision. Indeed, cities run by an elected mayor are expected to be less likely to con-
tract with the private sector than cities run by appointed managers. Indeed, elected
mayors are expected to be more prone to keep the provision inside the administration
in order to increase their ability to capture a rent. Similarly, cities run by an elected
mayor are expected to react less strongly to differences in contracting difficulty.
Finally, younger cities (cities formed after 1950) and cities with a high indebtedness
are expected to be more likely to privatize. The former because they have a less
developed political infrastructure and less public union influence, the latter because
they have more incentives to reduce the costs (provided that an assumption of the
theoretical model of Levin and Tadelis is that contracting reduces the costs).
In addition, Levin and Tadelis also analyse the impact of the Clean Government
Laws that already had been considered by Lo´pez-de-Silanes et al. (1997), that is, pur-
chasing standards, merit system, prohibition of political activities for civil servants),
labour market laws, budget constraints, and ideological issues (fraction of county votes
for Republican governor).
Using a multinomial logit model, Levin and Tadelis (2010) confirm that efficiency
considerations drive the make-or-buy decision. In particular, contracting difficul-
ties lead to less use of the private sector, and this effect is stronger for large cities.
Contracting difficulties also lead to more use of public contracting: a one standard
deviation increase in contracting difficulty leads to a decrease of about 40 percent of
private contracting. Hence, public contracting acts as a substitute for private con-
tracting when transaction costs are high. In addition, consistently with the theoretical
expectations, a one standard deviation decrease of the sensitivity of the residents to
the quality of the services leads to about one third less involvement of the private
sector. Efficiency considerations also appear in the fact that large cities have a big-
ger propensity to contract with the private sector (due to a bigger experience) and a
smaller propensity to contract with the public sector (as they have less incentives to
use such contracts to take profit from economies of scale).
By contrast, the conclusions regarding political variables and clean government
laws are quite mixed. If a merit system for hiring public employees as well as a
prohibition of strike — two factors that are expected to increase the efficiency of in-
house provision — lead to less private contracting, the strength of debt limits as well
as the existence of financial audit laws exhibit no significant impact on the choice of
a mode of provision. The negative impact of a merit system contradicts the previous
results of Lo´pez-de-Silanes et al.’s (1997) study. This may be explained by the fact
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that the the merit system improves the efficiency of the in-house provision, and that
this effect exceeds the fact that the merit system limits the ability of the public officials
to use in-house provision as a mean to offer jobs to relatives or political supporters
(cronyism).
Regarding ideological issues, whereas Lo´pez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) found that the
voting results obtained in a county by the Republican candidate at the last guberna-
torial election is significantly correlated with the propensity of this county to contract
out services, Levin and Tadelis (2010) find for their part no significant relationship
between the make or buy decision in a city and the voting results in its county.
1.7 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to provide the theoretical framework for the make-or-
buy decision, which will be used in the rest of the thesis. In presenting the different
contractual theories (Incentive Theory, Incomplete Contracts Theory, and Transaction
Cost Theory), it aimed to explain the differences between make and buy, and hence
to determine which organizational choices should be chosen in which cases.
We have shown that, whereas the Incentive Theory and the Incomplete Contract
Theory are important in the context of the make-or-buy in allowing to determine
the optimal shape of the contractual relationship in the case of the buy, the Incentive
theory does not provide an answer to the question of make-or-buy, and the Incomplete
contract theory is essentially a theoretical approach. By contrast, the Transaction
Cost Theory provides both a theoretical framework and the empirical tools that allow
to answer to this question.
We also highlight that the make-or-buy question for public services is not only
influenced by the transaction costs, but also by specific features of the public sec-
tor (lack of know-how, bureaucracy, limited ability to manage the risks), as well as
characteristics of public deciders (ideology, rent-seeking, political agenda), and finally
specificities of public services (complexity, need for continuity and adaptability).
Finally, we presented some of the most important recent empirical contributions
to the make-or-buy literature. We show that this empirical literature corroborates to
a large extent the efficiency predictions of the TCT. The evidence on public choice
and political considerations is for its part quite mixed.
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Chapter 2
Evidence from Swiss Municipalities
In the previous chapter, we have shown that the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture has mostly considered technical dimensions to explain government make-or-buy
decisions.
As we have shown above (Section 1.6), there is only a very scarce empirical litera-
ture on the determinants of the make-or-buy decision for public services. Furthermore,
to the best of our knowledge, no empirical study of the organizational choices has been
conducted yet in the context of Swiss public authorities. The first goal of this chapter
is hence to measure to what extent the predictions of the transaction-cost theory are
verified in the Swiss case, but most importantly to identify specific features of the
Swiss context that may interfere in the make-or-buy decision. To do this, we con-
structed a database of 22 services in 399 Swiss municipalities, in order to pursue an
analysis a` la Levin and Tadelis (2010) of the organizational choice for local public
services in Switzerland.
However, the study mentioned above does not completely control for the unob-
served individual heterogeneity; in particular, the cultural dimension. It is not an
issue if this cultural dimension is constant across municipalities within a country,
but we could think that it might vary across municipalities within a country that is
multicultural, for instance multilingual. Language is an important vector of culture,
as it captures the vertical and horizontal transmission of values Bisin and Verdier
(2000; 2001). The vertical channel to the extent that the native language to which we
are exposed during childhood and adolescence is likely to be an important predictor
of our values during adulthood. The horizontal channel in the sense that language
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is central to any type of social interaction. People sharing a common language are
more likely to form a social network, and then, to share common values and common
cultural traits.
The second goal of this chapter is hence to provide insights into this issue. We
use the different languages in Switzerland to capture heterogeneity in terms of culture
at the municipal level. However, as most policies in Switzerland are set at the state
(rather than the federal) level, we have to adopt a within-state estimation strategy
(state fixed effects). All states but three are monolingual; it is hence not suitable
to include a language variable together with state fixed effects. Thus, our approach
to the question consists in two steps: First, we run standard estimations to explain
make-or-buy municipal decisions for the provision of their services, combined with
a within-state estimation strategy. Second, using the predicted value of the latent
variable of the first-step logit model, we run estimations to explain the mispredictions
of this standard model, including a language variable.
The results show that the language systematically explains the mispredicted choices
in the particular case of public provision: while the predicted outcome is private pro-
vision, French-speaking municipalities are 33 percent more likely to choose public
provision than German-speaking municipalities. Interestingly enough, the language
does not explain the mispredicted choices in the case of private provision. Thus, we
highlight the necessity both to make the standard empirical model for government
make-or-buy decisions more flexible so as to account for the cultural dimension, and
to provide theoretical foundation for this cultural impact. This is what we do in the
second part of this thesis.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We shall first shed light
on some specific features of the Swiss context, in particular in terms of territorial
structures and local politics. In Section 2.2, we shall describe our data. We shall then
turn to our empirical analysis, which will be divided in two steps. First, in Section
2.3, we build up on the methodology of Levin and Tadelis (2010) to run an analysis
of the technical determinants of the organizational choices of 399 Swiss municipalities
for the provision of 22 public services. We then pursue in Section 2.4 an analysis
of mispredicted outcomes in order to identify the presence of a cultural bias in the
results of the first step. The last section (2.5) concludes the first part of the thesis
and opens the door for the analysis pursued in the second part.
2.1 Particularities of the Swiss context
2.1.1 Territorial structures
Switzerland is composed of 26 Cantons, divided in 184 districts that are further
divided in 2584 municipalities (in 2010). Compared to other European countries,
Switzerland is one of the countries where the municipalities are amongst the smallest,
with a median size of 1’152 inhabitants (Fig. 2.1). 26.7 percent of municipalities have
less than 500 inhabitants and only 10 municipalities have more than 50’000 inhabi-
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Note: Data: Eurostat, and the National Statistical Offices (2012).
Figure 2.1: Median size of municipalities in European Countries
tants (Table 2.1)1. The smallest municipality (Corippo TI) has only 15 inhabitants,
whereas the biggest, Zurich, has about 370’000 inhabitants.
Table 2.1: Size of the Swiss municipalities
Population
Municipalities Inhabitants
Number Cum. Percentage Cum. Number Cum. Percentage Cum.
number percentage number percentage
0-100 82 82 3.17% 3.17% 5’163 5’163 0.07% 0.07%
101-200 143 225 5.53% 8.71% 21’305 26’468 0.27% 0.34%
201-500 466 691 18.03% 26.74% 160’631 187’099 2.04% 2.38%
501-1’000 504 1’195 19.50% 46.25% 374’739 561’838 4.77% 7.14%
1’001-5’000 1’057 2’252 40.91% 87.15% 2’468’734 3’030’572 31.39% 38.54%
5’001-10’000 194 2’446 7.51% 94.66% 1’344’092 4’374’664 17.09% 55.63%
10’001-50’000 128 2’574 4.95% 99.61% 2’154’508 6’529’172 27.40% 83.03%
50’001-100’000 4 2’578 0.15% 99.77% 256’668 6’785’840 3.26% 86.29%
> 100’000 6 2’584 0.23% 100.00% 1’078’172 7’864’012 13.71% 100.00%
Data: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2012)
The territorial structures have remained essentially unchanged since the creation
of the Federal State in 1848, with the exception of the creation of the Canton of Jura
in 1979 (secession from the Canton of Berne). The number of municipalities has only
slightly decreased since 1848, decreasing from 3’203 to 2’584, which means a reduction
of less than 20 percent. Furthermore, the main part of this reduction is accounted by
a couple of Cantons, especially Thurgau, Fribourg and Tessin. These cantons have
pursued incentive policies to foster voluntary merger of municipalities. This voluntary
policy contrasts with some countries who achieved ambitious reforms of the territorial
structures, leading to a drastic reduction of the number of municipalities. This was
1Only 8 municipalities have more than 60’000 inhabitants, which corresponds to the average size
of the municipalities in the study of Levin and Tadelis (2010).
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the case for example in Belgium who virtually divided the number of its municipalities
by four in 1977, as well as Denmark who divided this number by 2.7 in 2007.
In addition to the official municipalities (commune politique, Einwohnergemeinde,
Politische Gemeinde), there exists a couple of local jurisdictions with some particular
rationale and that independent from the municipalities, especially in the German-
speaking Cantons. The Schulgemeinden are local jurisdictions in charge of the public
primary school. In some Cantons, these school-municipalities raise their own taxes.
One other form of municipalities is the so-called Bu¨gergemeinde, which is made up
of people having their place of origin in the municipality. These municipalities have
their origin in the XIXth Century, when the Constitution gave every Swiss citizen the
right to freedom of establishment. The creation of the Bu¨rgergemeinden allowed to
separate the political rights, given to all Swiss Citizens established in the municipality,
and the property of the municipal assets, reserved to the former Citizens of the city.
Nowadays, these municipalities are still in charge of managing their own assets and
must affect their revenue to public purposes. Finally, some types of municipalities
are specific to one canton, namely the so-called Fu¨rsorge- und Armengemeinden in
Canton of Glaris (assistance to the poor) and the Zivilgemeinden in Canton of Zurich
(water, gas and electricity distribution) (Steiner, 2002).
2.1.2 Autonomy and Importance of Municipalities
The consequence of this particularly small size of Swiss municipalities is that many
of them are too small to provide services in-house efficiently and to take profit from
economies of scale (Daﬄon, 2000a). This creates a trade-off that may lead the mu-
nicipalities to contract services even when the contractual difficulty is quite high. In
practice, this leads the municipalities to collaborate with each other (Local Govern-
ment Associations, LGA2), which can be considered as a particular form of public
contracting. This is linked with an institutional framework (cantonal laws) that facil-
itates the constitution of such associations. Steiner (2001) notes that “local govern-
ments associations are best suited for politically sensitive areas and sovereign tasks”.
He identifies 1359 LGAs — a number that increases year after year.
Municipalities account for about 22 percent of the public expenditure. In 2013,
this corresponds to 44.9 billion Swiss Francs (7.1 percent of the GDP). Among the
municipal expenditure, personal expenses account for 31.3 percent and the purchase
of goods and services for 21.6 percent. 21.7 percent of the expenditure concern the
schools, 20.5 the health, and 16.2 percent the social security. 30 percent of the ex-
penditure of municipalities are transfers to other public jurisdictions, in particular
inter-municipal equalization. 58 percent of the revenues come from taxes, and 12
percent from transfers. However, even if the municipalities account for a significant
part of the total expenditure of the public sector, their autonomy is quite limited, as
a large share of the expenditure (in particular social expenditures) are fixed by the
State (Daﬄon, 2000b)3.
2French: Associations de communes; German: Gemeindeverba¨nde
3Nevertheless, even when the State prescribes the provision of a service, the municipality still has
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2.1.3 Political system at the local level
Four important elements constitute the administrative and political system in Swiss
municipalities (Schedler, 2003): the executive body, the legislative organ, the political
committees, and finally the administration. The executive power is exerted by an
elected government4, which is headed by a mayor5. The number of members of the
local governments depends on the population, but also on the State. As it is the case
in the Federal government, the mayor has no extended decision power as compared
with his colleagues. On the contrary, he acts as a primus inter pares, i.e. he conducts
the meetings of the local government, and he takes on the external representation role.
An important feature of Swiss municipalities is that it is frequent in municipalities
— especially the small and medium ones — that local executive members are not
elected as representatives of political parties. According to Geser et al. (2012), 39.6%
of the 15’000 Swiss local executive members are not member of any political party,
and 4.8 percent are members of political groups that only exist at the local level. The
proportion of non partisan executive members reaches 80 percent in municipalities
smaller than 500 inhabitants. Only one executive member of every two is member of
one of the four biggest national parties6. Furthermore, the number of non-partisan
executive members sharply increased between 1988 and 2005 (Ladner, 2011). This
mitigates the impact of ideological choices, but more importantly this gives the policy
makers a bigger independence and thus greatly reduces the risk of conflicts between the
general interest and partisan interests. It has also to be noted that less than 2 percent
of the members of the executives serve on a full-time basis, and 16.7 percent on a part-
time basis, whereas more than 80 percent are non-professionals (Ladner, 2011; Geser
et al., 2012).
The legislative power at the local level can take different forms. In some municipal-
ities, the legislative power is exerted by an elected representative body (parliament)
whereas in other ones this power is exerted by a full assembly, i.e. a more or less fre-
quent meeting of all citizens of the municipality. Depending on the State, the choice
of a legislative mode may be left to the municipalities or it may be imposed by the
State. Full assemblies are the mode of legislative power in about 80 percent of the
municipalities, but the share strongly varies from one State to another. In some can-
tons (Neuchaˆtel, Geneva), all municipalities have a local parliament, whereas in seven
cantons, only full assemblies exist. In general, elected parliaments tend to exist in
cities and in larger municipalities whereas full assemblies are more common in small
to medium-sized municipalities. However, even in municipalities with elected parlia-
ments, citizens may vote on some issues, through popular initiatives and referenda:
if within a given period, a given number of citizens request it, the authority has to
the choice of the mode of provision.
4The members of the government are elected by the citizens, except in State of Neuchaˆtel, where
they are elected by the local parliament.
5The mayor can be elected by the citizens, by the other members of the executive, or by the local
parliament, depending from the State.
6Swiss People’s Party, Social Democratic Party, The Liberals, and Christian Democratic People’s
Party.
66
submit a project — e.g. the construction of a building, the modification of a munici-
pal law, a tax increase, a.s.o. — to a vote of the People. The scope of these political
rights (in particular the deadline, and the number of citizens required to instigate an
initiative or a referendum) are decided at the State level.
In addition to the legislative and executive organs, the municipalities have some
specialized political committees whose members can be elected either by the execu-
tive, the parliament, or the full assembly. These committees have competencies in a
particular area, for example in public finance (to give recommendations on the bud-
get, or on a specific investment), in territorial planning (to give recommendations on
construction permits or land use plans), on the support for culture (to award grants
to cultural actors), a.s.o.
Finally, the last important stakeholder is the administration. Overall, 17 per-
cent of workers in Switzerland worked for the public sector (Confederation, Cantons,
Municipalities) in 20107. In 2005, the municipalities represented 38 percent of the
employees of the public sector (51 percent for the States, 11 percent for the Confed-
eration) (Koller, 2008). The important number of employees of Local governments is
a proof of a high degree of decentralization at the municipal level8.
Both the small size of the municipalities, the extended democratic rights, and the
weak importance of political parties at the local level provide the citizens with a large
power of control on the functioning and the decision making of the municipality. As
noted by Schedler (2003): “On a scale which quantifies direct democratic influence
by the citizens of European countries, all three tiers of government in Switzerland
would achieve an number-one ranking”. For Christoffersen (2014): “In Switzerland,
it is common wisdom that politicians and the state have to be constrained by effective
institutions in order to prevent them from behaving selfishly. There is widespread
consensus that politicians need to be controlled by giving the citizens effective direct
democratic instruments and by intense jurisdictional competition. [. . . ] Perhaps, this
critical but realistic view of the behaviour of politicians is a consequence of Swiss
institutions themselves.”
2.1.4 Languages in Switzerland
Finally, the last important feature that makes Switzerland interesting for the purpose
of this thesis is that Switzerland hosts four languages that corresponds to very different
cultures. Indeed, as highlighted by Bisin and Verdier (2000; 2001), language captures
the vertical and horizontal transmission of values9. The vertical channel to the extent
that the native language to which we are exposed during childhood and adolescence
is likely to be an important predictor of our values during adulthood. The horizontal
7Source: UNECE Database
8However, as seen above, the actual autonomy of the municipalities is more restricted than sug-
gested by these statistics.
9Bisin and Verdier (2000) consider three transmission channels for cultural traits: (1) Vertical
transmission (by the parents, and more generally the ancestors); (2) Horizontal transmission (homo-
geneity of values and cultural traits within communities and social groups: countries, regions a.s.o.);
(3) Assortative mating (people sharing common values are more prone to interact).
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channel in the sense that language is central to any type of social interaction. People
sharing a common language are more likely to form a social network, and then, to
share common values and common cultural traits. Finally, among the channels of
transmission of cultural traits, language is the mostly inherited factor, which allows
avoiding any problem of reverse causality. Thus, language is a good proxy for culture.
These cultural areas can be defined very precisely. The borders between the lan-
guage areas, with the exception of the Romansh area, are quite sharp, as Fig. 2.2
shows. Switzerland was founded in 1291 by the alliance of the three States of Uri,
Schwyz and Nidwalden, the so-called Waldsta¨tten (literally forest States)10. The
Swiss territory expended through successive enlargements but remains confined to
the German-speaking area until several campaigns in the first decade of the 15th cen-
tury leading to the annexation of some Italian-speaking territories in the actual state
of Ticino as well as in the Lombardy and the Piedmont; however, these regions had
a status of subject territories. The first territorial expansions in the French-speaking
occurred as a result of Burgundian Wars (1474-1477) and the entry of Fribourg in the
Confederation (1481). At the federal level, the Constitution of 1848 recognized Ger-
man, French and Italian as the official national languages of the Swiss Confederation.
Romansh is also considered as a national language (since 1938) but it is subject to a
special status11. In year 2000, 72.5 percent of Swiss citizens were German-speaking,
21.0 percent French, 4.3 percent Italian and 0.6 percent Romansh. Amongst the 26
States (Cantons), 4 are French-speaking12, one is Italian-speaking and 17 are German-
speaking. Three states are officially bilingual French-German (Bern, Fribourg and
Valais) and one is trilingual (the Graubu¨nden state: Romansh, German and Italian).
If the French-German border does not correspond to important topological barriers,
the Italian-speaking area for its part is clearly separated from the other language areas
by mountain chains. Finally, in the trilingual Graubu¨nden state, the language areas
correspond mainly to valleys.
10The informations provided in this historical part are taken from Bu¨chi (2001) as well as Ducrey
(1983).
11“The official languages of the Confederation shall be German, French and Italian. Romansh
shall also be an official language of the Confederation when communicating with persons who speak
Romansh.” (Art. 70§1 of the Federal Constitution)
12The Jura state is officially a French-speaking State, even if one of its municipalities is German-
speaking.
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Figure 2.2: Administrative Language, by Municipality
Source. Own conception, Data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
2.1.5 Corruption
Corruption can be defined as: “the active or passive misuse of the powers of pub-
lic officials (appointed or elected) for private financial or other benefits”. However,
“no precise definition can be found which applies to all forms, types and degrees of
corruption or which would be acceptable universally” (Hough 2013). For the OECD:
“Corruption in the form of patronage (sometimes called favouritism, nepotism, clien-
telism) consists of the preferential treatment of firms and/or individuals by public
officials regarding the compliance with government rules for the allocation of gov-
ernment contracts or transfer payments. The private sector counterpart consists of
‘special favours’ in the form of financial rewards or professional opportunities granted
to the public official involved.”
In most cross-country comparisons, Switzerland appears to be one of the least
corrupted countries in the World. In 2016, Switzerland occupied the seventh place of
the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International (over 168 countries).
Only Denmark, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Norway received
better scores. However, despite this very good ranking, corruption in Switzerland is
known to be underestimated. Several polls show that hidden corruption, the share of
probable cases of corruption that do not result in conviction, is between 97 and 99
percent. These cases take in particular two forms. The first occurs abroad, namely
the fact that Swiss firms pay bribes when doing business in some foreign countries.
The second case occurs within the country, and takes the form of nepotism, that is,
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favouritism (e.g. towards relatives: friends, family, political colleagues) when hiring
an employee or when awarding a contract. This form of corruption usually does not
involve bribes.
To the best of our knowledge, no study ever highlighted any differences in terms
of corruption between the French- and German-speaking areas, and there exist no
measure of corruption at the level of Swiss municipalities. Verifying the existence
of a Roestigraben for corruption would be beyond the scope of this thesis. However,
as no evidence suggests the existence of such a bias, and as the factors explaining
across-country variations of corruption are not expected to vary across municipalities
of a same canton (keeping in particular in mind that religion — the main cultural
determinant of corruption13 — only varies across cantons, but not within cantons),
it seems reasonable to assume that corruption affects municipalities on both sides of
the language border in a same manner.
Furthermore, an eventual omitted variable bias induced by corruption can be ruled
out by our analysis of public spendings. Indeed, if our result was explained by corrup-
tion fostering private contracting (for bribes), this logically would mean that corrup-
tion is higher in the German area. Hence, we should observe that private provision
leads to higher spendings per capita in the German area, which is not the case. If on
the contrary we expect corruption to foster In-House provision, for example in order
to create opportunities of nepotism, we should expect In-House provision to be less
efficient in the French-speaking municipalities. Once again, our results show that it
is not the case. This allows us to conclude that our results are robust and cannot be
explained by a corruption-bias.
2.2 Data
Public services can be provided in many different ways. In our survey, we considered
ten different modes of provision, that we finally grouped in three categories for the
purpose of our study.
Internal: First, the service can be provided by public employees, that is, people
hired and paid by the public authority, without recourse to third parties. The mu-
nicipality takes all the decisions and bears the responsibility of the procurement ; the
coordination mechanism is hence hierarchy. This mode of traditional procurement
fully corresponds to the make option in Williamson’s framework.
Public company: This can be done in creating an administratively autonomous
entity whose ownership remains fully in the hands of the public authority. This entity
can be an autonomous public corporation or a company (under public or private
law) hold by the public sector. As the public authority keeps a full control over
all characteristics of the provision, this case is in practice very similar to traditional
procurement. For this reason, we merged this mode and the Internal mode
in a single mode In-House.
13La Porta, Lo´pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
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Public contracting: This way of providing public services consists in stipulating
contracts between public entities (local or cantonal jurisdictions, public agencies) for
the provision of one or several public services. Public contracting is part of the trend
towards New Public Management, since the years 1980’s. It can either take the form of
a precise purchase contract, or of contracts that describe general objectives rather than
giving a precise description of the expected outcome. An example of such a contract
in Switzerland is the contract signed in 2008 between the Swiss Confederation and the
Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences (FORS), whose goals are to produce
survey data, as well as to pursue research in empirical social sciences, with focus on
survey methodology (Athias, 2013a).
LGA: Alternatively, the service can be provided by an ad-hoc entity under public
law (e.g a Local Governments Association). Contrary to the public contracting, in
which the public authority gives up the most of its decision power, in the case of
a LGA the municipality is represented in the executive bodies of the entity, which
provides it with some decision and control power. This constitutes the traditional
way of contracting with other public authorities in Switzerland, and it is anterior to
the emergence of the New Public Management. Henceafter, we will refer to these
two cases (Public contract and LGA) as Public Contract.
All the modes presented so far (traditional procurement, public company, contract-
ing with other public authorities, local governments associations) compose a larger
category of Public provision.
Contracting-out with the private sector (Private provision) can take the form of a
service purchase contract, or of a lease contract. In this case, the public authority still
keeps the ownership of the infrastructure but allows a private firm to exploit it. In
our survey, we distinguished the classical Private contract — in which the service is
bought to a private firm — from long term arrangements (PPPs and Concessions)
involving a private partner in all stages of the provision (development, building, fi-
nancing and operation). Henceafter, PPPs, Concessions and Private provision
will form the category Private contracting.
Finally, some options that were present in the survey have been removed from our
database. First, due to the particularly small occurrence of this option (46 cases, less
than 1 percent of the observations), we do not consider the case in which the service
is provided by volunteers or by a NPO. We do not either consider the case where
the service is provided by another level of Government (Canton, District) without the
municipality intervening in the provision. Indeed, this case does not correspond to a
choice of the municipality, but to a unilateral decision of the upper tier. Finally, we
also remove the observations in which the municipality does not provide the service,
which means that the provision, if any, is made by the private market without the
intervention of public authorities. In most cases, this is linked with the absence of
demand for this service within the municipality, which makes it non-relevant for our
analysis. The choice to ignore the non-provided cases is very common in the empirical
literature (e.g. Hefetz and Warner (2004) and Levin and Tadelis (2010)).
Table 2.2 shows a synthesis of the organizational choices considered in our survey.
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Table 2.2: Modes of provision in the Athias-Wicht survey
In-House
Internal The service is provided by public employees, that
is, people hired and paid by the public authority,
without recourse to third parties. The municipality
takes all the decisions and bears the responsibility of
the procurement.
Public company The service is provided by a public agency or a firm
hold in majority by the public sector. This entity
has its own budget which is independent from the
municipality budget. The public authority keeps a
full control over all characteristics of the provision.
Public contracting
Local Governments Association The service is provided by a LGA, that is, an en-
tity under public law created to provide one or sev-
eral services. The municipality is represented in the
leading organs of the association.
Public contract The service is bought to another municipality or an-
other public authority (e.g. the Canton).
Private contracting
Private contract The service is bought to a private firm. It is paid by
the municipality which finances it through taxes or
through a redevance.
PPP The service is provided jointly by the municipality
and a private firm. The private partner is involved
in all stages of the process (development, building, fi-
nancing and operation), still under the control of the
municipality. It is remunerated by the municipality.
Concession Identical to PPP, but the private operator is paid
directly by the consumers.
Not considered in the empirical analysis
Other level The service is provided by another level of govern-
ment, without any intervention of the municipality.
Not-for-profit The service is provided by volunteers and/or by
NPOs.
Non provided The municipality does not provide the service, which
may be provided by the market.
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We collected data on the contracting choices of Swiss municipalities by survey
(Athias-Wicht Municipal Survey). The municipal level is an interesting case to deal
with contracting choices as many municipalities make decisions about service provi-
sion in parallel while they provide a wide range of services, from very simple to very
complex ones. The survey asks city administrators to identify the mode of provision
their municipality had chosen to provide each of the 22 services we were interested
in (reported, with descriptive statistics, in Table 2.4). We chose to survey municipal
secretaries as they are the best suited to provide us with precise and non ideological
information, by contrast with policy makers. In addition, contrary to the vast major-
ity of local policy makers, municipal secretaries are professionals, and are hence best
able to provide us with reliable information14. For these reasons, surveying munici-
pal secretaries is very common in studies regarding Swiss municipalities (e.g. Steiner
(2000), Ladner and Steiner (2005), Ladner (2002), Steiner and Kaiser (2016).). As
Kleindienst (1999) notes: “The municipal secretary holds the leading management po-
sition in the municipal administration. In many local authorities this makes him or
her the highest level civil servant. The municipal secretary has a key position because
he or she works at the interface between politics and administration.”. However, we
did not find it necessary to collect personal information on the municipal secretaries.
Indeed, it seems us reasonable to consider that personal characteristics of the respon-
dents are not likely to bias the results of our study. To the best of our knowledge,
this assumption has implicitly been made so far by all the studies based on municipal
secretaries surveys.
We selected the most important services at the local level, ranging from very sim-
ple ones (e.g. public works and office cleaning) to more complex ones (e.g. safety,
education). These services have been selected after discussions with several special-
ists and public officials, who identified them as the most relevant at the local level.
We collected data on the contracting choices of Swiss municipalities by a web-based
survey, that asked city administrators (municipal secretaries) to identify the mode of
provision their municipality had chosen to provide each of the 22 services we were
interested in. Albeit the survey was Internet-based, it was however also possible to
fill in the paper-based questionnaire (see Appendix) instead of using the web survey.
No reminders have been sent to the municipalities that did not complete the sur-
vey. We obtained responses from 399 municipalities among which 56.4 percent are
German-speaking and 43.6 percent are French-speaking15. Table 2.3 shows the num-
ber of municipalities by cantons in our sample and in all Swiss municipalities. In our
sample, 53.6 percent of the services provided are provided in-house, 22.9 are provided
through public contracting, and 23.5 percent through contracts with the private sec-
tor. We observe an important variation of contracting choices across services, even
though the three procuring methods are used in all services.
14“In contrast to the mayors (who are often part-time politicians), the municipal secretaries have
an in-depth knowledge of the community and are less likely to make party-political statements.”
(Steiner, 2000)
15In all Swiss municipalities, 68.4 percent are German-speaking and 31.6 percent are French-
speaking.
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Table 2.3: Number of answers to the Athias-Wicht survey by Canton
Nr Canton Own sample All Swiss Mun.
1 Zu¨rich 21 171
2 Bern / Berne 82 379
3 Luzern 9 83
4 Uri 3 20
5 Schwyz 4 30
6 Obwalden 2 7
7 Nidwalden 2 11
8 Glarus 0 3
9 Zug 2 11
10 Fribourg / Freiburg 41 164
11 Solothurn 10 118
12 Basel-Stadt 0 3
13 Basel-Landschaft 11 86
14 Schaffhausen 4 26
15 Appenzell Ausserrhoden 1 20
16 Appenzell Innerrhoden 0 6
17 St. Gallen 8 77
18 Graubu¨nden / Grigioni / Grischun 6 158
19 Aargau 28 216
20 Thurgau 9 80
21 Ticino 21 147
22 Vaud 71 318
23 Valais / Wallis 19 135
24 Neuchaˆtel 18 37
25 Gene`ve 14 45
26 Jura 13 57
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics (Dependent variable)
Service Private Std. Dev. Service Private Std. Dev.
Refuse collection 0.6488 0.4780 Animal carcases removal 0.1524 0.3600
Street lights 0.5069 0.5006 Cemeteries 0.1417 0.3492
Maintenance of water facilities 0.4849 0.5005 Local parks and gardens 0.1349 0.3423
Road maintenance 0.4290 0.4956 Office cleaning 0.1324 0.3397
Public transportation 0.3353 0.4735 Child day-care centres 0.1237 0.3296
Security in public spaces 0.2705 0.4451 Parking control 0.1175 0.3224
Snow cleaning 0.2533 0.4355 Sewage treatment 0.1082 0.3113
Trimming of trees 0.2297 0.4212 School canteen 0.1011 0.3019
Solid waste disposal 0.2237 0.4173 Drinking water distribution 0.0995 0.3001
Road cleaning 0.2180 0.4134 Specialized services in school 0.0599 0.2376
Forests 0.1934 0.3956 Maintenance of school buildings 0.0519 0.2222
All services 0.2364 0.4249
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In this chapter, as well as in chapter 3, we have forgone to pursue a dynamic
(panel) analysis of the organizational choices for several reasons. First of all, collecting
information on organizational choices in the municipalities for several years would
have considerably increase the time necessary to answer to our questionnaire, insofar
it would have been made it necessary for the respondents to find information on past
choices. This would probably have deterred many municipal secretaries to answer to
our survey. Hence, panel data would have been collected at the expense of a lower
response rate, but also at the expense of less precise data. In addition, it seems
reasonable to consider that the organizational choices exhibit quite few variation over
time. In addition, Levin and Tadelis (2010) show that the results of their study is
not sensitive to considering different years. For these reasons, we considered that the
rather small added value of a panel analysis did not compensate the losses in terms
of number of municipalities and quality of the data.
A central prediction of efficiency-based theories is that difficulties in specifying
and monitoring performance requirements are likely to reduce private provision. To
quantify these difficulties, we surveyed ten city administrators as well as MBA stu-
dents (to provide some external validity) asking them to assess the 22 services along
four contracting dimensions: (1) the difficulty of specifying in the contract the ex-
pected service and the quality requirements (ex-ante contracting difficulty); (2) the
difficulty of observing and measuring the quality of the service once provided (ex-post
contracting difficulty); (3) the difficulty in replacing contractors due to knowledge or
physical specificity; (4) the burden laid by the service on the municipal budget (to
capture economies of scale when contracting the service provision). We standardized
the answers of each respondent for all questions to have zero mean and unit variance.
We then averaged the standardized responses to construct an average response to each
question for each service. There was a tight correlation between the survey responses
of different city administrators and MBA students, which corroborates our implicit
assumption that dimensions of contracting difficulty are largely related to service
characteristics rather than being idiosyncratic to a given municipality-service pair.
However, the first three contracting dimensions turn out to be so highly correlated
across services as to be nearly collinear in multivariate regression analysis. Therefore
for the regression analysis we use a principal components approach to identify a sin-
gle contracting difficulty variable, defining Contracting difficulty as the first principal
component of this PCA. This first principal component explains 74 percent of the
variation in our four survey variables. Table 2.5 reports in columns 2-5 the individual
components of contracting difficulty (standardized means of the answers of 10 city
administrators to the Athias-Wicht restricted survey), that is, ex-ante difficulty, ex-
post difficulty, physical asset specificity, and knowledge specificity (see Appendix A.2
for more detail), and in column 1 the variable Contracting difficulty (first principal
component of columns 2-5). The relative difficulties of contracting for some services
are in line with our intuition. For instance, office cleaning and buildings maintenance
are two of the easiest services to contract. These services are routine, easy to measure
and monitor and do not involve a great deal of specialized equipment or knowledge.
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Child day care centres and specialized services in school are two of the most difficult
services to contract. For both services, performance is difficult to assess accurately
and specialized knowledge can play an important role.
In addition to asking the set of ten city administrators about these four dimen-
sions (which denote Service aspects), we included three questions in the survey sent
to every city administrator to know the provision mode of services, in order to cap-
ture Service × Municipality aspects. We asked them to assess (1) the sensitivity of
residents to the quality of each service; (2) the uncertainty surrounding the future
requirements of each service; (3) the level of competition for each service if they were
considering contracting with a private sector firm the service provision. We assume
hence that these three dimensions are idiosyncratic to individual municipality-service
pairs. Indeed, the citizens of a large urban municipality have different needs for some
services than the citizens of a mountain village or of a small municipality in the coun-
tryside. Hence, it is highly likely that their sensitivity is quite different. In the same
way, uncertainty also changes from one municipality to another, due to, for instance,
the fact that a municipality is experiencing strong demographic growth or increasing
urbanization or not. Finally, municipalities of different sizes or in different regions face
different transportation infrastructures and different markets, and hence face different
degrees of competition. We standardized each variable (Sensitivity, Competition and
Uncertainty) to have zero mean and unit variance.
The reason why we ran two different surveys are, first, that we expect that the
dimensions of contracting difficulty — difficulty to describe the expected outcome
and to monitor its quality, asset specificity — do not vary much across municipalities
(contrary to the difficulty to provide the service), a fortiori if we control for the
most important characteristics of the municipalities (in particular the size, urban,
and mountain). Secondly, we expect that the concept of contracting difficulty could
be difficult to apprehend for the respondents, hence leading to an important noise in
the answers, but also to a lower rate of participation, and this noise could depend
on cultural factors. Note that other empirical studies on the make-or-buy decision of
public services (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Levin and Tadelis, 2010) also implicitely
assume that contracting difficulty do not vary across cities.
For each municipality, we also collected information from official sources on the
size of the population16 (as municipalities may need to be a certain size to produce
a given service in-house with any sort of efficiency), the area, the income (proxied by
the local per capita yield of the Federal Direct Tax (FDT)), the municipal dependency
ratio (as a proxy for investment needs), the municipality passive interests per capita
(as a measure of indebtedness).
The repartition of the modes of provision for each service is provided in Fig. 2.3.
We can observe that there is an important variation of contracting choices across ser-
vices, even though the three procuring methods are used in all services. Some services
such as maintenance of school buildings are provided by municipal employees in 91
16As the number of large municipalities is quite low, we chose to cluster the size of population
in three classes — small (≤1500) , medium (1501-5000), big (<5000) — instead of using it as a
continuous variable, so as to avoid heteroscedasticity.
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Table 2.5: Contracting difficulty
Service Difficulty Ex-ante Ex-post Physical Knowledge
(PCA) diff. diff. specificity specificity
Office cleaning -3.1 -1.7 -1.5 -1.4 -1.1
Maintenance of school buildings -2.3 -1.1 -0.9 -1.4 -1.0
Snow cleaning -1.9 -0.9 -1.0 -0.3 -1.0
Refuse collection -1.7 -0.8 -1.0 0.9 -1.1
Road cleaning -1.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9
Cemeteries -1.2 -0.9 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7
Parking control -1.2 -0.9 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2
Trimming of trees -0.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1
Local parks and gardens -0.6 -0.5 0.4 -0.5 -0.7
Animal carcases removal -0.5 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2
Solid waste disposal -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 1.1 -0.6
Road maintenance -0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.4
Forests 0.0 0.2 -0.3 -0.4 0.2
Sewage treatment 0.9 0.2 -0.1 1.6 0.7
Security in public spaces 1.0 1.6 0.1 -1.3 0.4
Maintenance of water facilities 1.1 -0.2 0.9 0.7 0.8
Street lights 1.1 0.5 0.3 1.2 0.4
Drinking water distribution 1.4 0.5 0.4 1.4 0.6
School canteen 1.5 0.3 1.1 0.6 0.6
Public transportation 2.3 1.2 0.8 1.4 0.9
Specialized services in school 2.5 1.0 1.2 -0.6 1.9
Child day-care centres 3.4 1.6 2.3 -0.3 1.6
Columns 2-5 report the individual components of contracting difficulty (standardized means of
the answers of 10 city administrators to the Athias-Wicht restricted survey). Column 1 reports
the variable Contracting Difficulty, which is the first principal component of the four individual
variables. The questions related to columns 2-5 are shown in Appendix A.2.
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics for our explanatory variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source of the data
Service characteristics
Contracting Diff. 0 1 -3.129 3.423 Athias Wicht Restricted Survey
Budget Weight 0 1 -1.194 2.475 Athias Wicht Restricted Survey
City × Service characteristics
Sensitivity 0 1 -2.089 1.308 Athias Wicht Municipal Survey
Uncertainty 0 1 -1.173 2.570 Athias Wicht Municipal Survey
Competition 0 1 -1.282 2.375 Athias Wicht Municipal Survey
City characteristics
Income [1000 CHF] 1.159 1.407 0.125 12.250 Federal Tax Administration
Dependency Ratio 0.639 0.08 0.222 0.509 Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Mountain
Yes No Swiss Federal Statistical Office: “Niveaux
0.417 0.583 ge´ographiques de la Suisse 2012”
Size
Small Medium Big Swiss Federal Statistical Office: “Niveaux
0.435 0.379 0.185 ge´ographiques de la Suisse 2012”
Urban
Urban Rural Swiss Federal Statistical Office: “Niveaux
0.382 0.618 ge´ographiques de la Suisse 2012”
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percent of the municipalities of our sample. Other services such as refuse collection
are privately contracted over 65 percent of the time. Specialized services in school,
sewage treatments, forests maintenance and animal carcases removal services are in a
majority of municipalities publicly contracted. The service with the lowest share of
municipalities resorting to the private provision is specialized services in school (e.g.
school psychologists, logopaedics).
Fig. 2.4 shows a comparison of the share of private contracting for each service
between our data and Levin and Tadelis (2010). Services in the upper white triangle
are more often privately contracted in our Swiss data than in the U.S. data of Levin
and Tadelis (2010), whereas services in the gray triangle are more often privately
contracted in the U.S. than in Switzerland. This figure shows than 5 services out of
the 13 that are present in both studies are more often contracted-out in Switzerland,
including the services related to water (sewage treatment, drinking water distribution).
In order to control for the fact that some services are not provided in each city,
and to consider that the make-or-buy decision is affected by municipality-specific
characteristics, we regress a dummy variable Private, taking the value 1 if the service
is privately contracted on municipality fixed-effects (dummies). Then, we consider the
average residual by service as a measure of the frequency of private contracting for
each service. The same method is used, mutatis mutandis, for Public contracting and
In-house provision17. Figure 2.5 suggests a very weak impact of contracting difficulty
on private contracting. Whereas we might have expected a negative correlation, some
services with a high level of contracting difficulty are often contracted-out (e.g. public
transportation, maintenance of water facilities, street light). Figure 2.6 shows a strong
positive correlation between contracting difficulty and public contracting. In this case,
we do not observe any significant outlier. Finally, Figure 2.7 shows a strong negative
correlation between contracting difficulty and in-house provision. The only outlier is
refuse collection, with a low contracting difficulty and a very low frequency of in-house
provision. These results which at first glance may appear divergent with the rest of
literature, suffer however from the lack of control variables.
17The same methodology is used in Levin and Tadelis (2010).
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Figure 2.3: Modes of provision by services
79
Figure 2.4: Share of private contracting in our data and in Levin and Tadelis (2010)
Figure 2.5: Private contracting and contracting difficulty
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Figure 2.6: Public contracting and contracting difficulty
Figure 2.7: In-house provision and contracting difficulty
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2.3 Determinants of the Organizational Choices of
Swiss Municipalities
2.3.1 Empirical strategy
Our analysis is based on a multinomial-logit model. We consider the relationship :
Mode∗ij = Xi · αi + Yj · βj + Zij · γij + Ci · ζi + ij (2.1)
where Mode∗ij is an unobserved latent variable of the mode of provision (public
contracting, private contracting, or in-house) of the service j in the municipality i, Xi
is a vector of municipal characteristics (Size, Urban, Mountain, Income, Demographic
Dependency Ratio18), Yj is a vector of service variables (Contracting difficulty, Bud-
get Weight), and Zij is a vector of parameters that vary both across municipalities
and across services (Uncertainty, Sensitivity, Competition). Switzerland is a federal
country, in which the States (Cantons) have a rather large autonomy. All tasks re-
sort a priori to the Cantons, unless expressly specified in the Federal Constitution19.
This implies that no power can be transferred from the Cantons to the Federal State
without the agreement of both the majority of the people and the majority of the
States. It follows that most policies in Switzerland are set at the State (rather than
the Federal) level. For this reason, we have to adopt a within-state estimation strategy
(vector Ci of Canton fixed effects).
This identification strategy has several advantages. First, considering only the
bilingual cantons allows us to use Canton fixed effects. Doing this, we are able to com-
pare municipalities facing the same institutional framework. Problems of differential
laws and institutions across Cantons can hence be avoided. In addition, restricting
the study to municipalities close to the language border allows us to consider that the
unobserved heterogeneity in terms of structure of the market is similar on both sides
of the border. Due to the small distances, and to the fact that the Roestigraben does
not correspond to geographical barriers, the municipalities located close to the bor-
der have an access to firms located in both language areas without additional costs,
and the firms located at the border have the necessary local knowledge to work on
both sides of the border20. However, this unobserved heterogeneity in terms of geo-
graphical market structure might not be similar anymore further from the language
border, and we expect more heterogeneous sample further from the border. Finally,
it is a common (at least implicit) assumption in the literature (e.g. Bru¨lhart and
Jametti (2006)) that the quantity of provided public services, but also their quality,
is homogeneous across Swiss municipalities.
18The demographic dependency ratio is computed by dividing the number of inhabitants below 16
or above 65 (“dependents”) by the number of inhabitants between 16 and 65 (“active population”).
19Article 3 of the Swiss Constitution: “The Cantons are sovereign except to the extent that their
sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution. They exercise all rights that are not vested in the
Confederation.”
20For example, many municipalities in the French part of Canton Fribourg contracted-out the
waste removal to a firm located at a couple of kilometers of the border, in the German area.
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2.3.2 Results
Throughout this section, rather than reporting hard-to-interpret coefficients from the
multinomial logit model, we shall report the marginal effects on the choice probabili-
ties.
Table 2.8 report the results of multinomial logit regressions considering three
modes of provision: in-house provision (base category), public contracting, and pri-
vate contracting. The first two columns report the results of the model without State
fixed effects, whereas we added State dummies in the last two columns.
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. In line with the
transaction-cost theory, and consistently with Brown and Potoski (2003) and Levin
and Tadelis (2010), we observe that greater contracting difficulty — services for which
it is harder to write and administer performance contracts — is associated with more
public contracting and less private sector contracting. The impact of contracting dif-
ficulty on public contracting might be explained by the fact that public contracting is
a substitute for in-house provision for a municipality that wishes to take advantage of
economies of scale while retaining more control over provision for services for which
the contracting difficulty is high. However, the marginal impact is rather low and
much lower than in Levin and Tadelis (2010) : A one standard deviation increase in
contracting difficulty is associated with a change in the probability of being contracted
with the private sector of 3 percent. Second, we find a striking effect of competition.
Municipalities facing a strong competitive private sector market for a given service
are significantly more prone to contract it with private firms, which is in line with our
expectations. More precisely, a one standard deviation change in the perceived degree
of private sector competition is associated with 22 percent increase in the likelihood
of private contracting. This is the variable which has the most important effect on
the likelihood of private contracting. The fact that we observe a negative impact of
competition on public contracting suggests that public contracting acts as a substitute
for private contracting when the degree of competition is low.
Third, we observe that services for which future requirements are difficult to an-
ticipate (variable Uncertainty) are more often contracted with private sector firms.
In-line with the theoretical TCT literature which postulates that asset specificity and
uncertainty must be met at the same time for transaction costs to occur, we observe
that the effects of Contracting difficulty (that includes in particular asset specificity)
and Uncertainty reinforce each other (Table 2.7). In addition, this result may suggest
that municipalities try to outsource to a third part the risks associated with uncer-
tainty (e.g the risk of having an over- or under-capacity in the future). This might
however improve productive efficiency if the third part is best able to manage this risk
at the lowest cost, i.e. is best able to affect the risky outcome and minimise any nega-
tive impact of the underlying uncertainty on the project (Debande, 2002; Va¨lila¨, 2005).
Our results suggest that municipalities think that private firms have more skills to
manage the risks happening during the operation phases. This effect is in line with
the fact that Swiss municipalities are particularly small (see above in Section 2.1),
which makes it particularly difficult for them to manage this risk. The fact that we
83
also observe a positive impact of Uncertainty on public contracting (and not only on
private contracting) tends to confirm this hypothesis. If this interpretation is true,
we should observe a bigger impact of Uncertainty for small municipalities and/or a
smaller impact for big municipalities. Indeed, considering that bigger municipalities
are expected to be best able to manage the demand risk (i.e. to have a better pooling
of this risk), the impact of the demand risk should be smaller for big municipalities21.
In order to verify this hypothesis, we add to our model interaction terms between
uncertainty and municipal characteristics, in particular with the size. The results
reported in Table 2.9 show that the interaction term Uncertainty × Big has a signif-
icant negative impact, meaning that the effect of uncertainty decreases with the size
of municipalities. This tends to confirm the validity of our explanation.
Table 2.7: Uncertainty and Contracting difficulty
Public Private
Contr. Contr.
Uncertainty × Contr. Diff. -0.0019 -0.02***
(0.0033) (0.0039)
Contr. Diff. 0.0598*** -0.0066
(0.0045) (0.0043)
Uncertainty 0.0107 0.0321***
(0.0069) (0.0073)
Competition -0.0758*** 0.0562***
(0.0062) (0.007)
Sensitivity -0.0159*** 0.0157***
(0.0047) (0.0055)
Big -0.0648*** -0.0342*
(0.015) (0.0198)
Small 0.042*** 0.0101
(0.0157) (0.0174)
Urban 0.0271* -0.0279*
(0.0154) (0.0165)
Mountain -0.0205 -0.0314*
(0.0134) (0.0164)
Dep. Ratio -0.0025*** 0.0023**
(0.0008) (0.0011)
Income -0.0025 0.0186***
(0.006) (0.0048)
Budget Weight 0.0015 0.043***
(0.0078) (0.0081)
Canton FE Yes Yes
Municipalities 399 399
Obsservations 7395 7395
Notes: Multinomial Logit; In-house provision is the base outcome. Re-
ported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of different modes
of service provision. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal-
ity level. All regressions include State dummies. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Contrary to Levin and Tadelis (2010) who observed a negative impact of resi-
dents’ sensitivity on private contracting, we observe a significant positive impact of
21On the sharing of the demand risk between a public authority and a private provider, see Athias
(2009).
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this variable on private contracting, and a significant negative impact on public con-
tracting. Sensitivity can affect the make-or-buy decision by several means. The first
one is based on the transaction-cost theory: when the sensitivity is high, the risk of
opportunism is higher because the private contractor has a larger negotiation power.
Indeed, contractual penalties cannot be applied without jeopardizing the continuity
of the provision. This channel leads sensitivity to have a negative impact on private
contracting.
But the opposite effect can be explained by the fact that Swiss municipalities,
due to their small size, lack experience and know-how in order to provide public
services in an efficient way, which may lead the policy-makers to expect the private
sector to be best able to provide high quality public services. This should foster the
buy, particularly when the residents’ sensitivity is high, that is, when the quality of
the services is the most important. Indeed, the more the quality of the service is
important, the more an increase of the quality can compensate the transaction costs,
and hence foster the buy. Boycko et al. (1996) and Lo´pez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) have
shown that there are private benefits for politicians of keeping service provision inside
the government, because this allows them to keep a large control over the provision
of the services, which give them more leeway to satisfy personal interest. However,
external constraints can force them to contract-out with the private sector in the
interest of the municipality and at the expense of their own interest: a high sensitivity
of the residents can be such a constraint. This explanation is also coherent with the
fact that the positive impact of sensitivity is lower for bigger municipalities, insofar
the control exerted by the citizens is usually weaker in larger municipalities. In line
with this interpretation, we observe a significantly negative impact of the interaction
term Sensitivity × Big (Table 2.10).
Regarding control variables, we find a striking pattern in municipality size. We
observe that, compared to medium-sized municipalities, large municipalities are sig-
nificantly less prone to contract both with the private and the public sector. Small
municipalities for their part are more prone to contract with other public entities,
but exhibit no significant impact towards private contracting. These results are to be
explained by the fact that large municipalities have the critical size to provide local
public services by themselves whereas medium-sized and small municipalities have
to contract to take advantage of economies of scale. Moreover, small municipalities
do not always dispose from sufficient means and competencies to manage efficiently
certain services.
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Table 2.8: Multinomial Logit model
(1) (2)
Public Private Public Private
Contracting diff. 0.0604*** -0.0089** 0.0603*** -0.0084**
(0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0042)
Uncertainty 0.011* 0.0326*** 0.0132** 0.032***
(0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0066) (0.0069)
Competition -0.0759*** 0.0557*** -0.0769*** 0.0539***
(0.0062) (0.007) (0.0062) (0.007)
Sensitivity -0.0156*** 0.02*** -0.0154*** 0.0191***
(0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0053)
Big -0.065*** -0.0334* -0.0688*** -0.033
(0.015) (0.0198) (0.0151) (0.0205)
Small 0.042*** 0.0101 0.0475*** -0.0011
(0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0158) (0.0176)
Urban 0.0272* -0.0278* 0.0328** -0.0377**
(0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0155) (0.0165)
Mountain -0.0205 -0.0304* -0.0245 0.0148
(0.0134) (0.0164) (0.0174) (0.0219)
Dependency ratio -0.0025*** 0.0022** -0.0019** 0.0013
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Income -0.0025 0.0181*** 0.0025 0.0115**
(0.006) (0.0048) (0.0067) (0.0055)
Budget weight 0.0018 0.0444*** 0.0014 0.0445***
(0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0081)
Canton FE No No Yes Yes
Municipalities 399 399 399 399
Observations 7395 7395 7395 7395
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of differ-
ent modes of service provision. In-house provision is the base outcome.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
86
Table 2.9: Uncertainty and municipal characteristics
(1) (2)
Public Private Public Private
Uncertainty 0.0014 0.0407*** -0.0914** 0.0486
(0.0097) (0.0106) (0.0463) (0.0561)
Uncertainty x Big 0.0083 -0.0336** 0.0119 -0.036*
(0.0169) (0.0171) 0.0176) (0.0185)
Uncertainty x Small 0.023* -0.0062 0.0222 -0.0074
(0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0149) (0.0148)
Uncertainty x Urban -0.0023 0.0055
(0.0142) (0.0148)
Uncertainty x Mountain 0.0018 0.0302**
(0.0131) (0.0145)
Uncertainty x Dep. Ratio 0.0014** -0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Uncertainty x Income 0.0023 0.0016
(0.0048) (0.0039)
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipalities 399 399 399 399
Observations 7395 7395 7395 7395
Additional controls: Contracting difficulty, Competition, Sensitivity,
Big, Small, Urban, Mountain, Dependency ratio, Income, Budget weight.
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of differ-
ent modes of service provision. In-house provision is the base outcome.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.10: Sensitivity and municipal characteristics
(1) (2)
Public Private Public Private
Sensitivity -0.0211*** 0.0224*** -0.0347 0.1153***
(0.0075) (0.0078) (0.033) (0.0441)
Sensitivity x Big -0.0018 -0.0306** 0.0071 -0.0347**
(0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0136)
Sensitivity x Small 0.0126 0.0051 0.0037 0.0059
(0.0094) (0.0106) (0.0097) (0.0114)
Sensitivity x Urban 0.0136*** -0.0053
(0.0052) (0.0056)
Sensitivity x Mountain 0.0026 0.0018
(0.0091) (0.0102)
Sensitivity x Dep. Ratio -0.0005 -0.0011
(0.0005) (0.0007)
Sensitivity x Income 0.0013 -0.0066***
(0.0031) (0.0025)
Canton FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipalities 399 399 399 399
Observations 7395 7395 7395 7395
Additional controls: Contracting difficulty, Competition, Uncertainty, Big,
Small, Urban, Mountain, Dependency ratio, Income, Budget weight.
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of differ-
ent modes of service provision. In-house provision is the base outcome.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.11 reports the estimations of a model with fixed effects. In the first
regression, we replace all the service variables (including city × service variables) by
service fixed effects. Model 2 reports the results of an estimation in which the service
fixed effects are replaced by sector fixed effects. We consider four sectors, based on
the official accounting plan of Swiss municipalities, namely Education (4 services:
Child day-care centres, School canteen, Specialized services in school, Maintenance
of school buildings), Environment (7 services: Refuse collection, Solid waste disposal,
Animal carcases removal, Drinking water distribution, Maintenance of water facilities,
Sewage treatment, Cemeteries), Traffic (6 services: Snow cleaning, Road cleaning,
Road maintenance, Parking control, Street lights, Public transportation), and Green
and Nature (2 services: Local parks and gardens, Trimming of trees). In both cases,
the results are in line with the results of the baseline model.
Finally, the results of a Multinomial Logit model in which the city variables are
replaced by city fixed effects (estimations reported in Table 2.12) are also totally in
line with the results of the baseline model.
Table 2.11: Multinomial Logit with service / sector FE
(1) (2)
Public Private Public Private
Contr. Contr. Contr. Contr.
Big -0.067*** -0.0401** -0.0735*** -0.0372*
(0.0152) (0.0204) (0.0146) (0.0225)
Small 0.0566*** -0.0017 0.055*** -0.0037
(0.0151) (0.0178) (0.0164) (0.0195)
Urban 0.0529*** -0.0464*** 0.0372** -0.0415**
(0.0147) (0.0172) (0.0157) (0.0187)
Mountain -0.033* 0.0166 -0.0311* 0.0116
(0.0173) (0.0221) (0.0181) (0.0252)
Demographic Dep. Ratio -0.0012 0.001 -0.0017* 0.0015
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Income 0.0032 0.0114* 0.0037 0.0121*
(0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0064)
Municipalities 399 399 399 399
Observations 3795 3795 3795 3795
Additional controls Service FE Sector FE
Notes: Multinomial Logit; In-house provision is the base outcome. Reported coefficients are marginal effects on
probability of different modes of service provision. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. All
regressions include State dummies. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12: Multinomial Logit with City FE
Public Private
Contr. Contr.
Contr. Diff. 0.0595*** -0.0096**
(0.0046) (0.0041)
Uncertainty 0.0114* 0.0335***
(0.0067) (0.0072)
Competition -0.0763*** 0.0559***
(0.0063) (0.007)
Sensitivity -0.0172*** 0.0205***
(0.0047) (0.0052)
Budget Weight 0.0012 0.044***
(0.0079) (0.008)
Municipalities 399 399
Observations 7395 7395
Additional controls City FE
Notes: Multinomial Logit; In-house provision is the base outcome.
Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of different
modes of service provision. All regressions include State dummies.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
2.3.3 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our results, we also run a logit regression, merging the
categories Public contracting and In-House provision, thus directly opposing private
and public provision, with an identical specification. In this case, we are able to
estimate the model with robust standard errors clustered at both the municipal and
service levels. We also consider two models in which we include respectively service
and municipality fixed effects (Columns 2 and 3).
This analysis shows no significant impact of contracting difficulty on contracting,
which is due to the fact that contracting difficulty increases public contracting and
decreases private contracting. Hence, these two effects cancel each other out when
considering contracting in general. A similar pattern can be observed regarding the
residents’ sensitivity. In addition, in line with the fact that Uncertainty increased
both public and private contracting in the Multinomial Logit model, the logit model
logically exhibits a significant positive impact of Uncertainty on contracting. Also
in line with the results of the Multinomial Logit, we observe that the bigger the
municipality is, the less it contracts.
We finally run an ordered logit, considering a qualitative index of contracting, that
is, a dependent variable that takes the values 0 for in-house provision, 1 for public
contracting and 2 for private contracting (Table 2.14). In other words, we assume
that there is an increasing degree of contracting from in-house (the lowest degree of
contracting) to private contracting (the highest degree). We observe that the munic-
ipalities tend to choose higher degrees of contracting when the contracting difficulty
is high. This result is in line with the results of the multinomial logit model, who
shows that contracting difficulty increases public contracting, and that this effect is
bigger than the negative effect on private contracting. As in the multinomial logit,
Sensitivity and Uncertainty are positively correlated with higher degrees of contract-
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Table 2.13: Logit model: Contracting vs. In-House
(1) (2)
Contr. Diff. 0.0544 0.055
(0.0412) (0.0417)
Uncertainty 0.0438*** 0.0451***
(0.015) (0.015)
Competition -0.0175 -0.0195
(0.0204) (0.0207)
Sensitivity 0.0034 0.0033
(0.0252) (0.0254)
Big -0.1024*** -0.1072***
(0.0277) (0.0282)
Small 0.0526* 0.0467*
(0.0307) (0.0266)
Urban 0.0007 -0.0035
(0.0209) (0.0207)
Mountain -0.0516** -0.0109
(0.0227) (0.0262)
Dep. Ratio -0.0005 -0.0007
(0.0014) (0.0012)
Income 0.0171*** 0.0142**
(0.0063) (0.007)
Budget Weight 0.0432 0.0424
(0.0671) (0.0676)
Canton FE No Yes
Municipalities 399 399
Obsservations 7395 7395
Notes: Logit model. Dependent variable: dummy with value
1 for contracting (public and private) and value 0 for In-
House provision. Reported coefficients are marginal effects
on probability of contracting (publicly or privately). Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the municipality and service levels.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
ing. Services that account for a larger part of the municipal budget are also more
prone to contracted at a higher degree. Regarding municipal characteristics, we logi-
cally observe that the bigger the municipality, the less the services are contracted. By
contrast, municipalities with a higher income choose higher degrees of contracting.
This is also in line with the results of the multinomial logit, that showed that in-
come is positively correlated with private contracting, and that there is no significant
relationship between income and public contracting.
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Table 2.14: Ordered Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contracting diff. 0.123*** 0.140***
(0.0181) (0.0206)
Uncertainty 0.159*** 0.157***
(0.0329) (0.0329)
Competition 0.0478 0.0696**
(0.0326) (0.0296)
Sensitivity 0.0546** 0.0727***
(0.0233) (0.0238)
Budget weight 0.164*** 0.181***
(0.0287) (0.0341)
Big -0.341*** -0.359*** -0.325***
(0.0951) (0.105) (0.0946)
Small 0.147* 0.178** 0.170**
(0.0785) (0.0880) (0.0792)
Urban -0.0425 -0.0274 -0.0287
(0.0755) (0.0842) (0.0759)
Mountain -0.166** -0.246*** -0.218***
(0.0731) (0.0824) (0.0739)
Dep. Ratio 0.00216 0.00640 0.00426
(0.00440) (0.00497) (0.00448)
Income 0.0784*** 0.0948*** 0.0803***
(0.0242) (0.0272) (0.0247)
Additional controls No Service FE Sector FE City FE
Observations 7,395 7,395 7,395 7,395
Municipalities 399 399 399 399
Notes: *p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01. Ordered Logit. Dependent variable takes the values 0 for
in-house provision, 1 for public contracting and 2 for private contracting. Reported coefficients are log odd
ratios. Columns 1-3: Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level Column 4: Robust
standard errors. The sectors considered in column 3 are: Education, Environment, Traffic, Green and
Nature. All regressions contain Canton fixed effects.
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2.4 Unobserved Heterogeneity: Culture and Anal-
ysis of Mispredicted Outcomes
The second part of our analysis aims to shed light on the importance of culture on the
organizational choices. To do this, we use an original identification strategy to cap-
ture the unobserved heterogeneity and to find factors that explain the mispredicted
outcomes, that is, observations (service–municipality pairs) for which we observe a
public provision whereas the model predicts a private provision (what we shall call
henceafter False Public), and the observations for which we observe a private provision
whereas the model predicts public provision (False Private). Analysing the mispre-
dicted outcomes is interesting, as the fact that an outcome is mispredicted suggests
a gap between the expectations of the theoretical framework (operationalized in the
model) and the results observed in the practice.
Our analysis consists in two steps: first, we run a standard logit model combined
with a within-Canton estimation strategy in order to explain make-or-buy municipal
decisions for the provision of their services. Second, using the predicted value of
the latent variable of the first-step logit model, we run estimations to explain the
mispredicted outcomes in this standard model, including a language variable.
The use of this methodology based on false public and false private rather than
“simply” including a dummy French to our baseline model is justified by the fact
that, on the one hand, this cultural dummy would be highly multicolinear with the
Canton fixed effects, whereas on the other hand a model without Canton fixed effects
would not allow to disentangle the effects of culture and the effects of the cantonal
institutional framework. Hence, the only way of measuring the impact of culture while
considering the cantonal institutional framework is to consider only the municipalities
in bilingual cantons, which is what we are going to do in Chapter 3.
First-step estimation: make-or-buy model
In order to make the analysis of mispredictions possible, we will now turn to a binary
(logit) model. For the purpose of this study, as our concern is on cultural issues,
we restrict our sample to the 377 municipalities in the French- and German-speaking
areas.
We consider the relationship :
Private∗ij = Xi · αi + Yj · βj + Zij · γij + Ci · ζi + ij (2.2)
where Private∗ij is an unobserved latent variable of the mode of provision (pub-
lic or private) of the service j in the municipality i, Xi is a vector of municipal
characteristics (Size, Urban, Mountain, Income, Dependency Ratio), Yj is a vector of
service variables (Contracting difficulty, Budget Weight), and Zij is a vector of param-
eters that vary both across municipalities and across services (Uncertainty, Sensitivity,
Competition). As in the previous section, we adopt a within-state estimation strategy
(vector Ci of Canton fixed effects) in order to account the fact that all tasks resort a
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priori to the Cantons (see above in Section 2.1). Again, rather than reporting hard-
to-interpret coefficients from the logit models, we report the marginal effects on the
choice probabilities. The estimations are reported in Table 2.15. These results are in
line with those obtained in the previous section with the multinomial-logit approach.
Table 2.15: Determinants of private contracting
(1) (2)
Difficulty -0.0135*** -0.0135
(0.004) (0.0313)
Uncertainty 0.0258*** 0.0258**
(0.0068) (0.0117)
Competition 0.0548*** 0.0548***
(0.007) (0.0158)
Sensitivity 0.0234*** 0.0234
(0.0052) (0.0164)
Big -0.0355* -0.0355*
(0.0194) (0.0199)
Small -0.0038 -0.0038
(0.0175) (0.0158)
Urban -0.0336** -0.0336***
(0.0161) (0.0116)
Mountain 0.018 0.018
(0.0212) (0.0133)
Dep. Ratio 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0011) (0.0006)
Income 0.0117** 0.0117***
(0.0056) (0.0028)
Budget Weight 0.0397*** 0.0397
(0.0078) (0.0481)
Canton FE Yes Yes
Clustered SE Municipality Service
Municipalities 377 377
Observations 6992 6992
Pearson χ2 6963.74 6963.74
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value 0.4952 0.4952
Notes: Logit model. Dependent variable: Private contract-
ing. Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probabil-
ity of private provision (against in-house provision and pub-
lic contracting). Standard errors clustered at the municipal-
ity level (1st column) and at the service level (2nd column)
in parentheses. All regressions include Canton fixed effects
(dummies); ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Second-step estimation: An analysis of Mispredictions
We want to observe, for each pair municipality–service, the discrepancies between the
mode of provision predicted by the model and the actual mode of provision. In order
to determine the predicted outcome, we compute the probability of a private outcome
of our Logit model. This estimated probability is defined as:
Pˆr(Private = 1|w) = Λ(wδˆ) (2.3)
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where Λ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard logistic distribu-
tion, and wδˆ is the predicted value of the latent variable ( ˆPrivate
∗
ij) for a given set
of values w of the independent variables.
Then, we attribute the predicted outcome “Private” to the observations for which
the probability of the outcome “Private” is greater or equal to a threshold µ :
yˆ =
{
1 if Pˆr(Private = 1|x) > µ
0 if Pˆr(Private = 1|x) ≤ µ (2.4)
The value of µ has been fixed in such a manner that the proportion of predicted
“Private” corresponds to the proportions of Private actually observed in our data.
This analysis shows that 70.1 percent of the observations are aligned (i.e. the pre-
dicted outcome corresponds to the observed outcome), 14.7 percent are False-Public
(“Public” observed and “Private” predicted), and 15.2 percent are False-Private (“Pri-
vate” observed and “Public” predicted). We observe a significant gap between the
French and German-speaking municipalities (Fig. 2.8): whereas the proportion of
False-Public is 20.8 percent in the French area, it is only 9.3 percent in the German
area (p-value = 1.49 · 10−42). The difference in terms of False-Private is somewhat
smaller, but still significant, as 16.1 percent of the observations in German-speaking
municipalities and 14.1 percent in the French-speaking municipalities are False-Private
(p-value = 0.021).
Figure 2.8: Misspecified observations in both language areas
In order to be sure that the language is a driver of mispredictions, we then run
Logit regressions of the dummy variables False Private and False Public on service and
municipal variables (the variables used in our previous model plus a dummy variable
FRENCH ). To do this, we split our data into two subsamples, namely one sample
with the observations for which the predicted outcome is Private, and one sample
with the observations for which the predicted outcome is Public. We use the former
for the regressions regarding False-Public, and the latter for regressions regarding
95
Private Public
Private Public Private Public
PREDICTED
OBSERVED
Aligned
private
False
Public
False
Private
Aligned
Public
Figure 2.9: Aligned observations, False-Private, and False-Public
False-Private. The reason why we do this is that, when the predicted outcome is
Private, the only choice for the municipality is between Aligned-Private and False-
Public: Aligned-Public and False-Private are not possible choices (Fig. 2.9). Hence,
as our concern is on misprediction, observations for which the predicted outcome is
Private are not relevant to explain False-Private. Similarly, observations for which
the predicted outcome is Public are not relevant in the study of False-Public. In the
subsample of Private predicted outcome, 63.5 percent of the observations are False-
Public; in the subsample of Public predicted outcome, 19.8 percent of the observations
are False-Private. These proportions are in line with the true proportions of observed
Public and Private in the whole sample.
The regression results are reported in the Table 2.16. As in the first step model, we
show the estimations with standard errors clustered at the municipal level (columns
1 and 2) and at the service level (columns 3 and 4). We observe that the language
dummy FRENCH has a very significant positive impact on False-Public. This result
is robust across estimations. More specifically, we find that, while the predicted out-
come is Private, French-speaking municipalities are 33 percent more likely to provide
publicly public services than German-speaking municipalities (recall that on average
63.5 percent of private predicted outcome are False-Public and the estimated prob-
ability change is around 21 percentage points). By contrast, we do not observe a
robust evidence of an impact of the language on the mispredicted choices in the case
of private provision. The fact that the variables Big, Small, Urban, and Mountain are
dummies, as FRENCH is, allows for a direct comparison of the marginal effects: the
marginal effect of FRENCH is much higher than the marginal effects of Big, Small,
Urban, and Mountain, which points out that FRENCH explains a much larger part
of the False-Public misspecifications than these variables.
2.5 Conclusion
The goals of this chapter were, first, to observe to what extent the classical predictions
of the make-or-buy for public services (in terms of efficiency as well as political issues)
are verified in the Swiss case, in order to determine to what extent specific features of
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Table 2.16: Determinants of False-Private and False-Public
(1) (2) (3) (4)
False Private False Public False Private False Public
French -0.0126 0.2085** -0.0126 0.2085***
(0.0271) (0.1028) (0.0292) (0.0569)
Difficulty -0.0068 0.0397*** -0.0068 0.0397
(0.0043) (0.0116) (0.0271) (0.0464)
Uncertainty 0.0207*** -0.0482*** 0.0207* -0.0482***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.0113) (0.0164)
Competition 0.057*** -0.0635*** 0.057*** -0.0635**
(0.0078) (0.0209) (0.017) (0.0262)
Sensitivity 0.0238*** -0.0172 0.0238* -0.0172
(0.0054) (0.015) (0.0139) (0.0282)
Big -0.0348* 0.0723 -0.0348* 0.0723*
(0.0182) (0.0453) (0.0205) (0.0395)
Small -0.0235 -0.0758** -0.0235 -0.0758**
(0.0175) (0.0335) (0.0169) (0.0364)
Urban -0.0466*** -0.0159 -0.0466*** -0.0159
(0.0159) (0.0412) (0.0131) (0.0409)
Mountain -0.0036 -0.1195** -0.0036 -0.1195***
(0.0187) (0.0525) (0.0146) (0.0203)
Dep. Ratio 0.0012 -0.001 0.0012 -0.001
(0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0015)
Income 0.0082 -0.0226*** 0.0082 -0.0226***
(0.0101) (0.0077) (0.0052) (0.0034)
Budget Weight 0.0328*** -0.0608** 0.0328 -0.0608
(0.0078) (0.0256) (0.0463) (0.0611)
Clustered SE Municipality Municipality Service Service
Observations 5368 1622 5368 1622
Notes: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01; Logit model. Dependent variables:
False private (dummy, cols 1 and 3), False public (dummy, cols 2 and 4).
Reported coefficients are marginal effects on the probability of False-Private
conditional on a public predicted outcome, and False-Public conditional on a
private predicted outcome, respectively.
the Swiss context may interfere in the make-or-buy decision, and secondly to capture,
for the first time, the impact of culture on organizational choices, using the different
languages in Switzerland to capture heterogeneity in terms of culture at the municipal
level.
To do this, we built an original, self-constructed database of 22 services in 399
Swiss municipalities.
Regarding the classical determinants of the make-or-buy decision, we observe first
that, the higher the contracting difficulty, the less the public services are contracted-
out to the private sector, and the less it will be contracted-in with other public au-
thorities. Secondly, we observe a significant impact of size on public contracting,
namely that big municipalities are less prone to contract-in. By contrast, we do not
observe any impact of the size on private contracting. Regarding uncertainty, we ob-
serve that a higher level of uncertainty fosters the resort to both the private and the
public sectors, and that Uncertainty and Contracting difficulty reinforce each other.
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We explain the positive relationship between uncertainty and contracting-out by the
fact that Swiss municipalities, due to their small size, are not in a position to manage
efficiently the demand risk, which leads them to externalize this risk. Finally, we
observe a positive impact of residents’ sensitivity on private contracting. We explain
this result by the fact that the policy makers expect that the private sector will be
best able to provide high quality services, and that sensitivity may act as an external
constraint that force the policy-makers to contract-out when necessary, rather than
keeping the provision in-house in order to capture a rent.
The main insight of this analysis is then that Swiss municipalities, due to their
small size, lack experience and know-how in order to provide public services in an
efficient way. In the context of the make-or-buy decision, this increases the gap in
terms of productive efficiency in favour of private provision, which leads to foster the
buy.
Hence, the results regarding uncertainty and sensitivity suggest that small munic-
ipalities are less sensitive to transaction cost arguments due to a lack of competencies.
An important policy implication is hence that an increase of the size of the munic-
ipalities would allow to increase their productive efficiency in the delivery of public
services. This makes a case for strengthening the policy of incentives aiming to foster
mergers of municipality.
The results of the analysis of the mispredictions of the standard empirical model
for make-or-buy decisions suggest that this standard model might be misspecified due
to the omission of the cultural dimension in this decision. This opens the way to
further studies in order to make the standard empirical model for government make-
or-buy decisions more flexible, and to provide theoretical foundation for this cultural
impact. This is what is done in the second part of this thesis, in which we shall use
the discontinuity at the Swiss language border at identical actual set of policies and
institutions to analyze the causal effect of culture on the choice of how public services
are provided.
In addition, we observe a significant self-selection in our data, with an over-
representation of French-speaking municipalities (43.6 percent, whereas the proportion
in all Swiss municipalities is 29 percent) (Table 2.17). This difference vanishes when
we restrict our sample to the municipalities of the three bilingual cantons of Berne,
Valais, and Fribourg (Table 2.18). Hence, this is an additional argument suggesting
that the strategy that we shall develop in the next part of this thesis will allow us to
get a more robust evidence.
We can observe that the explanatory power of this model is quite low. Indeed, a
pure random assignment of the organizational modes would have lead to a share of 67
percent of aligned observations, whereas our analysis of misalignment shows that our
model leads to 70 percent of aligned observations. This represents a further argument
that an important determinant lacks in our analysis and that the “classical” determi-
nants of the make-or-buy decision highlighted by the literature are not sufficient to
explain the organizational choices in the Swiss context.
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Table 2.17: Comparison between our sample and all Swiss municipalities
All municipalities Our sample Difference
Size
Big Medium Small Big Medium Small
14.6 30.0 55.4 18.3 38.1 43.6 ***
French
Yes No Yes No
29.0 71.1 43.6 56.4 ***
Urban
Urban Rural Urban Rural
42.25 57.75 38.6 61.4 0
Mountain
Yes No Yes No
48.24 51.76 44.86 55.14 0
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Dep. Ratio 64.04 9.72 64.06 8.21 0
Income 1.05 1.35 1.17 1.40 *
Table 2.18: Comparison between our sample (only bilingual cantons) and all munici-
palities
All municipalities Our sample Difference
Size
Big Medium Small Big Medium Small
8.4 27.8 63.8 14.08 38.73 47.18 ***
French
Yes No Yes No
35.3 64.8 40.85 59.15 0
Urban
Urban Rural Urban Rural
39.18 60.82 30.28 69.72 **
Mountain
Yes No Yes No
52.21 47.79 51.41 48.59 0
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Dep. Ratio 65.24 0.37 64.80 0.74 0
Income 0.63 0.02 0.69 0.05 0
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AAppendices
A.1 Questions in the municipal survey
Mode of Provision
Please indicate which way your municipality provides each of following services.
(22 services, 10 modes)
Uncertainty
How difficult is it for the authorities to anticipate what the needs of the citizens will be in the next
five years ?
(1 = very easy; 2 = rather easy; 3 = moderately difficult; 4 = rather difficult; 5 = very difficult)
Sensitivity
How much importance do the citizens of your municipality assign to the quality of each of following
services ?
(1 = very little importance; 2 = rather little importance; 3 = moderate importance; 4 = rather
much importance; 5 = very much importance)
Competition
Assuming that your municipality decides to provide the service with a private contract or a con-
cession contract, will there be a large number of competing firms, or on contrary will the choice
be very narrow ?
(1 = very few competitors; 2 = rather few competitors; 3 = moderate number 4 = rather many
competitors; 5 = many competitors)
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A.2 Questions in the restricted survey
Ex-ante difficulty
For some services, it is quite easy for the authorities to describe precisely in the contract the
expected characteristics of the service or the way the service must be provided. For other services
on contrary, such a description is difficult to do, which can lead the contract to be incomplete and
the service to be quite different from what was expected by the authorities. In your opinion, to
what extent is it difficult for the authorities to stipulate a contract that describes precisely what
has to be done ?
(1 = very easy; 2 = rather easy; 3 = moderately difficult; 4 = rather difficult; 5 = very difficult)
Ex-post difficulty
To what extent is it difficult for the authorities to observe and to measure the quality of a service
provided by an external provider?
(1 = very easy; 2 = rather easy; 3 = moderately difficult; 4 = rather difficult; 5 = very difficult)
Knowledge specificity
The production of some services needs specific skills that would be difficult for the employees to
use when working for another employer (e.g. knowledge about specific equiments or softwares),
whereas other services need only more general knowledge. This aspect is independent of the
degree of education and depends more on experience or specific training. In what extent does the
production of following services need that the employees have skills they would not be able to use
if they were employed on other duties.
(1 = very weak specificity; 2 = rather weak specificity; 3 = moderate specificity; 4 = rather high
specificity; 5 = very high specificity)
Physical specificity
In your opinion, to what extent does the provision of this service need equipment (machines,
buildings, softwares a.s.o) that could not be used for other tasks ?
(1 = very weak specificity; 2 = rather weak specificity; 3 = moderate specificity; 4 = rather high
specificity; 5 = very high specificity)
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Lausanne, le 1er décembre 2012 
Madame, Monsieur, 
La Suisse est l’un des pays au monde où les régions (cantons) et les communes disposent de 
la plus grande autonomie. Cette autonomie se manifeste, entre autres, dans la manière dont les 
communes distribuent des services publics à leur population. En Suisse, si certains services 
publics, à l’exemple de la collecte des déchets, sont fréquemment et depuis longtemps 
externalisés à des entreprises privées, certains autres services sont presque toujours fournis 
directement par les collectivités publiques. En outre, il existe de nombreuses entreprises 
publiques dont le mode de gestion tient principalement de celui de l’économie privée. D’autre 
part, la plupart des communes collaborent en matière de services publics soit par des contrats 
de vente de services, soit par le biais  d’associations de communes ou de syndicats 
intercommunaux. Les enjeux de ces choix sont fondamentaux car ils affectent souvent la vie 
quotidienne des citoyens, mais aussi la qualité de la gouvernance publique et le rapport 
qu’entretient la population avec ses autorités. 
Ces questions importantes  n’ont à l’heure actuelle jamais fait l’objet d’études approfondies à 
l’échelle des communes suisses. C’est la raison pour laquelle nous avons choisi de consacrer 
une recherche à ce thème. Plus précisément, il s’agit d’étudier quels sont les facteurs qui 
guident les  communes au moment de choisir de produire elles-mêmes un service public ou 
d’externaliser la production de celui-ci à d’autres entités publiques ou privées. Cette recherche 
menée au sein de l’unité d’économie de la régulation de l’IDHEAP s’inscrit dans le cadre d’un 
projet du Fonds National Suisse de la Recherche Scientifique (FNS). Ce projet repose sur une 
démarche scientifique tout en ayant une portée pratique pour les collectivités publiques de notre 
pays. En cela, elle est originale et contribuera à l’élargissement des connaissances en matière 
de production des services publics dans un contexte fédéraliste, ceci dans le but d’une bonne 
gouvernance. 
Ce thème n’ayant jamais été étudié en Suisse, il nous est indispensable de constituer une base 
de données qui servira de fondement à notre étude. Il est important que cette base de données 
soit la plus large possible afin que des enseignements pratiques puissent être tirés de nos 
résultats. C’est pour cette raison que nous avons l’avantage de vous soumettre le présent 
questionnaire en vous remerciant de bien vouloir y répondre. Nous vous garantissons que notre 
base de données sera anonymisée et que les résultats publiés ne permettront en aucun cas 
d’identifier les réponses individuelles de chaque commune. Si nous vous demandons malgré 
tout d’identifier votre commune au début du questionnaire, c’est uniquement afin de mettre vos 
réponses en lien avec des données statistiques issues d’autres sources  (par exemple le chiffre 
de la population légale). 
En vous remerciant d’avance de votre précieuse collaboration, nous vous adressons, Madame, 
Monsieur, nos plus cordiales salutations 
Prof. Dr. Laure Athias, Professeure assistante 
Pascal Wicht, assistant-doctorant 
A l’attention du secrétaire communal 
A.3 Athias-Wicht survey (French version)
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 Pour chacune des questions suivantes, veuillez cocher une seule réponse. Si plusieurs 
réponses paraissent correspondre, veuillez choisir celle qui convient le mieux. Veuillez 
également répondre à toutes les questions : seuls les questionnaires remplis intégralement 
pourront être utilisés. Sauf précision contraire, toutes les questions s’entendent au 1er 
janvier 2012. 
Identification de la commune 
Nom de la commune :   
Canton :  
  
Fourniture des services publics 
Interne : Le service est fourni aux administrés par la commune, c’est-à-dire par des 
employés communaux, sans recours à des tiers. La commune est seule à décider et à 
assumer la responsabilité de ce service. Il s’agit du mode traditionnel de fourniture des 
services publics. 
Association : Le service est fourni par une association de commune (syndicat 
intercommunal), c’est-à-dire un organisme de droit public constitué pour la fourniture d’un 
ou plusieurs services. La commune est représentée dans les organes dirigeants de 
l’association. 
Régie : Le service est fourni par un établissement public autonome (services industriels) 
ou une entreprise appartenant en majorité aux pouvoirs publics. 
Contrat public : Le service est acheté à une autre commune ou à une autre collectivité 
publique (par exemple le canton).  
Contrat privé : Le service est acheté à une entreprise privée qui fournit le service. Le 
fournisseur est payé par la commune qui finance le service par une taxe ou par le budget 
public (c’est-à-dire par l’impôt). 
Partenariat public-privé : Le service est fourni conjointement par la commune et une ou 
plusieurs entreprises privées. Les responsabilités et les risques sont partagés entre le 
secteur public et le secteur privé. 
Concession : La commune ne fournit pas elle-même le service, elle autorise une ou 
plusieurs entreprises à fournir ce service et à le vendre aux administrés. La différence 
fondamentale avec le « contrat privé » est que dans le cadre de la concession, c’est le 
consommateur et non pas la commune qui paie directement le service au fournisseur. 
Autre niveau : Le service est fourni par un autre niveau gouvernemental (canton, cercle, 
district) sans que la commune n’intervienne dans la fourniture du service.  
Bénévolat : Le service est fourni par des bénévoles et/ou par des associations à but non 
lucratif. 
Non fourni : La commune ne fournit pas le service. La fourniture de celui-ci est, cas 
échéant, laissée au marché privé sans intervention des pouvoirs publics. 
  
 1. Veuillez nous indiquer de quelle manière votre commune fournit chacun des 
services suivants, selon les définitions ci-dessus.  
Si plusieurs réponses semblent convenir, veuillez cocher celle qui correspond le mieux. 
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Nettoyage des bureaux de l’administration  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Service d’hiver (déneigement des rues, salage) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Voirie, nettoyage des rues □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Contrôle du stationnement des véhicules sur le 
domaine public 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Collecte des ordures ménagères □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Déchetterie □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Enlèvement des cadavres d’animaux □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Eclairage public □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribution d’eau potable □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien des canalisations □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Epuration des eaux usées □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Accueils extrascolaires (pour enfants scolarisés, 
c’est-à-dire hors crèches et garderies) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Cantine scolaire □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Services scolaires spécialisés (logopédie, 
psychomotricité, psychologie scolaire) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien des bâtiments scolaires (conciergerie) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Surveillance de lieux sensibles (places publiques 
etc.), lutte contre le vandalisme 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Parcs et jardins (parcs publics, plates-bandes etc.) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Cimetières □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien et taille des arbres  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Forêts □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 2. Selon vous, à quel point est-il difficile pour les autorités de votre commune 
(exécutif communal) d’anticiper quels seront les besoins des citoyens de la 
commune concernant ce service dans les cinq prochaines années ? 
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Nettoyage des bureaux de l’administration  □ □ □ □ □ 
Service d’hiver (déneigement des rues, salage) □ □ □ □ □ 
Voirie, nettoyage des rues □ □ □ □ □ 
Contrôle du stationnement des véhicules sur le 
domaine public □ □ □ □ □ 
Collecte des ordures ménagères □ □ □ □ □ 
Déchetterie □ □ □ □ □ 
Enlèvement des cadavres d’animaux □ □ □ □ □ 
Eclairage public □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribution d’eau potable □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien des canalisations □ □ □ □ □ 
Epuration des eaux usées □ □ □ □ □ 
Accueils extrascolaires (pour enfants scolarisés, 
c’est-à-dire hors crèches et garderies) □ □ □ □ □ 
Cantine scolaire □ □ □ □ □ 
Services scolaires spécialisés (logopédie, 
psychomotricité, psychologie scolaire) □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien des bâtiments scolaires (conciergerie) □ □ □ □ □ 
Surveillance de lieux sensibles (places publiques 
etc.), lutte contre le vandalisme □ □ □ □ □ 
Parcs et jardins (parcs publics, plates-bandes etc.) □ □ □ □ □ 
Cimetières □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien et taille des arbres  □ □ □ □ □ 
Forêts □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
  
 3. Selon vous, quelle importance les citoyens de votre commune accordent-ils à la 
qualité du service fourni, pour chacun des services suivants ? 
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Nettoyage des bureaux de l’administration  □ □ □ □ □ 
Service d’hiver (déneigement des rues, salage) □ □ □ □ □ 
Voirie, nettoyage des rues □ □ □ □ □ 
Contrôle du stationnement des véhicules sur le 
domaine public □ □ □ □ □ 
Collecte des ordures ménagères □ □ □ □ □ 
Déchetterie □ □ □ □ □ 
Enlèvement des cadavres d’animaux □ □ □ □ □ 
Eclairage public □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribution d’eau potable □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien des canalisations □ □ □ □ □ 
Epuration des eaux usées □ □ □ □ □ 
Accueils extrascolaires (pour enfants scolarisés, 
c’est-à-dire hors crèches et garderies) □ □ □ □ □ 
Cantine scolaire □ □ □ □ □ 
Services scolaires spécialisés (logopédie, 
psychomotricité, psychologie scolaire) □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien des bâtiments scolaires (conciergerie) □ □ □ □ □ 
Surveillance de lieux sensibles (places publiques 
etc.), lutte contre le vandalisme □ □ □ □ □ 
Parcs et jardins (parcs publics, plates-bandes etc.) □ □ □ □ □ 
Cimetières □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien et taille des arbres  □ □ □ □ □ 
Forêts □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
 
 4. En supposant que votre commune décide de fournir les services suivants au 
moyen d’un contrat privé ou d’une concession, jugez-vous qu’elle serait en mesure 
de choisir entre de nombreuses entreprises ou qu’au contraire ce choix serait très 
restreint (peu de concurrents) ? 
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Nettoyage des bureaux de l’administration  □ □ □ □ □ 
Service d’hiver (déneigement des rues, salage) □ □ □ □ □ 
Voirie, nettoyage des rues □ □ □ □ □ 
Contrôle du stationnement des véhicules sur le 
domaine public □ □ □ □ □ 
Collecte des ordures ménagères □ □ □ □ □ 
Déchetterie □ □ □ □ □ 
Enlèvement des cadavres d’animaux □ □ □ □ □ 
Eclairage public □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribution d’eau potable □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien des canalisations □ □ □ □ □ 
Epuration des eaux usées □ □ □ □ □ 
Accueils extrascolaires (pour enfants scolarisés, 
c’est-à-dire hors crèches et garderies) □ □ □ □ □ 
Cantine scolaire □ □ □ □ □ 
Services scolaires spécialisés (logopédie, 
psychomotricité, psychologie scolaire) □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien des bâtiments scolaires (conciergerie) □ □ □ □ □ 
Surveillance de lieux sensibles (places publiques 
etc.), lutte contre le vandalisme □ □ □ □ □ 
Parcs et jardins (parcs publics, plates-bandes etc.) □ □ □ □ □ 
Cimetières □ □ □ □ □ 
Entretien et taille des arbres  □ □ □ □ □ 
Forêts □ □ □ □ □ 
 
  
 
Lausanne, den 8. Januar 2013 
 
 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren 
 
Die Schweiz geniesst eine hohe Selbständigkeit der Gemeinden und der Kantone. Dies 
zeigt sich unter anderem in der Art und Weise, wie die Gemeinden ihre Aufgaben 
wahrnehmen. Während Dienste wie die Abfallentsorgung oft und seit langem an 
privatrechtliche Unternehmen ausgelagert werden, werden andere Dienstleistungen fast 
immer durch die Gemeinde selber wahrgenommen. Dafür bestehen oft gemeindeeigene 
Unternehmen, die wie privatrechtliche geführt werden. Zudem werden viele 
Dienstleistungen durch Absprachen, Verträge und Arbeitsgemeinschaften zwischen 
Gemeinden oder im Verbund mehrerer Gemeinden erbracht. Die Wahl und das 
Zusammenspiel dieser Vorgänge  spürt der Bürger in Form der Qualität und der Kosten der 
täglichen Leistungen. Diese sind eine wesentlicher Massstab für das Vertrauen des 
Bürgers in seine Behörden. 
 
Bis anhin wurde diese Thematik in keiner schweizweiten Studie untersucht. Deshalb haben 
wir  beschlossen, die grosse Vielfalt im Bereich der öffentlichen Dienstleistungen auf 
Gemeindeebene in einer Studie aufzuzeigen und näher auszuleuchten. Welche 
Überlegungen werden in der Gemeinde gemacht? Was sind die Fakten die dazu führen, 
dass eine Dienstleistung selber erbracht oder eben ausgelagert wird? Diese 
Forschungsarbeit wird im Rahmen eines Projekts des Schweizerischen Nationalfonds 
(SNF) unter dem Schirm von IDHEAP (Hochschulinstitut für öffentliche Verwaltung) und 
des Departements für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Freiburg ausgeführt. 
Naturgemäss wird dieses Projekt mit wissenschaftlichen Methoden verfolgt, andererseits 
aber rechnen wir mit einem nachhaltigen praktischen Wert für die Gemeinden selber. 
 
Das Thema der Studie ist absolut neu. Darum brauchen wir eine breite Basis an 
Grundinformationen. Damit wollen wir sicherstellen, dass unsere Studie praktische 
Hinweise und Schlussfolgerungen ergibt, welche von den Gemeinden genutzt werden 
können.  Darum erlauben wir uns, sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, Ihnen den folgenden 
Fragebogen zukommen zu lassen.  Wir bitten Sie diesen bis zum 31.Januar 2013 
auszufüllen. Um die Fragen auszufüllen, benötigen Sie ungefähr 20 Minuten. Die Daten 
werden anonym behandelt und erlauben keinen Rückschluss auf ihren Ursprung. Trotzdem 
bitten wir Sie, den Namen ihrer Gemeinde am Anfang des Fragebogens zu nennen. Dies 
dient allein dazu, die Informationen  mit bestehenden statistischen Daten zu vernetzen 
(zum Beispiel mit der Einwohnerzahl). 
 
Wir danken Ihnen, sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, ganz herzlich für Ihre Mitarbeit an 
diesem Projekt und verbleiben 
 
mit freundlichen Grüssen, 
 
Prof. Dr. Laure Athias, Assistenzprofessorin (IDHEAP) 
Pascal Wicht, Diplomassistent (IDHEAP) 
An den Gemeindeschreiber 
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Kreuzen Sie für die folgenden Fragen bitte jeweils eine einzige Antwort an. Falls 
mehrere Antworten in Frage kommen, wählen Sie bitte die zutreffenste. Beantworten 
Sie bitte alle Fragen : nur vollständig ausgefüllte Fragebögen können verwendet 
werden. Alle Fragen beziehen sich auf die Situation am 1. Januar 2012.  
Identifizierung der Gemeinde 
Name der Gemeinde:   
Kanton:  
 
Bereitstellung der öffentlichen Dienstleistungen 
Begriffserklärungen : 
Intern: Die Leistungen werden von den Angestellten der Gemeinde erbracht. Die Gemeinde 
trägt die Verantwortung. Dies ist die übliche Form der Erbringung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen. 
Verbund: Die Leistungen werden über eine interkommunale Gemeinschaft 
(Gemeindeverband), das heisst über einen öffentlich rechtlichen Betrieb mit definiertem 
Leistungsauftrag erbracht. Die Gemeinde ist im Verwaltungsrat vertreten. 
Regie: Leistungen werden von einem selbständig handelnden Unternehmen erbracht (z.B. 
Industrielle Betriebe), welches mehrheitlich im Besitz der beteiligten Gemeinde ist. Dieses 
Unternehmen hat ein eigenes Budget, unabhängig von der Gemeinde. 
Öffentlicher Dienstvertrag: Leistungen werden von einer anderen Gemeinde oder von einer 
anderen öffentlichen Verwaltung (zum Beispiel Kanton) eingekauft. 
Unternehmensvertrag: Die Leistungen werden von einem privatrechtlichen Unternehmen 
eingekauft und vom Staat bezahlt (über die Steuern oder über Abgaben).  
Public Private Partnership (PPP): PPP ist die partnerschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen 
der öffentlichen Hand und privater Wirtschaft. Der von der Gemeinde bezahlte private Partner 
ist in alle Phasen (Planung, Bau, Finanzierung, Nutzung der Infrastrukturen) involviert. Damit 
unterscheidet sich PPP vom Unternehmensvertrag, wo der Unternehmer nur eine definierte 
Tätigkeit ausführt. 
Konzession: Wie PPP, mit dem Unterschied, dass das involvierte private Unternehmen seine 
Leistungen direkt an den Verbraucher verrechnet. 
Andere Leistungsebene: Die Leistungen werden von einer höheren Stufe erbracht (Kanton, 
Distrikt, Kreis.) 
Freiwillig: Die Leistung wird von Freiwilligen oder von einem Verein ohne Gewinnziel erbracht.  
Keine Leistung: Die Gemeinde erbringt diese Leistung nicht und überlässt diese 
privatrechtlichen Unternehmen.  
 
 
 
1. Bitte sagen Sie uns, wie Ihre Gemeinde jeden der folgenden Dienste anbietet (nach 
oben erwähnten Definitionen) 
Treffen mehrere Antworten zu, so kreuzen Sie diejenige an, die am besten übereinstimmt. 
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Reinigung der Verwaltungsbüros □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Schneeräumarbeiten, Salzstreuen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Straßenreinigung □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strassenunterhalt (Ausbesserung) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Parkkontrolle □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Kehrichtabfuhr □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Abfallsammelstelle □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Entsorgung von Tierkadavern □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Straßenbeleuchtung □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Trinkwasserversorgung □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Reparaturen der Wasserleitungen □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Abwasserreinigung □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Ausserschulische Betreuung (für Kinder im 
Schulalter, d.h. ausser Krippen) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Mittagstische □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Schuldienste  (Logopädie, Psychomotorik, 
Schulpsychologie) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Abwartsdienst Schulhäuser □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Überwachung öffentlicher Plätze, Kampf 
gegen Vandalismus  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Stadtgärtnerei □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Friedhof □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Baumschnitt, Baumpflege □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Waldarbeiten □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Öffentlicher Stadtverkehr □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
  
 
 
 
2. Wie schwierig ist es für die Behörden Ihrer Gemeinde (Gemeindeexekutive) Ihrer 
Meinung nach, das Bedürfnis der Bürgerinnen und Bürger Ihrer Gemeinde nach den 
folgenden Dienstleistungen in den nächsten fünf Jahren abzuschätzen? 
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Reinigung der Verwaltungsbüros □ □ □ □ □ 
Schneeräumarbeiten, Salzstreuen □ □ □ □ □ 
Straßenreinigung □ □ □ □ □ 
Strassenunterhalt (Ausbesserung) □ □ □ □ □ 
Parkkontrolle □ □ □ □ □ 
Kehrichtabfuhr □ □ □ □ □ 
Abfallsammelstelle □ □ □ □ □ 
Entsorgung von Tierkadavern □ □ □ □ □ 
Straßenbeleuchtung □ □ □ □ □ 
Trinkwasserversorgung □ □ □ □ □ 
Reparaturen der Wasserleitungen □ □ □ □ □ 
Abwasserreinigung □ □ □ □ □ 
Ausserschulische Betreuung (für Kinder im 
Schulalter, d.h. ausser Krippen) □ □ □ □ □ 
Mittagstische □ □ □ □ □ 
Schuldienste  (Logopädie, Psychomotorik, 
Schulpsychologie) □ □ □ □ □ 
Abwartsdienst Schulhäuser □ □ □ □ □ 
Überwachung öffentlicher Plätze, Kampf gegen 
Vandalismus  □ □ □ □ □ 
Stadtgärtnerei □ □ □ □ □ 
Friedhof □ □ □ □ □ 
Baumschnitt, Baumpflege □ □ □ □ □ 
Waldarbeiten □ □ □ □ □ 
Öffentlicher Stadtverkehr □ □ □ □ □ 
 
  
 
 
 
3. Wie wichtig ist Ihrer Meinung nach die Dienstleistungsqualität der folgenden 
Dienste für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger Ihrer Gemeinde? 
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Reinigung der Verwaltungsbüros □ □ □ □ □ 
Schneeräumarbeiten, Salzstreuen □ □ □ □ □ 
Straßenreinigung □ □ □ □ □ 
Strassenunterhalt (Ausbesserung) □ □ □ □ □ 
Parkkontrolle □ □ □ □ □ 
Kehrichtabfuhr □ □ □ □ □ 
Abfallsammelstelle □ □ □ □ □ 
Entsorgung  von Tierkadavern □ □ □ □ □ 
Straßenbeleuchtung □ □ □ □ □ 
Trinkwasserversorgung □ □ □ □ □ 
Reparaturen der Wasserleitungen □ □ □ □ □ 
Abwasserreinigung □ □ □ □ □ 
Ausserschulische Betreuung (für Kinder im 
Schulalter, d.h. ausser Krippen) □ □ □ □ □ 
Mittagstische □ □ □ □ □ 
Schuldienste  (Logopädie, Psychomotorik, 
Schulpsychologie) □ □ □ □ □ 
Abwartsdienst Schulhäuser □ □ □ □ □ 
Überwachung öffentlicher Plätze, Kampf gegen 
Vandalismus  □ □ □ □ □ 
Stadtgärtnerei □ □ □ □ □ 
Friedhof □ □ □ □ □ 
Baumschnitt, Baumpflege □ □ □ □ □ 
Waldarbeiten □ □ □ □ □ 
Öffentlicher Stadtverkehr □ □ □ □ □ 
  
 
 
 
4. Gehen Sie unter der Annahme, dass sich Ihre Gemeinde entscheidet, folgende 
Dienste mittels eines privaten Vertrags oder einer Konzession anzubieten, davon 
aus, dass die Gemeinde in der Lage sein wird, mehrere Bewerber in Konkurrenz zu 
setzen oder dass die Wahl im Gegenteil sehr beschränkt sein wird (wenige 
Mitbewerber)? 
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Reinigung der Verwaltungsbüros □ □ □ □ □ 
Schneeräumarbeiten, Salzstreuen □ □ □ □ □ 
Straßenreinigung □ □ □ □ □ 
Strassenunterhalt (Ausbesserung) □ □ □ □ □ 
Parkkontrolle □ □ □ □ □ 
Kehrichtabfuhr □ □ □ □ □ 
Abfallsammelstelle □ □ □ □ □ 
Entsorgung von Tierkadavern □ □ □ □ □ 
Straßenbeleuchtung □ □ □ □ □ 
Trinkwasserversorgung □ □ □ □ □ 
Reparaturen der Wasserleitungen □ □ □ □ □ 
Abwasserreinigung □ □ □ □ □ 
Ausserschulische Betreuung (für Kinder im 
Schulalter, d.h. ausser Krippen) □ □ □ □ □ 
Mittagstische □ □ □ □ □ 
Schuldienste  (Logopädie, Psychomotorik, 
Schulpsychologie) □ □ □ □ □ 
Abwartsdienst Schulhäuser □ □ □ □ □ 
Überwachung öffentlicher Plätze, Kampf gegen 
Vandalismus  □ □ □ □ □ 
Stadtgärtnerei □ □ □ □ □ 
Friedhof □ □ □ □ □ 
Baumschnitt, Baumpflege □ □ □ □ □ 
Waldarbeiten □ □ □ □ □ 
Öffentlicher Stadtverkehr □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
 
  
 
 Losanna, 3 dicembre 2012 
 
 
Egregio Signore 
Gentile Signora 
 
La Svizzera è uno dei paesi al mondo in cui i cantoni e i comuni hanno una maggiore 
autonomia, osservabile soprattutto nel modo in cui i comuni distribuiscono i servizi pubblici 
alla popolazione. Se alcuni servizi, come la raccolta dei rifiuti, sono da qualche tempo 
affidati a società private, gli altri servizi sono comunemente forniti direttamente dagli enti 
pubblici stessi. Inoltre, ci sono molte aziende pubbliche la cui modalità di gestione è 
sostanzialmente basata su quelle in uso nel settore privato. D’altronde, la maggior parte dei 
comuni collabora fra loro in materia di servizi, sia tramite contratti di prestazione, sia tramite 
associazioni comunali o consorzi intercomunali. 
 
Le conseguenze di queste scelte sono fondamentali perché spesso incidono sulla vita 
quotidiana dei cittadini ma anche sulla qualità della gestione pubblica e sul rapporto tra 
popolazione e autorità. Si tratta di questioni importanti che finora non sono mai state 
approfondite al livello dei comuni svizzeri. È per questo che abbiamo scelto di svolgere 
un’attività di ricerca su quest’argomento. Più in particolare, vogliamo studiare i fattori che 
portano i comuni a scegliere fra la fornitura diretta di un servizio pubblico oppure la sua 
esternalizzazione verso altri enti pubblici o privati. Questa ricerca si svolgerà all'interno 
delle unità di Economia della regolamentazione dell’IDHEAP e della Facoltà di Economia 
politica presso l'Università di Friburgo, ed è sostenuta da un progetto di ricerca del Fondo 
nazionale svizzero (FNS). Il progetto si basa su un approccio scientifico, pur avendo 
rilevanza pratica per le autorità pubbliche del nostro Paese. Come tale, è originale e 
contribuirà alla diffusione della conoscenza nella fornitura di servizi pubblici in un contesto 
federalista, con l'obiettivo di una loro efficiente gestione. 
 
Poiché questo tema non è mai stato studiato in Svizzera, è essenziale creare una banca 
dati che servirà come base per il nostro studio. È importante che la banca dati sia la più 
completa possibile affinché dai nostri risultati possano essere tratti insegnamenti utili. 
Abbiamo quindi il piacere di sottopor Le il seguente questionario, e Le chiediamo di volerlo 
compilare e ritornare entro il 20 dicembre. Il tempo necessario per rispondere a tutte le 
domande è di circa venti minuti. Noi garantiamo che le informazioni immesse nella banca 
dati saranno rese anonime, e che la pubblicazione dei risultati non permetterà in alcun 
modo di individuare le risposte dei singoli comuni. La richiesta di identificare il nome del 
comune all'inizio del questionario serve solo per mettere le risposte in relazione ai dati 
statistici provenienti da altre fonti (ad esempio, il numero della popolazione legale). Una 
volta concluso il nostro studio, sarà oltremodo nostra premura inviar Le una sintesi dei 
risultati. 
 
La ringraziamo sin d’ora per la gradita e preziosa collaborazione e Le porgiamo in nostri 
migliori saluti. 
 
Dr. Laure Athias, professore assistente, IDHEAP 
Pascal Wicht, dottorando-assistente, IDHEAP 
Alla cortese attenzione del  
Segretario comunale 
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Per ciascuna delle seguenti domande indicare una sola risposta. Se più risposte sembrano 
rispondere meglio a una domanda, si prega di scegliere quelle più adatte. Si prega inoltre 
di rispondere a tutte le domande, poiché solo i questionari debitamente compilati 
potranno essere utilizzati. Tutte le domande fanno riferimento alla data del 1° gennaio 
2012. 
Identificazione del Comune 
Nome del Comune:  
Cantone:  
 
Prestazione di servizi pubblici 
Definizioni: 
Interno: il servizio è fornito ai cittadini da parte del Comune, ossia dai dipendenti comunali, 
senza l’intervento di terzi. Il Comune è il solo a decidere e ad assumersi la responsabilità per il 
servizio. Questo è il modo tradizionale di fornitura di servizi pubblici. 
Associazione: Il servizio è fornito da un’associazione intercomunale (Consorzio), vale a dire un 
organo statutario di diritto pubblico istituito per la fornitura di uno o più servizi. Il Comune è 
rappresentato negli organi direttivi del Consorzio. 
Azienda municipalizzata: Il servizio è fornito da un ente pubblico autonomo (per es. i servizi 
industriali) o da un’azienda con capitale a maggioranza pubblica. Tale ente ha un proprio 
bilancio, indipendente da quello del Comune. 
Appalto pubblico: Il servizio è fornito da un altro Comune o a un'altra autorità pubblica (ad 
esempio il Cantone). 
Contratto privato: Il servizio è fornito da una società privata direttamente al cittadino. Il 
prestatore del servizio è pagato dal Comune che si finanzia tramite una tassa specifica oppure 
con il bilancio pubblico (vale a dire con le imposte). 
Partenariato pubblico-privato (PPP): Il servizio è fornito congiuntamente dal Comune e da 
una o più aziende private. In un PPP il partner privato è pagato dal Comune ed è coinvolto in 
tutte le fasi del processo (sviluppo, costruzione, finanziamento, gestione delle infrastrutture). 
Questa è la differenza fondamentale fra PPP e contratto privato in cui l'operatore privato 
interviene unicamente nella fase operativa. 
Concessione: Questo modello è identico al PPP, con la differenza che l'operatore privato è 
remunerato direttamente dai cittadini-consumatori. 
Altro livello: Il servizio è fornito da un altro livello di governo (Cantone, Circondario, Distretto) 
senza che il Comune intervenga nella fornitura del servizio. 
Volontariato: Il servizio è fornito da volontari e/o da associazioni senza scopo di lucro. 
Non fornito: Il Comune non fornisce il servizio poiché lasciato interamente al settore privato 
senza alcun intervento dell’autorità pubblica.  
 
 
 
1. Vogliate indicare con quale modalità il Suo Comune fornisce i seguenti servizi, in 
base alle definizioni suggerite.  
Se risposte multiple sembrano più opportune, si prega di scegliere quelle più pertinenti. 
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Pulizia degli uffici amministrativi □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi invernali (spazzaneve, spargimento sale, 
ecc.) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Rete viaria, pulizia strade □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione strade comunali (cantieri) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Parcheggi comunali □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Raccolta rifiuti domestici □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Discariche  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Eliminazione cadaveri animali domestici □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Illuminazione pubblica □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribuzione acqua potabile □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione delle canalizzazioni □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Depurazione acque □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi doposcuola (per bambini in età 
scolastica, esclusi quindi asili e asili nido) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Mensa scolastica □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi scolastici specializzati (logopedia, 
psicomotricità, sostegno psicologico nelle 
scuole) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione edifici scolastici (custodia) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Sorveglianza zone sensibili (luoghi pubblici), 
lotta contro il vandalismo 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Parchi e giardini pubblici □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Cimiteri □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione forestale □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Boschi □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Trasporti pubblici urbani □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
 
 
2. A Suo avviso, quanto sarè difficile per l’autorità locale (Esecutivo comunale) 
prevedere le esigenze dei cittadini del Suo Comune per i seguenti servizi nei 
prossimi cinque anni? 
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Pulizia degli uffici amministrativi □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi invernali (spazzaneve, spargimento sale, 
ecc.) □ □ □ □ □ 
Rete viaria, pulizia strade □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione strade comunali (cantieri) □ □ □ □ □ 
Parcheggi comunali □ □ □ □ □ 
Raccolta rifiuti domestici □ □ □ □ □ 
Discariche  □ □ □ □ □ 
Eliminazione cadaveri animali domestici □ □ □ □ □ 
Illuminazione pubblica □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribuzione acqua potabile □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione delle canalizzazioni □ □ □ □ □ 
Depurazione acque □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi doposcuola (per bambini in età scolastica, 
esclusi quindi asili e asili nido) □ □ □ □ □ 
Mensa scolastica □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi scolastici specializzati (logopedia, 
psicomotricità, sostegno psicologico nelle scuole) □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione edifici scolastici (custodia) □ □ □ □ □ 
Sorveglianza zone sensibili (luoghi pubblici), lotta 
contro il vandalismo □ □ □ □ □ 
Parchi e giardini pubblici □ □ □ □ □ 
Cimiteri □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione forestale □ □ □ □ □ 
Boschi □ □ □ □ □ 
Trasporti pubblici urbani □ □ □ □ □ 
 
  
 
 
 
3. Secondo Lei, quanto è importante per i cittadini del Suo Comune la qualità di 
ciascuno dei seguenti servizi? 
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Pulizia degli uffici amministrativi □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi invernali (spazzaneve, spargimento sale, 
ecc.) □ □ □ □ □ 
Rete viaria, pulizia strade □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione strade comunali (cantieri) □ □ □ □ □ 
Parcheggi comunali □ □ □ □ □ 
Raccolta rifiuti domestici □ □ □ □ □ 
Discariche  □ □ □ □ □ 
Eliminazione cadaveri animali domestici □ □ □ □ □ 
Illuminazione pubblica □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribuzione acqua potabile □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione delle canalizzazioni □ □ □ □ □ 
Depurazione acque □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi doposcuola (per bambini in età scolastica, 
esclusi quindi asili e asili nido) □ □ □ □ □ 
Mensa scolastica □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi scolastici specializzati (logopedia, 
psicomotricità, sostegno psicologico nelle scuole) □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione edifici scolastici (custodia) □ □ □ □ □ 
Sorveglianza zone sensibili (luoghi pubblici), lotta 
contro il vandalismo □ □ □ □ □ 
Parchi e giardini pubblici □ □ □ □ □ 
Cimiteri □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione forestale □ □ □ □ □ 
Boschi □ □ □ □ □ 
Trasporti pubblici urbani □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Nell’ipotesi che il Suo Comune decida di fornire i seguenti servizi attraverso un 
contratto di diritto privato o di una concessione, a Suo parere il Comune sarebbe in 
grado di scegliere tra un numero elevato di aziende oppure, al contrario, la scelta 
sarebbe limitata a pochi concorrenti? 
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Pulizia degli uffici amministrativi □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi invernali (spazzaneve, spargimento sale, 
ecc.) □ □ □ □ □ 
Rete viaria, pulizia strade □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione strade comunali (cantieri) □ □ □ □ □ 
Parcheggi comunali □ □ □ □ □ 
Raccolta rifiuti domestici □ □ □ □ □ 
Discariche  □ □ □ □ □ 
Eliminazione cadaveri animali domestici □ □ □ □ □ 
Illuminazione pubblica □ □ □ □ □ 
Distribuzione acqua potabile □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione delle canalizzazioni □ □ □ □ □ 
Depurazione acque □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi doposcuola (per bambini in età scolastica, 
esclusi quindi asili e asili nido) □ □ □ □ □ 
Mensa scolastica □ □ □ □ □ 
Servizi scolastici specializzati (logopedia, 
psicomotricità, sostegno psicologico nelle scuole) □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione edifici scolastici (custodia) □ □ □ □ □ 
Sorveglianza zone sensibili (luoghi pubblici), lotta 
contro il vandalismo □ □ □ □ □ 
Parchi e giardini pubblici □ □ □ □ □ 
Cimiteri □ □ □ □ □ 
Manutenzione forestale □ □ □ □ □ 
Boschi □ □ □ □ □ 
Trasporti pubblici urbani □ □ □ □ □ 
 
Part II
Culture and Make-or-Buy
Decisions for Public Services
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Chapter 3
Does Culture Matter for Public
Service Delivery ?
In the first part of this thesis, and more particularly in Chapter 2, we have high-
lighted the fact that cultural differences may help to explain the differences that can
be observed across jurisdictions on their make-or-buy decisions. Indeed, as beliefs
and values, that are transmitted fairly unchanged from generation to generation, af-
fect individual and group behaviours, they are a central determinant of institutional
arrangements.
The goal of this chapter is to use interesting features of the French-German lan-
guage border in Switzerland (Roestigraben) to provide a robust causal evidence of the
importance of culture in explaining the organizational choices of Swiss local Govern-
ments.
To do this, we shall use a Regression-Discontinuity Design (RDD) approach, com-
bined with a within-canton identification strategy on a sample of municipalities in
the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg, and Valais in order to show that mu-
nicipalities on both sides of the language border and facing identical economic and
institutional frameworks make significantly different organizational choices.
The results show a very large impact of the language border on the modes of
provision of public services in Swiss municipalities. We find that French-speaking
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border municipalities are 60 percent less likely to contract with the private sector
than their German-speaking adjacent municipalities, pointing out that the cultural
factor is the most important one in municipalities’ make-or-buy decisions
Analysing the expenditure of Swiss municipalities, we finally show significant dif-
ferences in the efficiency of the organizational choices in both language areas. We
show that in-house provision is more efficient in the French-speaking area, and that
contracting (public or private) increases the public spending differential between the
French- and German-speaking areas. These results suggest that mission-matching
might be the channel of transmission between culture and the organizational choices.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1, we shall provide an
overview of the main features of the Roestigraben, in order to show why this language
border will allow us to provide causal inference. In Section 3.2, we shall present our
identification strategy. Section 3.3 provides a detailed description of the data we use
Section while Section 3.4 presents our estimation results. Section 3.5 will present our
analysis of public expenditure. Finally, Section 3.6 will conclude.
3.1 The Roestigraben
The language border between French and German areas is called Roestigraben1, em-
phasizing the fact that this language border is a cultural border (Bu¨chi, 2000). In
addition, as highlighted in Eugster et al. (2011), Novembre, Johnson, Bryc, Kutalik,
Boyko, Auton, Indap, King, Bergmann, Nelson, Stephens and Bustamante (2008)
find that genetic markers differ more strongly between people living in Latin (that is,
French, Italian, and Romansh) Swiss areas and the German Swiss area than within
those regions. In addition, Novembre et al. (2008) find that genetic markers differ more
strongly between people living in Latin (that is, French, Italian, and Romansh) Swiss
areas and the German Swiss area than within those regions. The term Roestigraben
first appeared in the media in the years 1970s. However, cultural differences be-
tween the French- and German-speaking areas already existed in the beginning of the
20th Century2, and peaked during World War I, where the French-speakers supported
mostly France and the Triple Entente whereas the German-speakers mostly supported
the German-speaking countries of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria). The ap-
pointment of the notoriously pro-German General Wille as the Commander-in-Chief of
the Swiss Army, as well as a huge espionage scandal in which some (German-speaking)
General officers only received lighter penalties for having transmitted confidential in-
formation to the German High Command, created important tensions.
This Roestigraben is all the more interesting that it is a sharp border, insofar the
fraction of French native speakers falls from 85 percent to 8 percent within a distance
of 5 kilometers across the border. Between 5 and 10 kilometers, the respective shares
1Referring to Roesti, a popular potato-dish in the German area (but not in the French part) of
the country.
2The most important cultural gap until the mid-19th Century was not between the language
areas, but more between the religion areas, that is between the (conservative) Catholic cantons and
the (liberal) Protestant cantons, which in particular provoked the Sonderbund civil war (1847).
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Figure 3.1: Discontinuity of the languages at the border
Notes: Percentage of French-speakers in the cities of our dataset (5km bins) as a function of the distance to the
border (positive distance for French-speaking cities). Languages other than French and German are not considered.
The vertical line indicates the language border.
are 92 percent and 3 percent (Fig. 3.1). It seems reasonable to assume that these
minorities are too small to impact significantly the choices made by the authorities.
Furthermore, when considering the official (administrative) language, the fraction
of French-speaking municipalities falls from almost 100 percent to 0 percent within a
distance of 5 kilometers across the border (and vice versa for administratively German-
speaking municipalities), suggesting the existence of a sharp cutoff. Note also that the
administrative language of municipalities have not changed over time3. Furthermore,
there is no associated change in geography at this language border, and large parts of
the language border run within Swiss States (Cantons).
Secondly, it is a well-known fact that this language border is also a cultural bor-
der. This cultural difference manifests itself frequently regarding voting outcomes,
for example in the vote for the adhesion of Switzerland to the European Economic
Area (1992), where 75 percent of the French-speakers voted in favour of the adhesion,
whereas 57 percent of the German-speakers refused it. All French-speaking cantons
voted Yes whereas all German-speaking cantons but two voted No (Fig. 3.2). Another
example, more recent, is the vote on the Federal Initiative “Against Mass Immigra-
tion” (introduction of immigration quotas) that had been refused in all French speak-
ing cantons (59 percent of the voters voted No), whereas all German-speaking cantons
but three accepted the Initiative (52 percent of Yes-votes) (Fig. 3.3). Hence, partic-
ularly in Switzerland, the language of a municipality or an individual is an excellent
proxy for its cultural identity.
The Figure 3.4 displays a map of Switzerland shaded according to the official lan-
3To be completely precise, we are aware of one municipality in the French part, called Mont
Tramelan, which administrative language is German since 1952.
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Figure 3.2: Vote on the adhesion of Switzerland to the European Economic Area
Notes: Vote on the adhesion of Switzerland to the European Economic Area (December
6, 1992). Cantons in green voted Yes, Cantons in red voted No.
Figure 3.3: Vote on the Initiative ”Against Mass Immigration”
Notes: Vote on the Initiative ”Against Mass Immigration” (February 9, 2014). Cantons
in green voted Yes, Cantons in red voted No.
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Figure 3.4: The Roestigraben
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
guage of each municipality. The thick line represents the Roestigraben. The black
segments represent the portions that run between two cantons, whereas the red seg-
ments represent the portions of the Roestigraben that run within cantons.
This is important since most policies in Switzerland are set at the state (rather
than the federal) level. Thus, within these bilingual states, municipalities of different
sides of the language border face the same regional set of policies and institutions and
the same economic conditions, which includes in particular the set of public services
that municipalities have to provide, as well as qualitative requirements. For example,
in the case of schools, the size of the classes and the qualifications of the teachers
are set at the Cantonal level. In addition, the political environment, as for example
the budgetary rules, the mode of legislative power (elected parliament or assembly
of all citizens) or the scope of the rights of initiative and referendum, are decided
at the State level are mainly set at the Cantonal level. Within-state contrasts on
either side of the border measure therefore to what extent public authorities make
different make-or-buy decisions for public-services delivery even if they face identical
levels of policy guidelines. From an econometric point of view, these features call
for a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD), using the Roestigraben, combined
with a within-state estimation strategy (state fixed effects), i.e. we contrast border
municipalities on either side of the segments of the language border that run through
states. The assumption is that within-state municipalities that are just of either side
of the border are very similar (firms and individuals’ location decisions are likely to
be balanced) so that the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be the same across
the border4. Thus, this Roestigraben approach strikes us as a near-to-ideal object of
4This Roestigraben identification strategy is followed by some studies, e.g Eugster et al. (2011),
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inquiry in order to capture the causal effect of culture on public service delivery.
3.2 Identification Strategy: Regression Disconti-
nuity Design
We want to quantify the relationship between the alternative forms of service provi-
sion and technical factors as well as cultural factors. In order to describe the choice
between the three alternatives, we use a standard multinomial logit approach com-
bined with a spatial regression discontinuity design5. In the following model, we com-
pare the probability that municipality i provides service j using the provision mode
m ∈ {Private contracting, Public contracting} against the base category In-House:
ln
[
Pr(Yij = m)
Pr(Yij = InHouse)
]
= αlm + δm · Fi +
2∑
k=1
βlkm ·Dki +
2∑
k=1
βrkm ·Dki · Fi+
γ′m ·Techij + η′m ·Xij + ijm,∀m, (3.1)
with Fi, for French, being a dummy taking the value 1 for French-speaking munici-
palities. The running variable Di, for Distance, which measures the distance to the
closest cross-border municipality, takes positive values for French-speaking municipal-
ities (at the right, r, of the language border) and negative values for municipalities
in the German side (at the left, l, of the language border)6. We allow for different
spatial trends. When the variable Di takes the value 0, our measure of culture changes
discontinuously at the language border. Techij is a vector of technical variables, and
Xij is a vector of additional controls, including State fixed effects (dummies).
The key parameter in this regression is δm. Indeed, δm estimates the contrast in
the probability of contracting choices at the border, that is, the difference in the mean
probability of contracting choices between French and German-speaking municipalities
at the border (i.e., when Di = 0). αlm measures the mean of the outcome variable in
French-speaking border municipalities if they were German-speaking. The parameters
βlkm measure the spatial trend in contracting choices outcomes in the Swiss German
area, whereas the parameters βrkm allow for a completely different spatial trend in
the French area.
In order to capture the pure effect of the language, we focus on the three bilingual
States (Bern, Fribourg and Valais) to the extent that French and German-speaking
municipalities of a same State face the same institutional framework, which we capture
through State fixed effects. We confine the analysis on the municipalities located not
Eugster and Parchet (2013),(Eugster et al., 2016).
5For a presentation of some technical considerations on this method, see the Introduction.
6To implement the local border contrast, we determined each municipality’s distance to the
language border. To do so, we computed the Euclidian distance, using geodata provided by the
Swiss Federal Office of Topography, to proxy for economic distance between pairs of cross-border
municipalities. We then took the nearest cross-border neighbour as the value for the distance to the
language border.
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more than 40 km from the language border. In order to check for the robustness of
our results, we run our regressions with different bandwidths of 20, 25, 30 and 40
km, with both a linear spatial trend for all distances and and a quadratic spatial
trend at 40 km. This model is estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the
municipal level.
To check the robustness of our results, we also run a logit regression, merging the
categories Public contracting and In-House provision, thus directly opposing private
and public provision, with an identical specification. In this case, we are able to
estimate the model with robust standard errors clustered at both the municipal and
service levels.
The key identifying assumption of our RDD is that factors other than culture
— that potentially influence municipalities’ make-or-buy decisions — do not change
discontinuously at the language border. In other words, the assumption boils down
to conditional independence of outcome and potential language group membership at
the language border.
This assumption is plausible for the segments of the language border that run
through States. As already highlighted above (Section 3.1), States have much discre-
tion in setting legal and policy rules. But the within-State segments allow us to adopt
a within-State estimation strategy, that is, to add State fixed effects. Appendix B.4
provides evidence that is consistent with this assumption.
3.3 Data
In this chapter, we shall use our self-constructed dataset on public services in the
municipalities, that we have already used in the first part of the thesis (see Sec-
tion 2.2 to have a description of the methodology that we have used to construct this
dataset). However, in order to run within-canton estimations, we extract from this
database a subsample of the three bilingual Cantons (Berne, Fribourg and Valais),
which represents 142 municipalities among which 84 are German-speaking and 58 are
French-speaking.
Fig. 3.5 shows a map of the municipalities — in the three bilingual cantons — that
answered to our survey. The red line indicates the language border. French-speaking
municipalities are represented in orange and German-speaking municipalities are rep-
resented in blue. This map suggests that, given the way the responding municipalities
are scattered, there are too much missing municipalities to be able to perform a spatial
analysis of mimetism with accuracy.
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Figure 3.5: Municipalities of our sample (bilingual cantons)
Notes: Municipalities available in the Athias-Wicht database. The red line indicates the language bor-
der. French-speaking municipalities are represented in orange and German-speaking municipalities are
represented in blue.
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In the three bilingual cantons, 84 percent of the municipalities are located at a
distance lower than than 20 kilometers of the language border, whereas the percentage
is 87 percent within the municipalities of our sample. This difference of 3 percentage
points is however non significant7.
As is the fist part, the dependent variable is a categorical variable that measures the
mode of provision of a given service in a given municipality. This variable takes three
possible values, namely in-house provision, public contracting, and private contracting.
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for our dependant variable. In our sample,
54 percent of the services provided are provided in house, 21 percent through contracts
with the private sector and 22 percent through contracts with other public entities.
The distribution within French-speaking municipalities is quite similar (52 percent in-
house, 22 percent public contracting, 22 percent private contracting), as well as within
German-speaking municipalities (55 percent in-house, 22 percent public contracting,
20 percent private contracting).
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the modes of provision
All German French
Mean Min Mean Min Mean Min
(Std dev.) Max (Std dev.) Max (Std dev.) Max
Services provided 18.592 0 18.250 10 19.088 13
(2.782) 22 (2.212) 22 (2.081) 22
– In House 10.021 0 10.095 2 9.914 0
(3.568) 18 (3.284) 18 (3.971) 16
– Public contract 4.134 0 4.012 0 4.281 0
(2.304) 13 (2.300) 10 (2.328) 10
– Private contract 3.880 0 3.655 0 4.158 0
(2.380) 22 (2.352) 10 (2.396) 10
– Other 0.556 0 0.488 0 0.667 0
(0.911) 6 (0.814) 3 (1.041) 4
Observations 2640 1533 1107
Municipalities 142 84 58
We capture the technical determinants of the make-or-buy decision using the same
variables as in the first part of this thesis, namely Contracting difficulty, Uncertainty,
and Sensitivity. We also use the same set of Control variables, that is, the size (3
classes), Urban, Mountain, the Dependency Ratio, the Income (FDT yield p.c. ),
and the Budget Weight (for a complete description of these variables and the way we
measure them, see above in Section 2.2). In addition, we are then able to include an
additional variable Debt, that we proxy using the passive interests as a share of the
tax receipts8.
As we want to consider cultural factors, it would seem reasonable to consider the
dominant religion in the municipality (catholic or protestant). However, as Table 3.2
shows, the distribution of the majority religion in the municipalities of each canton.
7p-value of the χ2 test: 0.35.
8We did not use this variable in the first part, as the data were not available for all Cantons.
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It points out that Protestant and Catholic areas mostly correspond to canton borders.
For this reason, we do not control for religion, as it is captured by canton fixed effects.
Including a variable Religion would be subject to a strong multicollinearity with the
canton fixed effects. Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for all the right hand
side variables in the municipalities in the bilingual cantons, that is, in the sub-sample
of municipalities that we use in this chapter.
Table 3.2: Majority religion in the municipalities of the bilingual cantons
BE FR VS
Protestant 98.77% 9.76% 0%
Catholic 1.23% 90.24% 100%
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for RHS variables
Mean Std Dev Min Max Source of the data
City × Service characteristics
Sensitivity 0.00 1.00 -1.10 1.75 Athias Wicht Municipal survey
Uncertainty 0.00 1.00 -1.17 2.57 Athias Wicht Municipal survey
City characteristics Athias Wicht Municipal survey
Language
French German
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
0.41 0.59
Distance (absolute) 20.02 12.76 1.68 52.07 Swisstopo
Size
Small Medium Big
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
0.44 0.38 0.18
Urban
Urban Rural Swiss Federal Statistical Office: “Niveaux
0.39 0.61 ge´ographiques de la Suisse 2012”
Income [kCHF] 1.17 1.40 0.13 12.2 Federal Tax Administration
Dependency ratio 64.79 8.79 22.2 85.3 Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Debt 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.13 State and municipal Finance Offices
Mountain
Yes No Swiss Federal Statistical Office: “Niveaux
0.49 0.51 ge´ographiques de la Suisse 2012”
Service characteristics
Budget weight 0.00 1.00 -1.19 2.47 Athias Wicht Restricted survey
Competition 0.00 1.00 -1.28 2.38 Athias Wicht restricted survey
The main novelty in the data used in this chapter is the variables that we use in
order to capture the impact of culture. Our explanatory variable capturing culture
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the official (administrative) language of
the municipality is French and 0 if this language is German. For the purpose of
our RDD analysis, we also shall consider a variable measuring the distance to the
language border. This variable has been constructed using geodata and is defined as
the distance to the closest municipality on the other side of the border. This running
variable takes positive values for municipalities in the French area, and negative values
for German-speaking municipalities.
We also consider the (political) ideological orientation of the municipalities. As
already highlighted, a large part of the elected members of local executives do not
represent a political party. In our sample of municipalities, 58.3 percent of the mem-
bers of local executives do not represent a party, that is, they have been elected either
as independents or as members of a local non-partisan coalition. In 45 percent of the
municipalities, the local executive is composed exclusively of non-partisan members.
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This strongly reduces the impact of ideology at the local level. As Table 3.4 shows,
the party that holds the more mandates is The Liberals (21 percent of all seats),
followed by the Swiss People’s Party (7 percent), the Christian Democratic Party (6
percent), and the Socialist Party (4 percent). None of the other parties hold more
than 2 percent of the seats.
Table 3.4: Political affiliation of the members of local executives
Party Ideology Number Percentage
Non partisan 588 58%
The Liberals (FDP – PLR) Right 209 21%
Swiss People’s Party (SVP – UDC) Right 68 7%
Christian Democratic Party (CVP – PDC) Center-Right 64 6%
Socialist Party (SP – PS) Left 41 4%
Christian Social Party (CSP – PCS) Center-Left 25 2%
Conservative Democratic Party (BDP – PBD) Center-Right 5 0.5%
Evangelist Party (EVP – PEV) Center-Left 4 0.4%
Federal Democratic Union (EDU – UDF) Right 2 0.2%
The Greens Left 3 0.3%
Sample: Municipalities that are present in the Athias-Wicht Survey. Data: Ladner municipal database,
completed with other official sources (municipalities and Cantons).
These results show that the relative strength of the parties in local executives
strongly diverges from their strength in Federal elections, where the two strongest
parties are the Swiss People’s Party (29.4 percent of voters) and the Socialist Party
(18.8 percent of voters). This tends to confirm that the results of the Federal elections
are not a suitable proxy for the ideology at a local level. Hence, a measure of the
political position of a local executive should integrate the actual composition of the
executive, and in particular the fact that it is composed of partisan and/or non-
partisan members. In order to account for this fact, we construct a measure that
encompasses the actual political affiliation of local executive members.
Information about the party affiliation of the local executive members has been
collected from Ladner’s municipal database9, and the data that were missing in this
database have been completed with data provided by the municipalities and the Can-
tons.
Ideology of each party is measured using the Parlarating data. Parlarating is a
yearly ranking (constructed by academic scholars) of the ideology of all the members
of the National Council based on their roll-call votes. This scale is frequently used
by political scientists to quantify the ideology of political parties in Switzerland and
is constructed as follows. A set of on topics are selected among all roll-call votes
that had been made in the National Council during a given year. Criteria used to
select the votes that will be considered are, first, their importance, and second the
existence of a clear left-right pattern, that is, the fact that it is possible to attribute
the choice made by each counsillor to the left or the right. Finally, the most often a
counsillor chose the left proposition, the most he is considered to be left-winged, and
vice-versa. The counsillors are ranked on a scale between -10 (left) to +10 (right),
9www.andreasladner.ch
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and the value 0 corresponds to the center (Hohl and Jeitziner, 2002). Averaging the
scores of the members of a same party allows to compare the actual position of the
parties (based on votes rather than on slogans or promises), but also to observe across-
cantonal differences between the members of a same party. Indeed, in Switzerland,
the positions of the members of some parties may significantly differ from one Canton
to another10.
For the purpose of our study, we consider the rating for the year 2011. We compute
for each municipality a score that corresponds to the mean of the Parlarating scores
of all members of the local executive. To do this, we attribute to each member of
a local executive a value that corresponds to the Parlarating score of her party in
her Canton (Table 3.5). We do not differentiate between the mayor and the other
members of the executive, as the former has no extended decision power than the
other members: his role only consists in presiding the meetings of the executive and
representing the municipality. When such a score is not available, which is the case
for the smallest parties, we consider instead the Parlarating score for her party in the
whole Switzerland. Local executive members that do not represent any political party
are not considered and hence do not affect the score of their municipality11.
Table 3.5: Parlarating ranking of the parties in each Canton
Berne Fribourg Valais Switzerland
The Greens -8.1 -8.2
Socialist Party -7.0 -7.7 -7.4 -7.8
Evangelist Party -2.9 -2.7
Christian Democratic Party 0.4 -0.8 0.5 0.4
Christian Social Party 0.4 -7.7 0.5 0.4
Conservative Democratic Party 1.3 1.0
The Liberals 2.3 1.9 1.7 2.2
Swiss People’s Party 7.3 7.8 6.9 7.8
Swiss Democratic Union 7.3 7.8
Reported values are the means of the Parlarating scores of the National Counsilors that are members of
the party. The scale is between -10 (left) and +10 (right), and 0 corresponds to the center.
Finally, we transform this municipal ranking into a categorical variable that takes
three possible values: RIGHT if the ranking is bigger than 0, LEFT if the ranking
is smaller than 0, and NON-PARTISAN if none of the members of the executive
represents a party (which means that the municipal ranking cannot be computed).
Summary statistics are reported in Table 3.6. We can observe that about the half of
the municipalities have no partisan member. Among the municipalities with partisan
executive members, a large majority are right-wing (76 percent of the partisan mu-
nicipalities). Only 13 percent of the municipalities in our sample (that is, 24 percent
of the partisan municipalities) are left-wing.
10We are able to consider cantonal variations for members of the Federal Parliament, since the
electoral districts are the Cantons.
11In 36 percent of the municipalities, the executive is composed of both partisan and non partisan
members.
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Table 3.6: Distribution of the political variable across the cantons
Left Right Non Part.
Berne 0.098 0.512 0.390
Fribourg 0.122 0.171 0.707
Valais 0.316 0.526 0.158
TOTAL 0.134 0.416 0.451
The reported values are the share of the municipali-
ties of each canton whose position corresponds to each
category. All rows sum to 1.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 RDD Results
Throughout the section, rather than reporting hard-to-interpret coefficients from the
logit and multinomial logit models, we report the marginal effects on the choice prob-
abilities.
Figure 3.6 shows a preliminary graphical evidence of the existence of a significant
gap at the language border in terms of organizational choices. The figure reports
a polynomial fit of the residuals of the OLS regression of the percentage of private
contracting on City variables (including Canton fixed effects, without the cultural
variable French) as a function of the distance to the language border, as well as
95 percent confidence intervals. This approach allows us to control for municipal
characteristics and provides a graphical evidence of the existence of a significant gap
at the language border in terms of organizational choices. We can observe a very
strong discontinuity at the border, that however tends to vanish when moving further
away from the border. This suggests that municipalities located further from the
border face more unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 3.7 reports results from the fully specified RDD multinomial logit with
different spatial specifications, that is, bandwidths of 20, 25, 30 and 40 km with a
linear spatial trend, and 40 km with a quadratic trend.
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. The RDD approach
allows us to observe the effect of the language border at identical actual set of policies
and institutions and at identical actual relative efficiency of public and private provi-
sion. This effect is substantial: French-speaking border municipalities are around 60
percent less likely to contract with the private sector than their German-speaking adja-
cent municipalities (recall that on average about 21 percent of services are contracted
privately and the estimated probability change is between -11 and -17 percentage
points depending on the specification). We do not observe a robust evidence of an
impact of the language border in the propensity to contract with the public sector.
Table 3.8 shows the results (coefficient on the French variable) of Logit and Or-
dered Logit regressions. The first row shows the results of a Logit analysis using
Private contracting as the dependent variable (against In-house provision and Public
Contracting), hence opposing public provision to private provision. In the second
row, we estimate Logit models opposing contracting (public and private) to In-house
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Table 3.7: RDD-Multinomial Logit Models for Frequency of Public and Private Con-
tracting
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Figure 3.6: Private contracting and the language border
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Notes: Residuals of the OLS regression of the Percentage of private provision as a function
of City variables, including distance to the border in absolute terms and Canton fixed
effects. Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing. Dashed lines are 95% confidence
intervals. The vertical line indicates the language border.
provision. Whereas we observe that the French-speaking municipalities have a sig-
nificantly lower propensity to contract-out with the private sector, we observe no
impact of the language on contracting in general. These results suggest that Public
contracting is closer to in-house provision than to Private contracting. This is in line
with the fact that LGAs — which do not pertain to NPM reforms — account for
two thirds of the public contracts. The cultural effect also manifests itself when the
organizational modes are ranked according to a more continuous qualitative index of
incentives power, as suggested by the results — reported in the third and fourth rows
— of ordered Logit models in which the dependent variable takes the highest value for
Private contracting. These results also suggest that Public contracting distinguishes
itself more clearly from in-house when considering the degree of incentives power.
Note that the difference between In-House provision and Public contracting tends to
be larger when LGAs are removed from the sample, that is, when Public contracting
only consists in actual contracts (row 4).
Regarding the efficiency-based predictions, our results are in line with the results
that we obtained in the first part. In particular, we still observe that greater con-
tracting difficulty is associated with more public contracting and less private sector
contracting, with slightly larger marginal effects: a one standard deviation increase
in contracting difficulty leads to 11 percent less contracting-out and 8 percent more
contracting-in. Regarding Uncertainty and Sensitivity, we still observe a positive im-
pact on private contracting. As for contracting difficulty, the magnitude of the effect
is substantially larger. The impact on public contracting is still negative, albeit it
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Table 3.8: Logit and Ordered Logit Estimations for the French variable
Method Dep. Var. City × Service Sector FE Service FE
Logit Private (vs. Public) -0.1536*** -0.1236** -0.1264*
(0.0504) (0.0618) (0.0652)
Logit Contracting (vs. In-house) -.0880 -.0332 -0.042
(0.014) (0.0873) (0.1075)
Ord. Logit In-house < Public < Private -0.506* -0.362 -0.365
(0.298) (0.322) (0.347)
Ord. Logit In-house < Public (non LGA) < Private -0.709** -0.471 -0.660
(0.343) (0.372) (0.417)
Notes: *p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01. 20 km Bandwidth. All regressions contain following RHS variables: Distance, French × Distance,
Size (3 classes), Urban, Mountain, Demographic Dep. Ratio, Income, Debt, Political ideology (3 classes). Additional control variables:
Contracting difficulty, Uncertainty, Sensitivity (col. 1), Sector dummies (col. 2), Service dummies (col. 3). Ord. Logit: Reported coefficients
are log odd ratios. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Logit: Reported coefficients are marginal effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the service and municipality level.
becomes not significant. The impact of the size of the municipalities also remains
unchanged: big municipalities contract less with both the public and the private sec-
tor, whereas the smallest municipalities do more public contracting. Our new control
variable Debt shows no significant impact on contracting, both public and private.
This suggests that the municipalities do not use contracting as a means to circumvent
the budget constraint or restrictions in the number of employees. Finally, the political
color of the municipality do not affect the organizational choices.
3.4.2 Robustness checks
Service and sector fixed effects
As robustness checks, we estimate our Multinomial logit model replacing all service
and city×service variables by sector12 and service fixed effects. This allows us to
tackle the issue of a potential dependence between the survey measures of city-service
characteristics and the actual organizational choices. Estimations are shown in Ta-
bles 3.9 and 3.10. Albeit this approach has its own weaknesses, to the extent that
some service-related parameters vary from one municipality to another, the results
are still in line with our baseline model: the impact of the French variable, while
significant only at some bandwidth, is however negative at all bandwidths, both for
the model with sector fixed effects and in the model with service fixed effects. These
results hence suggest that the effect of culture tends to vanish with larger bandwidth,
which suggests that unobserved heterogeneity may appear when moving away from
the border. In particular, whereas it seems reasonable to assume that the market
structures are identical within German- and French-speaking municipalities located
12We consider 4 sectors based on the official accounting plan of Swiss municipalities, namely
Education (Child day-care centres, School canteen, Specialized services in school, Maintenance of
school buildings), Environment (7 services: Refuse collection, Solid waste disposal, Animal carcases
removal, Drinking water distribution, Maintenance of water facilities, Sewage treatment, Cemeteries),
Traffic (6 services: Snow cleaning, Road cleaning, Road maintenance, Parking control, Street lights,
Public transportation), and Green and Nature (2 services: Local parks and gardens, Trimming of
trees)
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close to the border, a bigger segmentation is possible when moving away from the bor-
der, due to the fact that transportation costs become significant when the distance
increases.
Selection bias
In order to check whether our results are biased by sample selection, we estimate a
Probit model of the determinants of Private provision including the Heckman correc-
tion. Initially developed in the case of a continuous dependent variable by Heckman
(1974; 1977) and applied to binary dependent variables by Van de Ven and van Praag
(1981), this method consist in the estimation of a two stage model, namely the estima-
tion of two probit equations: the selection equation and the substantial equation. The
former measures the probability that a given observation (in our case, a municipality)
belongs to the sample (in our case, the fact that the municipality has answered to
our survey). This equation allows to generate a correction factor that will be used in
the substantial equation, which measures the determinants of the dependent variable
(in our case the fact that a pair City×Service is provided by the private sector). The
results of this analysis, shown in Table 3.11, suggest that our results are robust to the
correction of an eventual selection bias.
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Table 3.9: RDD-Multinomial Logit Models for Frequency of Public and Private Con-
tracting, with sector FE
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Table 3.10: RDD-Multinomial Logit Models for Frequency of Public and Private
Contracting, with service FE
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Table 3.11: RDD-Probit model with Heckman correction
Private
French -0.606*
(0.316)
Distance 0.00299
(0.0176)
French × Dist. 0.0219
(0.0267)
Contr. Diff. -0.0191
(0.0122)
Uncertainty 0.0569***
(0.0189)
Sensitivity 0.0221**
(0.0107)
Big -0.380
(0.312)
Small 0.448***
(0.167)
Urban 0.146
(0.176)
Mountain 0.222
(0.161)
Demographic Dep. Ratio -0.000738
(0.00121)
Income 0.0591
(0.119)
Budget Weight 0.0198
(0.0208)
Debt -0.569
(0.655)
Executive: Non partisan -0.0143
(0.0355)
Executive: Right -0.0892**
(0.0406)
Constant 0.808***
(0.292)
Observations 6,696
Notes: *p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01. Dependent
variable: Private contractingg (dummy). Regressions include
State dummies. Probit model with Heckman correction. Band-
width: 20 km. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal-
ity level.
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3.4.3 Ruling out a Cultural Bias
As the culture variable might not be orthogonal to the technical variables, it introduces
a potential bias in the municipality choices. To check whether it is the case, we show
estimations of our multinomial logit model of the determinants of the make-or-buy
decision, where we added interactions of the technical variables with the FRENCH
variable (Table 3.12). Results indicate that there is no cultural bias in the make-or-buy
choices.
Table 3.12: RDD-Multinomial Logit Models and Cultural Bias
20 km 20 km 20 km
Linear Linear Linear
Public Private Public Private Public Private
Cultural aspects
French 0.0643 -0.152*** 0.0815 -0.1608*** 0.0702 -0.1608***
(0.0522) (0.0586) (0.0534) (0.0558) (0.0525) (0.0573)
Distance -0.0043 -0.0017 -0.0048 -0.0017 -0.0043 -0.0017
(0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0022)
French×Distance 0.002 0.0085* 0.0023 0.0086* 0.0021 0.0085*
(0.0051) (0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0044) (0.0051) (0.0044)
Technical factors
French × Contr. Diff. 0.0201 0.0094
(0.0159) (0.0143)
French × Uncertainty 0.0448 -0.0079
(0.0311) (0.0252)
French × Sensitivity 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0192) (0.0179)
Contr. Diff. 0.0812*** -0.0295** 0.0918*** -0.0247** 0.0914*** -0.0248**
(0.0125) (0.0118) (0.0099) (0.0096) (0.0099) (0.0096)
Uncertainty -0.0095 0.0676*** -0.0337 0.0728*** -0.0086 0.0677***
(0.017) (0.0143) (0.0259) (0.0197) (0.0168) (0.0143)
Sensitivity -0.0155 0.0222** -0.0157 0.0216** -0.0164 0.0216
(0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0161) (0.0143)
Other controls
Big -0.0651 -0.0561 -0.0623 -0.0566 -0.0655 -0.0563
(0.0445) (0.0401) (0.0467) (0.0398) (0.0452) (0.0401)
Small 0.1116*** 0.0308 0.1111*** 0.031 0.1107*** 0.0308
(0.037) (0.0326) (0.0369) (0.0325) (0.0371) (0.0326)
Urban 0.0886** -0.0138 0.0865** -0.0134 0.0875** -0.0137
(0.0351) (0.0321) (0.0357) (0.0321) (0.035) (0.0317)
Mountain -0.0673* 0.0421 -0.0722* 0.0441 -0.0654* 0.0426
(0.0378) (0.0376) (0.0381) (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0376)
Demographic Dep. Ratio 0.0013 0.0008 0.0014 0.0008 0.0011 0.0008
(0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0023)
Income 0.0727*** 0.042 0.071*** 0.0437 0.0712*** 0.0421
(0.0255) (0.0355) (0.0256) (0.036) (0.0251) (0.0353)
Budget weight 0.0129 0.0288 0.011 0.0306 0.0142 0.0298
(0.02) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0194)
Debt -0.2461 -0.4316 -0.2943 -0.398 -0.2738 -0.4259
(0.8216) (0.8551) (0.8237) (0.8457) (0.8102) (0.8512)
Executive: Right 0.0258 -0.0158 0.0215 -0.0147 0.0241 -0.0158
(0.0412) (0.0356) (0.0406) (0.0354) (0.0411) (0.0355)
Executive: Non partisan 0.0386 -0.0859** 0.0356 -0.0861** 0.0371 -0.0858**
(0.0507) (0.0381) (0.0511) (0.038) (0.0505) (0.0384)
Observations 1290 1290 1290 1290 1290 1290
Municipalities 72 72 72 72 72 72
French/German 39/33 39/33 39/33 39/33 39/33 39/33
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects on probability of different modes of service provision.
In-house provision is the base outcome. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. All
regressions include State dummies. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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3.4.4 Ruling out spatial difference in the marginal effect of
culture: A differences-in-differences strategy
The fact that the magnitude of the impact of the language border estimated with
our RDD models tends to decrease with the bandwidth (albeit it is still significant)
may signify that the cultural gap is less strong for municipalities that are not located
directly at the border. In order to test whether the effect of culture is above all a
border effect, we use a difference-in-differences strategy consisting in estimating if
municipalities located within 20 km on either side of the language border (treatment
group) behave differently from municipalities whose distance from the language border
is bigger than 20 km (counterfactual municipalities).
As in the baseline RDD model, we use a Multinomial Logit approach in order
to compare the probability that municipality i provides service j using the provision
mode m ∈ {Private contracting, Public contracting} against the base category In-
House:
ln
[
Pr(Yij = m)
Pr(Yij = InHouse)
]
= αlm + βmFi + γmBorderi + δmFi ×Borderi
+ X’ijζm + ijm,∀m, (3.2)
where Fi is a dummy taking the value 1 if the municipality i is French-speaking,
Borderi is a dummy taking the value 1 if the municipality i is located closer than
20 kilometers from the language border, and X’ij is a vector of controls, including
Service dummies, City variables and canton fixed effects. m is the set of the three
possible modes of provision and j is the set of 22 services.
The coefficient β measures the impact of being French-speaking for municipalities
located outside the border area. The coefficient γ compares German-speaking munic-
ipalities inside and outside the border area. Finally, δ is the difference-in-differences
estimator.
The estimations of this model, as well as a Logit model opposing private to public
provision, are reported in Table 3.13. The fact that the coefficient of the variable
French is negative for Private contracting suggests that the cultural effect still exists
for municipalities located further from the border. Finally, the fact that the interaction
term has no significant effect suggests that the cultural effect is not confined to the
border. This analysis suggests that the cultural impact is the same for municipalities
inside and outside the border area.
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Table 3.13: Spatial differences in the marginal effect: Differences-in-differences
Multinomial Logit Logit
Public Private Private
French 0.0745 -0.2513** -0.2254***
(0.1124) (0.1064) (0.0831)
Border 0.012 -0.0473 -0.0452
(0.0498) (0.0614) (0.0504)
French × Border -0.0248 0.1766 0.1598
(0.074) (0.1101) (0.0984)
Observations 2343 2343 2343
Municipalities 131 131 131
Notes: *p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01. All regressions include
State dummies. Other controls: Service Fixed Effects, Size (3 classes),
Mountain, Urban, Income, Debt, Demographic Dep. Ratio, Ideology (3
classes). Border20 is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the municipal-
ity is located closer than 20 km from the border. MLogit: Reported
coefficients are marginal effects on probability of different modes of
service provision. In-house provision is the base outcome. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Logit: Reported
coefficients are marginal effects on probability of private contracting.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality and service levels.
3.5 Pinning down the exact channel: analysis of
public expenditure
In section 5.3, we have shown that culture is a major determinant of the organizational
choices for the provision of local public services in Switzerland, and that municipalities
in the French-speaking area 60 percent less prone to contract-out with the private
sector to provide a given public service. Three possible channels may explain these
results. First, the effect of culture might be mediated by differences in terms of
unemployment, in line with the study of Eugster et al. (2016) who showed substantial
differences between the French- and German-speaking areas in terms of attitudes
towards work and job search. Secondly, the culture effect could be due to a corruption
differential, in line with the study of Fisman and Miguel (2007). Finally, this result
might also be explained by differences in terms of preferences. The goal of this section
is hence to assess the consequences of contracting decisions in order to pin down the
exact channel.
Our measure of the municipal expenditure considers the total expenditure in the
three categories Expenditure for Personnel (salaries and contributions to the social
security scheme), Purchase of goods and services, and Contribution to other public
entities. Doing so, our variable is cleaned-up from several expenditure on which the
municipality has no control (e.g social grants that are determined by cantonal and
federal norms, and consequences of past decisions (interests, depreciations)). Table
3.14 presents the descriptive statistics for the new variables used in this section.
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Table 3.14: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure p.c. 2648.07 1007.28 905.66 16568.45
Pc In-House 0.4805 0.2103 0 1
Pc Public Contr. 0.2426 0.1615 0 0.7143
Pc Private Contr. 0.2768 0.1835 0 0.8000
We estimate the following RDD model:
ln yit = αl + δFrenchi +
2∑
k=1
βlkD
k
i +
2∑
k=1
βrkD
k
i × Frenchi + θPrInhousei
+ γPrInhousei × Frenchi + X’itη + Provided’iζ + λt + it (3.3)
where yit is the per capita spending related to purchases of goods and services,
wage, and payments to other public authorities. Two variables are constructed based
on the Athias-Wicht municipal survey: PrInhousei is the fraction of the services
provided that are provided in-house in municipality i13, Provided’i: is a vector of
dummies taking the value 1 if the service j is provided in municipality i (whatever the
mode of provision). Finally X’it is a vector of other municipality controls (including
canton fixed effects), and λt is a year fixed effect.
The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: δ measures the public spending
p.c. differential between border French and German-speaking municipalities when
contracting (PrInhouse = 0). θ measures the public spending p.c. differential among
German-speaking municipalities according to their propensity to provide in-house. γ
measures the public spending p.c. differential between French and German-speaking
municipalities according to their propensity to provide in-house, comparatively to
their public spending p.c. differential when contracting. Finally, δ + γ measures the
public spending p.c. differential between French and German-speaking municipalities
according to their propensity to provide in-house. We also estimate the same model
without spatial trend.
Table 3.15 reports the estimations of this model at different bandwidths. The
fact that γ — the coefficient of the interaction term — is negative shows that In-
House provision is more efficient on the French side of the language border. A 10-
percent increase of the number of services provided in-house leads to a reduction of
the differential in terms of public spending per capita when contracting (that is, when
the PrInHouse variable takes the value 0) of about 10 percentage points.
The negative sign of the French coefficient δ suggests that contracting (public or
private) increases the public spending differential between the French- and German-
speaking areas.
Finally, the positive sign of the PrInHouse coefficient θ shows for its part that
13This variable does not vary over time, which is in line with the fact that it is culturally deter-
mined.
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In-House provision tends to increase the public spendings per capita in the German
area (albeit this result is weakly significant).
Whereas this result may suggest that French-speaking municipalities have a com-
parative advantage for In-House provision and German-speaking municipalities have a
comparative advantage for contracting-out, the results of a similar model considering
the percentage of public contracting rather than the percentage of in-house provision
(Table 3.16) show that it is not the case. Indeed the positive sign of the interaction
variable γ suggests that public contracting is less efficient in the French-speaking area
than in the German-speaking municipalities. In addition, we do not observe a similar
impact when considering private contracting (Table 3.17). These results are confirmed
when we run the same regressions without RDD (Tables 3.18, 3.19, and 3.20).
These results show that In-house provision is more efficient in the French area.
Hence, these results are totally in line with the fact that French-speaking munici-
palities do more in-house provision whereas German-speaking municipalities do more
contracting. This suggests that our results might be explained by mission-matching.
Indeed, mission-matching is expected to lead to productivity gains. The next chapter
will define more precisely the meaning of being motivated. Then, we shall verify that
motivation is systematically different in both language areas.
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Table 3.15: Effects of In-House versus contracting within and across culture (RDD)
Dep. Var.: Ln(Spendings p.c.) 20 km 25 km 30 km 40 km 40 km
Bandwidth Linear Linear Linear Linear Quadratic
French 0.466** 0.423** 0.341** 0.277* 0.409**
(0.215) (0.170) (0.158) (0.153) (0.199)
Distance 0.0201** 0.00322 0.00816** 0.00773** 0.00156
(0.00765) (0.00404) (0.00382) (0.00319) (0.00956)
French × Distance -0.0390** -0.0168* -0.0148* -0.00930* -0.0189
(0.0158) (0.00930) (0.00790) (0.00489) (0.0213)
Distance2 -0.000168
(0.000229)
French × Dist.2 0.000580
(0.000522)
Pr. In House 0.266 0.262 0.297* 0.286* 0.282*
(0.209) (0.172) (0.163) (0.154) (0.155)
French × Pr. InHouse -0.962*** -0.891*** -0.805*** -0.703*** -0.711***
(0.318) (0.257) (0.228) (0.224) (0.225)
Big 0.0503 0.0433 0.0732 0.0177 0.0121
(0.108) (0.0890) (0.0914) (0.0824) (0.0831)
Small -0.266*** -0.196*** -0.177*** -0.149*** -0.151***
(0.0897) (0.0719) (0.0653) (0.0547) (0.0569)
Urban 0.267* 0.277*** 0.239*** 0.202*** 0.222***
(0.155) (0.0906) (0.0680) (0.0551) (0.0618)
Income 5.95e-05 0.000108* 0.000113* 0.000140** 0.000139**
(6.54e-05) (6.35e-05) (5.81e-05) (5.85e-05) (5.72e-05)
Mountain 0.0342 0.0461 0.0830 0.0719 0.0633
(0.117) (0.0593) (0.0573) (0.0519) (0.0512)
Debt -1.504 0.688 0.320 0.745 0.806
(1.298) (1.170) (1.364) (1.358) (1.272)
Demographic Dep. Ratio 0.0608 -0.284 -0.324 -0.186 -0.204
(0.493) (0.303) (0.270) (0.271) (0.278)
Non partisan 0.119 0.144** 0.129** 0.0723 0.0843
(0.0856) (0.0623) (0.0587) (0.0619) (0.0614)
Right 0.0533 -0.0115 -0.0263 -0.0549 -0.0487
(0.0971) (0.0680) (0.0624) (0.0603) (0.0591)
Constant 7.191*** 7.891*** 7.544*** 7.598*** 7.501***
(1.057) (0.636) (0.507) (0.411) (0.424)
Observations 138 178 200 250 250
R-squared 0.712 0.632 0.603 0.550 0.556
Notes:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust Standard errors clustered at the city level in
parentheses. OLS estimations for the years 2013 and 2014. Additional control: dummy variables
for each service (1 if the service is provided in the mun.). All regressions include Canton fixed
effects and a year dummy.
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Table 3.16: Effects of public contracting within and across culture (RDD)
Dep. Var.: Ln(Spendings p.c.) 20 km 25 km 30 km 40 km 40 km
Bandwidth Linear Linear Linear Linear Quadratic
French -0.347* -0.290* -0.274* -0.217* -0.106
(0.196) (0.161) (0.148) (0.123) (0.140)
Distance 0.0233*** 0.00256 0.00845** 0.00722** 0.00276
(0.00816) (0.00419) (0.00399) (0.00329) (0.00969)
French × Distance -0.0349** -0.0118 -0.0120 -0.00674 -0.0159
(0.0137) (0.00904) (0.00807) (0.00499) (0.0203)
Distance2 -0.000123
(0.000231)
French × Dist.2 0.000481
(0.000507)
Pr. Publ. Contr -0.0294 -0.0330 -0.0374 -0.0305 -0.0132
(0.288) (0.234) (0.235) (0.198) (0.203)
French × Pr. Publ. Contr 1.120** 0.856** 0.601 0.423 0.388
(0.451) (0.387) (0.391) (0.306) (0.296)
Big 0.000933 0.0588 0.107 0.0370 0.0339
(0.0890) (0.0837) (0.0894) (0.0823) (0.0826)
Small -0.279*** -0.200** -0.178** -0.144** -0.145**
(0.0894) (0.0768) (0.0681) (0.0583) (0.0598)
Mountain 0.275* 0.282*** 0.231*** 0.189*** 0.204***
(0.157) (0.0936) (0.0748) (0.0602) (0.0660)
Income 7.24e-05 0.000143* 0.000139** 0.000158*** 0.000159***
(6.10e-05) (7.19e-05) (6.07e-05) (5.69e-05) (5.60e-05)
Urban -0.00943 0.0378 0.0726 0.0655 0.0560
(0.125) (0.0785) (0.0748) (0.0670) (0.0676)
Debt -1.862 0.776 0.423 0.761 0.824
(1.459) (1.360) (1.542) (1.511) (1.451)
Demographic Dep. Ratio 0.208 -0.167 -0.207 -0.0563 -0.0613
(0.451) (0.322) (0.291) (0.286) (0.291)
Non partisan 0.0383 0.0955 0.0942 0.0391 0.0466
(0.0922) (0.0680) (0.0638) (0.0670) (0.0670)
Right -0.00353 -0.0539 -0.0599 -0.0825 -0.0804
(0.105) (0.0750) (0.0686) (0.0693) (0.0686)
Constant 7.243*** 8.185*** 7.964*** 7.860*** 7.791***
(0.990) (0.662) (0.555) (0.478) (0.495)
Observations 138 178 200 250 250
R-squared 0.719 0.615 0.576 0.520 0.524
Notes:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust Standard errors clustered at the city level in
parentheses. OLS estimations for the years 2013 and 2014. Additional control: dummy variables
for each service (1 if the service is provided in the mun.). All regressions include Canton fixed
effects and a year dummy.
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Table 3.17: Effects of private contracting within and across culture (RDD)
Dep. Var.: Ln(Spendings p.c.) 20 km 25 km 30 km 40 km 40 km
Bandwidth Linear Linear Linear Linear Quadratic
French -0.347* -0.290* -0.274* -0.217* -0.106
(0.196) (0.161) (0.148) (0.123) (0.140)
Distance 0.0233*** 0.00256 0.00845** 0.00722** 0.00276
(0.00816) (0.00419) (0.00399) (0.00329) (0.00969)
French × Distance -0.0349** -0.0118 -0.0120 -0.00674 -0.0159
(0.0137) (0.00904) (0.00807) (0.00499) (0.0203)
Distance2 -0.000123
(0.000231)
French × Dist.2 0.000481
(0.000507)
Pr. Private Contr -0.0294 -0.0330 -0.0374 -0.0305 -0.0132
(0.288) (0.234) (0.235) (0.198) (0.203)
French × Pr. Private Contr. 1.120** 0.856** 0.601 0.423 0.388
(0.451) (0.387) (0.391) (0.306) (0.296)
Big 0.000933 0.0588 0.107 0.0370 0.0339
(0.0890) (0.0837) (0.0894) (0.0823) (0.0826)
Small -0.279*** -0.200** -0.178** -0.144** -0.145**
(0.0894) (0.0768) (0.0681) (0.0583) (0.0598)
Mountain 0.275* 0.282*** 0.231*** 0.189*** 0.204***
(0.157) (0.0936) (0.0748) (0.0602) (0.0660)
Income 7.24e-05 0.000143* 0.000139** 0.000158*** 0.000159***
(6.10e-05) (7.19e-05) (6.07e-05) (5.69e-05) (5.60e-05)
Urban -0.00943 0.0378 0.0726 0.0655 0.0560
(0.125) (0.0785) (0.0748) (0.0670) (0.0676)
Debt -1.862 0.776 0.423 0.761 0.824
(1.459) (1.360) (1.542) (1.511) (1.451)
Demographic Dep. Ratio 0.208 -0.167 -0.207 -0.0563 -0.0613
(0.451) (0.322) (0.291) (0.286) (0.291)
Non partisan 0.0383 0.0955 0.0942 0.0391 0.0466
(0.0922) (0.0680) (0.0638) (0.0670) (0.0670)
Right -0.00353 -0.0539 -0.0599 -0.0825 -0.0804
(0.105) (0.0750) (0.0686) (0.0693) (0.0686)
Constant 7.243*** 8.185*** 7.964*** 7.860*** 7.791***
(0.990) (0.662) (0.555) (0.478) (0.495)
Observations 138 178 200 250 250
R-squared 0.719 0.615 0.576 0.520 0.524
Notes:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust Standard errors clustered at the city level in
parentheses. OLS estimations for the years 2013 and 2014. Additional control: dummy variables
for each service (1 if the service is provided in the mun.). All regressions include Canton fixed
effects and a year dummy.
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Table 3.18: Effects of In-House versus contracting within and across culture (non
RDD)
Dep. Var.: Ln(Spendings p.c.)
Subsample 20 km 25 km 30 km 40 km
French 0.401* 0.270* 0.366** 0.371***
(0.201) (0.157) (0.151) (0.141)
Pr. In House 0.446** 0.318* 0.353** 0.309*
(0.220) (0.169) (0.162) (0.157)
French × Pr. In House -0.991*** -0.814*** -0.781*** -0.628***
(0.333) (0.262) (0.238) (0.231)
Big -0.0259 0.00741 0.0155 -0.0239
(0.111) (0.0927) (0.0933) (0.0868)
Small -0.211** -0.187** -0.154** -0.143***
(0.0870) (0.0730) (0.0643) (0.0542)
Mountain 0.225 0.247*** 0.193*** 0.126**
(0.136) (0.0834) (0.0619) (0.0487)
Income 0.000111 0.000139** 0.000117** 0.000134**
(7.44e-05) (6.13e-05) (5.67e-05) (5.77e-05)
Urban 0.149 0.0964* 0.128** 0.100*
(0.118) (0.0561) (0.0601) (0.0552)
Debt -1.504 0.634 0.333 1.194
(1.439) (1.171) (1.272) (1.168)
Demographic Dep. Ratio 0.0542 -0.258 -0.315 -0.124
(0.465) (0.285) (0.287) (0.298)
Executive: Non partisan 0.0975 0.102 0.111* 0.0524
(0.0846) (0.0682) (0.0630) (0.0638)
Executive: Right 0.0126 -0.0484 -0.0390 -0.0753
(0.0904) (0.0699) (0.0627) (0.0633)
Constant 7.365*** 8.109*** 7.510*** 7.565***
(0.985) (0.668) (0.533) (0.435)
Observations 138 178 200 250
R-squared 0.663 0.610 0.578 0.521
Notes:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust Standard errors clustered at the
city level in parentheses. OLS estimations for the years 2013 and 2014. Additional
control: dummy variables for each service (1 if the service is provided in the mun.).
All regressions include Canton fixed effects and a year dummy.
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Table 3.19: Effects of public contracting within and across culture (non RDD)
Dep. Var.: Ln(Spendings p.c.)
Subsample 20 km 25 km 30 km 40 km
French -0.342* -0.370** -0.206 -0.0592
(0.191) (0.165) (0.139) (0.106)
Pr. Publ. Contr. -0.237 -0.0980 -0.129 -0.108
(0.322) (0.233) (0.243) (0.207)
French × Pr. Publ. Contr. 1.290** 0.916** 0.680 0.437
(0.526) (0.422) (0.416) (0.327)
Big -0.0802 0.0335 0.0571 0.000513
(0.101) (0.0873) (0.0942) (0.0884)
Small -0.229** -0.197** -0.157** -0.139**
(0.0925) (0.0771) (0.0678) (0.0583)
Mountain 0.234 0.264*** 0.189*** 0.117**
(0.155) (0.0879) (0.0682) (0.0490)
Income 0.000110* 0.000158** 0.000127** 0.000143**
(6.34e-05) (6.92e-05) (5.81e-05) (5.63e-05)
Urban 0.108 0.0776 0.118 0.0962
(0.124) (0.0724) (0.0741) (0.0674)
Debt -1.602 0.741 0.429 1.156
(1.474) (1.331) (1.428) (1.287)
Demographic Dep. Ratio 0.147 -0.190 -0.239 -0.0364
(0.461) (0.318) (0.319) (0.309)
Executive: Non partisan 0.0600 0.0797 0.0972 0.0379
(0.101) (0.0722) (0.0655) (0.0674)
Executive: Right -0.00561 -0.0679 -0.0511 -0.0829
(0.106) (0.0778) (0.0700) (0.0711)
Constant 7.316*** 8.289*** 7.891*** 7.784***
(0.953) (0.660) (0.575) (0.497)
Observations 138 178 200 250
R-squared 0.674 0.603 0.553 0.495
Notes:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust Standard errors clustered at the
city level in parentheses. OLS estimations for the years 2013 and 2014. Additional
control: dummy variables for each service (1 if the service is provided in the mun.).
All regressions include Canton fixed effects and a year dummy.
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Table 3.20: Effects of private contracting within and across culture (non RDD)
Dep. Var.: Ln(Spendings p.c.)
Subsample 20 km 25 km 30 km 40 km
French -0.240 -0.283** -0.196 -0.0960
(0.197) (0.131) (0.120) (0.112)
Pr. Private Contr. -0.430 -0.360* -0.389** -0.312**
(0.290) (0.207) (0.189) (0.152)
French × Pr. Private Contr. 0.366 0.389 0.462 0.443
(0.454) (0.343) (0.343) (0.274)
Big -0.0120 0.0307 0.0350 0.00423
(0.0982) (0.0863) (0.0839) (0.0790)
Small -0.171* -0.174** -0.149** -0.135**
(0.0858) (0.0730) (0.0650) (0.0538)
Mountain 0.233* 0.237*** 0.187*** 0.126**
(0.124) (0.0872) (0.0644) (0.0482)
Income 0.000150* 0.000176** 0.000153*** 0.000154***
(7.85e-05) (6.80e-05) (5.76e-05) (5.66e-05)
Urban 0.0933 0.0588 0.0819 0.0615
(0.103) (0.0639) (0.0626) (0.0595)
Debt -1.656 0.694 0.367 1.089
(1.562) (1.213) (1.319) (1.186)
Demographic Dep. Ratio 0.283 -0.0661 -0.138 0.0147
(0.490) (0.334) (0.298) (0.301)
Executive: Non partisan 0.00920 0.0306 0.0513 0.0198
(0.0931) (0.0802) (0.0669) (0.0688)
Executive: Right -0.0586 -0.116 -0.102 -0.111
(0.0932) (0.0746) (0.0669) (0.0692)
Constant 7.959*** 8.771*** 8.111*** 7.962***
(1.061) (0.786) (0.577) (0.470)
Observations 138 178 200 250
R-squared 0.622 0.578 0.554 0.505
Notes:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust Standard errors clustered at the
city level in parentheses. OLS estimations for the years 2013 and 2014. Additional
control: dummy variables for each service (1 if the service is provided in the mun.).
All regressions include Canton fixed effects and a year dummy.
151
3.6 Conclusion
The goal of this this chapter was to find a robust causal evidence on the role of culture
in explaining the propensity of public authorities to involve the private sector in the
delivery of public services.
Using the language border between the German-speaking and French-speaking
areas in Switzerland (the so-called Roestigraben) in a Regression-Discontinuity design
(RDD) approach combined with a within-canton identification strategy, that is, within
the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg, and Valais, we show that culture has a
substantial impact on the make-or-buy decision of local Governments: municipalities
in the French side of the language border are 60 percent less prone to contract-out
with the private sector than adjacent municipalities in the German side of the border,
under an identical economic and institutional framework. Regarding the classical
technical determinants of the make-or-buy decision, we observe that these factors are
totally in line with the results of Chapter 2, albeit the magnitude of these effects are
much smaller that the effect of culture. We hence conclude that culture is the most
important determinant of the organizational choices for public services.
We then test for different issues. We first test for the existence of a cultural bias
induced by the fact that the culture variable might not be orthogonal to the technical
variables. To do this, we include interaction terms between our cultural variable and
the technical variables, which allows us to conclude that there is no bias induced
by culture. We then test for a potentially different impact of the marginal effect of
culture within each side of the border. Using a difference-in-differences identification
strategy, we show that the impact of culture is the same in the municipalities that
are at the language border and in the municipalities that are further away from the
border.
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Chapter 4
The Public Service Motivation
(PSM) — Literature review
In the Chapter 3, we have shown that the cultural factor is a key determinants of
the make-or-buy decision for local public services in Switzerland. We now want to
understand what are the channels of transmission between culture and organizational
choices.
Public service motivation can be defined as a special care about the output being
produced when faced with public services. When goods are produced with external
benefits, then individuals who work in the production of these goods may factor the
value of the output that they produce into the amount of effort that they put in. For
such motivated agents, rewards to putting in effort are then non-pecuniary. However,
the non-pecuniary rewards depend on the way in which the organization is structured,
whether it is structured around a mission that matches motivated agents’ preferences
or not.
Public Service Motivation particularily fosters In-House provision rather than pub-
lic contracting. Indeed, public contracting — or at least part of it — may imply
objectives of profit similar to that of the private sector, whereas in-house provision
is by its very nature non-profit oriented. This may make public contracting less
mission-oriented than in-house provision (Besley and Ghatak, 2005).
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Before running empirical analyses to provide evidence on this channel (what we
shall do in Chapter 5), it is necessary to well understand what PSM is and hence to
consider the specific literature at the origin of the concept. The goal of this chapter is
then to present a review of the literature regarding Public Service Motivation (PSM).
Indeed, by contrast with the literature on bureaucracy and rent seeking, who suggest
that public provision is by its very nature less efficient than private provision, PSM
suggests on the contrary that the matching (person-organization fit) between highly
public service motivated employees and an organization (the public sector) whose
goals and practices correspond the best with their aspirations might make the public
sector more efficient than private firms.
This literature review highlights that the literature shows that culture is a major
determinant of PSM, which may explain across-country differences in the level of
PSM and, in the Swiss case, the differences between the language regions. Then,
the literature also highlights the importance of a good matching between the mission
and values of the organization and the PSM of the employees. Finally, we identify
several limitations of this literature, in particular the empirical one. In particular, we
highlight the difficulties to measure PSM in a way that makes it possible to transpose it
to different countries, as well as to provide across-country comparisons. Our literature
review also sheds light on some issue related with the definition of PSM. Indeed, this
definition changed over time, from a public sector motivation to a public service
motivation that can also apply under certain conditions to services provided by the
private sector. In addition, PSM is always measured in absolute terms, which does
consider the fact that the agents have a more or less high propensity to behave in a
civic manner, irrespective of whether they work for the public or the private sector,
and irrespective of whether they provide services with a public-service component
or not. This definition is hence too narrow and does not fit with the needs of our
research. Constructing a PSM measure that allows to control for general civicness will
be an important contribution of our next chapter. Finally, as the empirical literature
on Public Service Motivation considers only public agents, it is not able to study
potential relationships between PSM and the organizational choices. Tackling this
issue will be the main goal of Chapter 5.
The remainder of this chapter will be as follows. In Section 4.1, we define PSM
and we present its main theoretical foundations. We also highlight the importance of
mission-matching. In Section 4.2, we shed light on the way PSM is operationalized in
the empirical literature. In Section 4.3, we review the literature on the determinants
of PSM. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.
4.1 Definition
4.1.1 The foundations
Until the beginning of the years 1980’s, the research on public employees and pub-
lic sector efficiency was dominated by the public choice literature (e.g. Buchanan
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and Tullock (1962), Tullock (1965), and Niskanen (1971)), which considered that the
public sector was by its very bureaucratic nature inefficient, that public employees
were less performing and less committed to their work than employees of the private
sector. This point of view is well illustrated by the point of view expressed by Warren
and Niskanen (1974) : “American bureaucracy is guilty of gross mismanagement of
the public interest. The real accountability crisis is that even if our bureaucrats act
inefficiently and against our interests, as is too often the case, we cannot realisti-
cally hope for administrative abuses to be checked by the present ‘watchdog’ system.”
These considerations, along with the arrival in power of liberal politicians as Mar-
garet Thatcher in the U.K. in 1979, and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. in 1981, lead to
the implementation, since the beginning of the 1980’s, of New Public Management
(NPM) reforms in order to apply the “good practices” of the private sector to the
public sector (Hood, 1991).
This literature did not consider it as possible that different motivations can exist,
and that these different motivations may — under certain circumstances — make it
inefficient to apply directly to the public sector the receipts of the private economy.
However, a new strand of research began to emerge in the public administration
literature since the 1980’s, namely the Public Service Motivation (PSM).
The first occurrence of the concept of Public Service Motivation dates back to
Rainey (1982). In reaction to the paper of Buchanan (1975), who argued that public
sector managers were less job-involved than private sector managers1, Rainey showed
on the contrary that public employees paid a bigger importance to the social interest.
Asking 275 individuals (managers) working either for a U.S. Federal agency or for a
large private firm how much importance they put on different motivation factors, he
observed that public sector employees valued significantly more motives that generated
benefits for the Society (e.g. engaging in meaningful public service, doing work that
is helpful to other people, a.s.o. ), and that they reported significantly lower scores
regarding motives in line with utility maximizing (e.g. higher pay, achieving status
and prestige, making a good deal of money)
Albeit this study did not sketch a theoretical framework of the concept of Public
Service Motivation, or even define this concept (“it is difficult to define the concept
any more directly or clearly than this, because it is actually a very complex concept”),
it was however the first attempt to highlight the fact that agents in the public and
the private sector are subject to different motivations, by contrast with the dominant
paradigm that all workers (whenever they worked for the public or the private sector)
sought exclusively to maximize their own utility, in line with the Public choice theory.
In the same vein, for Staats (1988), public employees distinguish from private
employees by the fact that they have a particular public ethos : “ ‘Public service’ is a
concept, an attitude, a sense of duty — yes, even a sense of public morality.”.
The concept of PSM has been formalized for the first time by Perry and Wise
1Buchanan compared the levels of involvement between two samples of managers from the public
and private sectors, respectively. To measure the job involvement of the respondents, he used con-
structs as the importance of their work in their life, as well as “the psychological absorption in their
work”.
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(1990), who aimed to review and structure the related concepts developed so far, as
well as to highlight and identify the specificities of working for the public sector, as
“public service signifies much more than one’s locus of employment”. This paper also
intended to be an answer to the explosion of the New Public Management, and to
the introduction of the merit pay for the employees of the U.S. Federal Government
in 1979. Perry and Wise define PSM as “an individual’s predisposition to respond
to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations.
The term ‘motives’ is used here to mean psychological deficiencies or needs that an
individual feels some compulsion to eliminate.”. Building up on Knoke and Wright-
Isak (1982), they distinguished three types of public service motives: rational, norm-
based, and affective. The rational motives are mainly related to the participation
in the policy-making process, either because of a personal identification with the
goals of a given service, because this gives the agent a certain prestige, or because it
allows him to satisfy some personal interest. The rational motives are by definition
self-interested, albeit the satisfaction of self-interest may also lead to a satisfaction
of the general interest. This may include the phenomenon of warm-glow identified
by Andreoni (1989; 1990) in the context of charity giving: agents adopt a pro-social
behaviour, not because it will profit to the others, but because it increases their self-
esteem and they receive utility from the act of being pro-social. The second category
of motives are norm-based motives: agents work for the public service because they
desire to serve the public interest, which can include concerns for social equity. This is
directly connected with a commitment to the values of the public sector. Finally, the
third category of motives are affective motives, that is a particular commitment to
a program and “a genuine conviction about its social importance”, which can include
a component of self-sacrifice.
On the basis of this framework, Perry and Wise (1990) sketch, without testing
them, three propositions. First, individuals who are highly public-service motivated
will be more prone to seek to work for public organizations. Secondly, public service
motivation increases the individual performance of the agents. Finally, public orga-
nizations that attract a large number of highly public-service motivated workers will
have less need to resort to utilitarian incentives to achieve a high performance. These
three propositions have given rise to a huge empirical literature, which corroborated
them to a large extent, as we will show in the next section.
4.1.2 Public sector motivation or Public service motivation?
Since the end of the years 1990’s, several scholars (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999; Steen,
2008) shed light on the fact that PSM is not totally specific to the public sector
stricto sensu. On the contrary, characteristics of public-service motivated agents
can also be observed to a large extent within employees of the not-for-profit sector,
and even in some cases within employees of the for-profit private sector. For this
reason, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) provide a wider definition of PSM: “A general
altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation
or humanity.”. In the same vein, Perry and Hondeghem (2008) define now PSM as
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“An individual’s orientation to delivering services to people with a purpose to do good
for others and society”, and Vandenabeele (2007) as “The belief, values, and attitudes
that go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interest of
a larger political entity and that motivates individuals to act accordingly whenever
appropriate”. Hence, the definition of PSM moved from an initial definition centered
on who provides a service to a definition centered on what are the characteristics
of the service. In other words, public service motivation is no more considered as
a motivation to work for the public sector, but rather than a motivation to provide
public services (in a wide sense), regardless of the fact that this service is provided
by the public or the private sector. The move from the first definition, that we could
call “public sector motivation” to the second definition which corresponds more to the
very terms “public service motivation” is not only a question of terminology; on the
contrary, it changes fundamentally the scope of the research. For Brewer and Selden
(1998): “If public service refers to actions that do something valuable or worthwhile
for society, PSM is a universal trait that transcends the public sector”. Whereas the
person-based definition focuses on questions like: “does it benefit or harm the society
if a given service is provided by the private sector rather than public employees?”,
the service-based definition does not allow to answer to such a question, at least
directly, that is, without considering the matching between the values of public-service
motivated agents with the values of the organization for which they work (Person-
Organization-Fit, see below in Sub-Section 4.1.3). Rather, it enlarges the scope of
research and provides useful insights in order to understand how government agencies
should be organized — in particular regarding their management of HR — in order
to provide public services in an efficient manner.
Recentering the debate on PSM on a service-based definition also allows to disen-
tangle the real motivation based on the will that one’s work is profitable for the society
and extrinsic motivations in terms of, for example, job security, a generous pension
system, or good wages offered by the public sector (Perry and Hondeghem, 2008).
It is however important to note that PSM should not be confused with the concept
of intrinsic motivation developed, among others, by Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), and
Deci and Ryan (1985). Intrinsic motivation can be defined as “the doing of an activity
for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence.” (Ryan and
Deci, 2000). This inherent satisfaction can be the intention to be useful to the Society
(which would go along with Public Service Motivation), but it can also consist in
factors that increase the utility of the agent without necessarily benefiting the oth-
ers, for example the fact of fulfilling interesting or challenging tasks. In other words,
whereas intrinsic motivation is essentially self-centered, PSM is on the contrary es-
sentially turned towards the others. As Grant (2008) notes: “prosocial and intrinsic
motivations involve different reasons for expending effort. For intrinsically motivated
individuals, effort is based on interest and enjoyment; for prosocially motivated indi-
viduals, effort is based on a desire to benefit others”. In addition, what is important
in intrinsic motivation is the process, the way the task is performed, whereas the focus
of PSM is on the outcome (Grant, 2008). For Vandenabeele (2007), PSM is neither
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totally intrinsic (because of its outcome orientation), nor totally extrinsic (because it
is not dependent from extrinsic rewards).
4.1.3 Aligning the goals: Person-Organization Fit and Mission-
Matching
Once admitted that workers distinguish from each other by different levels of public
service motivation, it is crucial to determine under which conditions this motivation
can better be expressed, and in particular which organizational structures and pro-
cedures fit the best with highly public-service motivated employees. The so-called
Person-Organization (P-O) fit exists when the employees and the organization they
work for share a certain amount of values, which increase the employees’ commitment
and their satisfaction to achieve tasks that hold intrinsic values for them (Moynihan
and Pandey, 2007). Kristof (1996) was among the first to provide a definition of the
P-O fit: “the compatibility between people and organizations that occurs when: (a)
at least one entity provides what the other needs, (b) they share similar fundamental
characteristics, or (c) both”
In line with the literature on organizational commitment, the Person-Organization
is expected to increase the organization’s efficiency in reducing the turnover: individ-
uals whose values fit better with the values of the organization are less likely to quit,
ceteris paribus. The impact of P-O fit on the turnover has been verified not only
in the public and not-for-profit sectors, but also in the private, for-profit sector. In
the particular case of PSM, the studies of Naff and Crum (1999), Balfour and Wech-
sler (1996), Elfenbein and O’Reilly (2007), Moynihan and Pandey (2007), and Steijn
(2008) corroborate the existence of a strong relationship between the turnover and
PSM: highly public-service motivated agents are less likely to quit their job in the
public sector.
Albeit the results of the study of Bright (2007) on 205 employees from three public
organizations in three U.S. States suggests that Person-Organization fit and Public
Service Motivation are not related, the largest part of the research suggests on the
contrary a strong complementarity between P-O fit and PSM, due to the fact that
P-O fit acts as a mediator between PSM and work attitudes. As noted by Brewer
and Selden (1998): “PSM is an individual — not a sector-based — concept; however,
some value congruence is expected between individuals with PSM and public-sector
organizations.” This hypothesis is supported by Kim’s (2012) empirical study of on
814 public servants in South Korea. The consequence is that it is in the interest of
government organizations to hire employees with a high degree of public service mo-
tivation, as these organizations will allow them to express this high PSM, to improve
their organizational commitment and their job satisfaction, which in turn increases
the organization’s efficiency. In the same vein, Wright and Pandey (2008) found very
similar results on a sample of 206 employees of local governments in the North-Eastern
U.S.
Consistently with these findings, public-service motivated employees of the public
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sector will have a lower job satisfaction, and in fine provide less efficient work, if they
feel that the organization they work for fail to serve the public interest they consider
as important, as shown by Vinzant (1998) in the case of social workers. In addition,
the person-organisation fit has also a component of person-job fit: inside the same
(public) organization, some jobs may be more subject than others to the expression of
public-service values (Christensen and Wright, 2011), and hence that highly public-
service motivated employees will particularly be attracted by public jobs in some
sectors as welfare, education, health, and culture (Vandenabeele, 2008; Leisink and
Steijn, 2008; Leisink and Steijn, 2009). Indeed, these sectors have a strong component
of public interest, and the quality of the provided services directly affect the citizens’
welfare. Similarly, some jobs in these sectors may allow the workers to express public-
service values even in the private sector (Steen, 2008; Wright and Christensen, 2010;
Christensen and Wright, 2011).
It follows that an adequate matching between the organization’s values and the
values of public-service motivated workers is of prime importance. In particular, this
means that incentive schemes have to be in adequacy with the values of the employees,
or at least the majority of them: red tape and high-powered incentive schemes based
on sanctions and rewards, merit wage, and a strict control of the employees may
be inefficient — and even counter-productive — in contexts where PSM is high, as
these incentives tend to crowd-out the PSM (Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Be´nabou and
Tirole, 2006; Frey, Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger, 1996).
In this section, we have shown that the PSM literature aims to shed
light on the fact that agents working for the public sector and/or to pro-
vide public services are characterized by a higher motivation and a higher
commitment, due to the fact that they feel that their work creates benefits
for the Society, and that this effect is particularly strong when the values
of the organization they work for are in line with their own values (P-O
fit).
Provided that PSM increases — ceteris paribus — the efficiency of the
provision of public services, we should hence expect that a high degree
of PSM should result in a higher propensity to maintain the provision of
public services in-house. This means in particular that jurisdictions facing
a same institutional environment should be less prone to contract-out if
they know a higher level of public service motivation.
4.2 The difficulty of measuring PSM
4.2.1 The dimensions of Perry (1996)
Both seminal papers of Rainey (1982) and Perry and Wise (1990) highlighted the need
to transpose the theoretical intuitions of PSM into a measurable scale that would allow
to provide empirical evidence supporting these intuitions. We have seen above that
Rainey (1982) based his analysis on a set of questions directly related to motivational
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factors.
This need has been fulfilled with the empirical framework developed by Perry
(1996), which is still nowadays at the heart of the largest part of the empirical litera-
ture on PSM, either in its original version or in adapted versions based on it. Based
on the three motives developed in Perry and Wise (1990), (norm-based, rational,
and affective), Perry (1996) identifies four dimensions that are constitutive of PSM.
These dimensions are: (1) a commitment to the public interest; (2) compassion; (3)
an attraction to public-policy making, and (4) self-sacrifice. Each of the first three
dimensions is related to one of the motives. The commitment to the public interest
operationalizes the norm-based motives, compassion is rooted in the concept of affec-
tive motives. The attraction to public-policy making is related with rational motives:
“attraction to public policy making can be exciting and dramatic and can reinforce
one’s image of self-importance”. The fourth dimension, self-sacrifice, is defined as
“the willingness to substitute service to others for tangible personal rewards”2. Two
other dimensions (civic duty, and social justice) have been first considered, but have
been rejected because the empirical tests run by Perry showed that they were too
strongly correlated with one or several of the other dimensions, which would have
resulted in a severe lack of unidimensionality of the constructs.
These four dimensions were translated into 24 items: 3 for the attraction to public-
policy making, 5 for the commitment to the public interest, 8 for compassion, and 8
for self-sacrifice. Each of this items consist in a statement with which the respondent
can assess his agreement with a Likert scale (see Table 4.1).
Different alternative constructs have been proposed, based on the typology of Perry
(1996). Kim and Vandenabeele (2010), Coursey and Pandey (2007), and DeHart-
Davis, Marlowe and Pandey (2006) call into question the fact that self-sacrifice is
independent from the three other dimension. The former suggests to remove this di-
mension, as it is a prerequisite for all three other factors, whereas the two latter merge
the self-sacrifice and public interest dimensions. On the contrary, some other schol-
ars suggest to complete Perry’s framework with additional dimensions, as “democratic
governance” (Hondeghem and Vandenabeele, 2005; Vandenabeele et al., 2006; Vanden-
abeele and de Walle, 2008). On the other hand, Vandenabeele 2008 adds a dimension
of customer-orientation. Comparing different measures of PSM based on the original
typology of Perry (1996), Wright and Christensen (2009) show that the results of
PSM empirical research are strongly dependent from the choice of a construct.
An important issue with the measures of PSM based on Perry’s constructs is the
fact that these constructs are expected to be strongly correlated with elements that
not exactly PSM, in particular the level of civicness of the respondents. Indeed, several
items in Perry’s typology capture civic behaviours that are not specific to the public
sector, for example Nr. 18 (“I believe in putting duty before self”), or Nr. 23 “I am
one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone else.” Hence,
these PSM constructs do not disentangle PSM and civic behaviours that are expressed
2Perry illustrates self-sacrifice with the famous sentence of President Kennedy in his inaugural
address in 1961: “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country”
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Table 4.1: Constructs of Public Service Motivation in Perry (1996)
Dimension Items
Public policy making 1. Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed)
2. The give and take of public policy making doesn’t
appeal to me. (Reversed)
3. I don’t care much for politicians. (Reversed)
Public interest 4. It is hard for me to get intensely interested in
what is going on in my community. (Reversed)
5. I unselfishly contribute to my community.
6. Meaningful public service is very important to me.
7. I would prefer seeing public officials do what is
best for the whole community even if it harmed my
8. I consider public service my civic duty.
Compassion 9. I am rarely moved by the plight of the underpriv-
ileged. (Reversed)
10. Most social programs are too vital to do without.
11. It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when
I see people in distress.
12. To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare
of others.
13. I seldom think about the welfare of people whom
I don’t know personally. (Reversed)
14. I am often reminded by daily events about how
dependent we are on one another.
15. I have little compassion for people in need who
are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves.
16. There are few public programs that I wholeheart-
edly support. (Reversed)
Self-sacrifice 17. Making a difference in society means more to me
than personal achievements.
18. I believe in putting duty before self.
19. Doing well financially is definitely more impor-
tant to me than doing good deeds. (Reversed)
20. Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than
myself.
21. Serving citizens would give me a good feeling
even if no one paid me for it.
22. I feel people should give back to society more
than they get from it.
23. I am one of those rare people who would risk
personal loss to help someone else.
24. I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for
the good of society.
Source: Perry (1996)
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both in everyday life, also when public services are not involved. In addition, some
other items measure the importance paid to public services, without any component
of civicness or good behaviour. For example, the fact that a respondent considers
that “Most social programs are too vital to do without” (Nr. 10) does not necessarily
mean that he would express a particular motivation if he worked in this sector, but
only that he finds that these programs are important — perhaps only as a beneficiary.
4.2.2 Measuring PSM in different countries
In addition, the fact that the concepts of PSM, and the typology of Perry (1996) have
been developed in the United States raises issues when it turns to apply them in other
countries.
This is particularly important when it turns from within-country studies to cross-
country comparisons: in this case, it is crucial — but also difficult — to translate
precisely the questions in the different languages without changing — even slightly
— their signification. It is even more problematic to find correspondences between
concepts that may differ from one country to another. For example, an expression
like self-sacrifice may be interpreted very differently by people belonging to different
cultures, as shown in the case of Belgium by Vandenabeele and Hondeghem (2004).
Apart from technical issues related to the measurement of PSM, the definition of what
is constitutive of the public sector culture, and hence the relative importance of the
different components of PSM, also vary strongly across countries and cultures. The
concept itself of what is public service covers a wide range of definitions, even in coun-
tries that share a common historical heritage, as it is the case with most European
Countries (Vandenabeele and de Walle, 2008; Raadschelders, 2003). For Vanden-
abeele, Hondeghem and Steen (2004): “differences in both terminology and content
complicate research on PSM and make it difficult to conduct macro-level comparative
studies.” Kim (2009) calls into question the pertinence of the the dimension Attrac-
tion to public-policy making in general, and in particular whether it is appropriate
when PSM is considered in the context of South Korea, due to the homogeneity of the
Korean society (contrary to the U.S. ans many other countries, Koreans share a com-
mon culture in the whole country), but also to the influence of Confucianism: “Under
the influence of Confucian virtues and collectivistic culture, Koreans are inclined to
become civil servants to serve the public and enhance the public interest generally, not
specifically in their own interests. Thus, normative and affective motives will be more
prominently related to PSM than rational motives.”. For these reasons, he modified
the scale, removed the Attraction to public-policy making dimension from his analysis,
and reduced the number of items from 24 to 14.
Hondeghem and Vandenabeele (2005) and Vandenabeele et al. (2006) highlight
strong differences in the perception of the Compassion dimension across countries:
whereas French agents of the public sector emphasize individual compassion, they
observe more collective compassion in the Netherlands.
Due to these difficulties, there exist few studies that quantify and compare the
level of PSM between a large set of countries. In order to construct cross-country
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Note: Data: Vandenabeele and Van de Walle (2008)
Figure 4.1: Public service motivation in OECD countries
PSM measures, Vandenabeele and de Walle (2008) use data from the International
Social Survey Program (ISSP), on more than 52’000 respondents in 39 countries.
They consider questions on the importance of 5 items, measured on a Likert scale,
namely “To keep watch of the actions of government” and “To be active in social or
political associations”(Politics and Policy dimension), “To help people in my country
who are worse of than myself” and “To help people in the rest of the world who are
worse of than myself” (Compassion dimension) and “To choose products for political,
ethical, or environmental reasons, even if they cost a bit more” (Self-sacrifice dimen-
sion). In general, they measure the highest PSM scores in Southern European and
American countries, and the lowest scores in Central and Eastern Europe, particu-
larly in the former Soviet bloc: among the 10 countries with the lowest PSM rates,
6 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Russia, Slovak Republic) belonged to
the Eastern bloc. We report the measures for OECD countries in Table 4.1. The
authors explain cross-country variations by different historical evolutions, and path
dependency: “Although the concept of public service motivation is found everywhere
and one can speak of a robust common core, the focus and empirical nature tends to
differ due to a different or partial implementation of similar ideas.”
4.2.3 Public service motivation in Switzerland
Methodology and empirical evidence
A large part of the empirical research conducted on PSM in Switzerland is based on the
same dataset of 3754 municipal employees in 279 municipalities (Anderfuhren-Biget,
Varone, Giauque and Ritz, 2010; Anderfuhren-Biget, 2012; Giauque, Anderfuhren-
163
Biget and Varone, 2015). These studies use a PSM variable based on the 4 dimensions
of Perry (1996) (see above, in Sub-Section 4.2.1).
In line with the results measured in other countries, Anderfuhren-Biget et al.
(2010) observe that individuals with a higher PSM tend to be more satisfied with their
jobs and to be more committed and more efficient. Giauque et al. (2015) test for their
part the extent of P-O fit in Swiss municipalities. They show that a good adequacy
between personal aspirations and the work environment creates good conditions that
lead the individual to express their PSM. On the contrary, “public employees who
feel a sense of non-congruence between organisational practices and their expectations
demonstrate more negative attitudes towards their work and organisation, which might
in turn contribute to decreasing PSM.”. The authors show that extrinsic motivators
are less prone to foster the expression of PSM than intrinsic motivators. However,
they only observe the difference of impact between intrinsic and extrinsic motivators,
and not their signs. In particular, they do not show whether extrinsic motivators have
a positive or a negative impact on PSM: all we know is that this impact is smaller
than the impact of intrinsic motivators.
Whereas these two papers focused on an institutional/organizational component of
PSM, that is, the way PSM is expressed in a given working environment, Anderfuhren-
Biget (2012) focuses on the individual determinants of PSM. Consistently with the
research conducted in other countries, they observe a significant impact of socio-
demographic variables (age, gender, education level). In addition, they show a signif-
icant difference in terms of PSM between the two main language areas. Whereas the
score are higher in the German part for the dimension “Attraction to policy making”,
and to a lesser extent for “Self-sacrifice” and “Commitment to public interest”, French
respondents exhibit for their part higher scores for the dimension “Compassion”.
In the same vein, Ritz and Brewer (2013) show very similar results using the
same municipal database as well as a database of 14’486 employees of the Federal
administration. In particular, they also observe higher PSM in the German-speaking
area. They explain this result by the fact that Swiss-Germans are more interested in
politics, which is a consequence of the fact that local governments in the German-
speaking areas have a larger autonomy, and that the democracy in German Cantons
is more inspired by direct democracy whereas municipalities in the Latin area tend to
delegate more power to their elected representatives, thus leading to a weaker political
involvement of the citizens.
Finally, Ritz (2009) conducts a study on the impact of PSM on the efficiency of the
activity of the public sector. Based on a database of 13532 employees of the 7 Federal
Departments, he shows a positive relationship between PSM and internal efficiency
in terms of cost reduction, process simplification, and decision making.
These studies however face several shortcomings. The first one applies to the pa-
pers considering local government employees (Anderfuhren-Biget et al., 2010; Anderfuhren-
Biget, 2012; Giauque et al., 2015). Whereas the respondents live and work in different
cantons, the authors do not control for Canton fixed effects. Neither do they control
for institutional characteristics of the municipalities the individuals work for e.g its
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size, or the scope of NPM reforms conducted, provided that NPM reforms have been
implemented at the cantonal level in the majority of the cantons in the German area
while they are quite scarce in the French area (Steiner, 2000; Ritz and Sinelli, 2013).
This difference can also be observed at the local level: in year 2000, about 10 years
after the first NPM attempts in Switzerland, wave more than one third of the mu-
nicipalities in the German area had experienced NPM reforms, whereas less than
10 percent of the French-speaking municipalities did so (Steiner, 2000; Ladner, Arn,
Friederich, Steiner and Wichtermann, 2000)3. Hence, a possible omitted variable bias
questions the validity of the results of the studies mentioned above. This critique is
corroborated by the fact that the main explanations that Ritz and Brewer give for
the difference between the French and German areas are indeed institutional rather
than cultural.
The second important weakness, which applies to both the studies at the local
and Federal levels, is that these studies only consider public sector employees. In-
cluding workers of the private sector in the study would have brought a necessary
counterfactual. Without it, it is not possible to determine if the identified factors are
really determinants of PSM, or whether they are only determinants of a self-selection
process that may make, for example, individuals with a same level of PSM more prone
to join the public sector in the German area than in the French area. Hence, neither
Giauque et al. (2015) nor Ritz and Brewer (2013) do allow to determine whether there
is a difference in the general propensity of French and German individuals to adopt
PSM attitudes, irrespective of whether they work for the public or the private sector.
Finally, the main limit of these studies is that they do not disentangle the pure public
component of public service motivation from a more general measure of civic attitudes
that an agent expresses in everyday life as well as in his professional life, in the public
or private sector. In addition, the critiques presented above on the difficulty to use
Perry’s dimensions in a multi-cultural context — because of difficulties of translation
and diverging interpretations of key concepts — still apply in the Swiss context.
In this section, we have shown that mesuring PSM is a complex chal-
lenge. Most of the literature is based on the constructs defined by Perry
(1996). This is also the case of the literature regarding Switzerland. How-
ever these constructs suffer from several limitations. The most important
is that they do not allow to disentangle PSM from a more general propen-
sity to adopt a civic behaviour, that manifests itself to the same extent
when the public sector is involved or not. In addition, as most studies
consider only employees of the public sector, they lack from a counterfac-
tual. Finally, difficulties in translating the questions, as well as difficulties
to transpose the concepts in countries with another organizational culture
make it difficult to provide cross-country comparisons. For this reason,
in the next chapter, we shall use a proxy of PSM that controls for the
3For Ladner (2016): “In the more Napoleonic and state oriented French speaking municipalities,
the new steering possibilities based on products and global budgeting seem to be more attractive whereas
in the German speaking part reforms are more frequent and we find stronger support for managerial
reforms and private sector solution”
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general degree of civicness. In addition, our analysis will focus on local
jurisdictions facing a same institutional framework, which will allow us to
observe a real causal evidence.
4.3 The Determinants of PSM
4.3.1 Cultural determinants
Vandenabeele et al. (2006) and Vandenabeele and de Walle (2008) highlight the impact
of the dominant religion, insofar the community — and the government institutions
as well — integrates moral values taught by the Churches in its own values, even
unconsciously. This is the case, in particular, of compassion. Among countries sharing
a same dominant religion, the relative religious engagement also affects the level of
PSM: Christian countries in which religion plays an important role or where the
religious participation is higher (e.g Southern-European countries) tend to have higher
degrees of PSM (Vandenabeele and de Walle, 2008; Norris, 2003). This could explain
why Poland — where the religious participation is quite strong — is the only Post-
communist country that still exhibits a rather high PSM in the study of Vandenabeele
and de Walle (2008). These results regarding religion are in line with the fact that,
within a country, more religious individual tend to have a higher PSM Perry (1997)
(see below in Sub-Section 4.3.3).
Other analyses on cultural traits that affect PSM are based on the dimensions
developed by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (1991) and Hofstede (2001). The first
dimension is the individualist vs. collectivist nature of the society. The PSM scores
measured by Vandenabeele and de Walle (2008) suggest that collectivist societies
(in Asia, Latin America, and to a lesser extent Southern Europe) develop higher
levels of PSM than individualist societies, which is line with the fact that collectivist
societies emphasize values as solidarity with the other members of the society, loyalty,
compassion, and self-sacrifice to the interest of the “group”. This is in line with what
Kim (2009) observed in South Korea.
The second dimension is risk aversion (uncertainty avoidance): strongly risk-averse
societies (Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America, Japan, and Germanic coun-
tries) tend to implement more formal rules, that are a deterrent for PSM.
Power distance is defined by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) as “the extent
to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country
expect and accept that power is distributed unequally”. Hence, countries with a
high power distance (Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia) accept a strongly
hierarchical society, whereas small power distance countries (Western European and
Northern American countries) put a greater importance on equality, which also means
that the individuals are more prone to act in a way that reduces these inequalities.
The Masculinity vs. Feminity dimension distinguishes values like performance and
competition (values that Hofstede et al. (2010) considers as “Masculine”4. from values
4“Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men are
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as quality of life, warm personal relationship, and solidarity (“Feminine” values). It
is hence a distinction between performance societies and welfare societies (Kim 2015).
“Masculine” societies are prevalent in Latin and Germanic countries, as well as in
Japan, whereas “Feminine” societies are more prevalent in Northern Europe. As
“Feminity ” is associated with a greater tendency to help other people and to seek
the global welfare, “feminine” societies are expected to have a higher PSM.
Using data from the ISSP, Kim (2015) analyses the individual and national (using
Hofstede et al.’s (2010)’s dimensions) determinants of the PSM of more than 43’000
respondents from 32 countries5. His findings are in line with the expected results
regarding collectivism (collectivist societies tend to have higher PSM), masculinity
(societies with more masculine values have higher PSM) and indulgence. By con-
trast, he finds no significant relationship between PSM and power distance, as well
as uncertainty avoidance. In addition, he confirms that individual characteristics as
gender, age, education level, and religiosity still remain significant determinants of
PSM, even after controlling for national characteristics.
4.3.2 Institutional determinants
Studying PSM in different countries or large regions makes it necessary to consider
political and institutional characteristics of the country (or the region). Indeed, these
institutional framework constitutes the framework conditions that may foster or de-
ter the expression of the agents’ PSM, isofar the institutions, culture, and the well-
functioning of society do affect each other (Tabellini, 2010). “The institutions and
their administrative history explain most of the features found in a specific PSM con-
cept. This also explains the multidimensional appearance of PSM, as these institutions
are structured in a systemic way and relate to one another. Whenever studying PSM,
these institutions should be taken into account, because ignoring them will probably
results in violating concept validity.” (Vandenabeele et al., 2006).
Vandenabeele et al. (2006) point out substantial differences between the U.K.,
who “has a distinct public service ethos, which consists of core values, behaviors and
institutions”, and the Weberian German bureaucracy who “focuses more on the legal
and structural elements of public administration, [. . . ] and is acknowledged to this day
for its efficiency and formal controls.”. They identify several important characteristics
that are not taken into account within Perry’s (1996) dimensions, in particular the
degree of formalism of the bureaucracy, the competencies considered as important for
civil servants (generalist tradition in the U.K. vs. legalist tradition in Germany), or
the proximity and the dependency between the civil servants and the policy-makers.
The level of economic development and the structure of the economy have a strong
impact on the development of PSM, with higher levels of PSM in industrial and
supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more
modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which
social gender roles overlap: Both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned
with the quality of life.” (Hofstede et al., 2010)
5PSM is measured by the responses to the questions: “How important is a job that allows someone
to help other people?” and “How important is a job that is useful to society’ ’
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agricultural countries than in economies based essentially on tertiary sectors.
The fact — highlighted by Vandenabeele — that PSM is particularly low in coun-
tries who used to belong to the Soviet bloc is in line with the previous results of
Norris (2003), who explain this result by the fact that these countries have a recent
experience of totalitarian governments, but also by the “shock therapies” of massive
reductions of the size of the State that accompanied the transition to the market-
economy. As shown by Pratchett and Wingfield (1996) and Norris (2003), a similar
impact can be observed in capitalist countries that experienced massive NPM re-
forms in the years 1980’s and 1990’s: “Governments in Anglo-American nations could
have a more difficult time attracting workers because of recent public sector reforms”
(Norris, 2003).
4.3.3 Individual determinants
When considering individuals living in a same country, many studies highlight the
importance of personal characteristics on the individuals’ levels of PSM. A posi-
tive relationship has been observed between PSM and age as well as education level
(Perry, 1997; Naff and Crum, 1999; Houston, 2000; Bright, 2005; Steijn and Leisink,
2006; Camilleri, 2007; Moynihan and Pandey, 2007; Pandey and Stazyk, 2008), as well
as between PSM and income (Perry 1997). Whereas the positive relationship between
age and PSM has been demonstrated many times, this result has received no satisfy-
ing justification yet (Perry and Hondeghem 2008). Results regarding the gender are
mixed and depend from the dimension considered: whereas women exhibit a higher
degree of compassion, men score higher in terms of attraction to policy making and
Commitment to the public interest (Bright, 2005; DeHart-Davis et al., 2006; Van-
denabeele, 2007; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015). Finally, individuals who are more
implicated in associations tend to have higher PSM.
In addition to these individual determinants measured within countries, the cross-
country-based literature observed several country-level determinants of PSM, linked
with either the institutions, the history, or culture.
In this section, we have shown that the literature identifies three kinds
of determinants of PSM, namely cultural determinants (e.g. religion, indi-
vidualist vs. collectivist society, risk aversion), institutional determinants
(organizational culture, economic development) as well as individual deter-
minants (education, age, gender). However, this literature totally ignores
the existence of reverse causality. We should however expect both the in-
stitutions and culture to be affected by the PSM of the individuals. Indeed,
culture is the expression of the behaviours of the individuals composing a
society, and the institutions are also shaped by the behaviour or the indi-
viduals that are part of them. In the following chapter, we shall address
this issue, and show that PSM has a significant impact on the institutions,
namely on organizational choice.
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4.4 Conclusion
Key elements can be drawn from this overview of the literature. The first point
concerns the importance of PSM, as well as P-O fit. It has been established that
Public Service Motivation is a key factor to consider when studying the efficiency
of public services. PSM may explain the success or the failure of reforms of the
public sector, in particular the implementation of HR practices based on sanctions
and rewards. The management culture has to be in line with the presence — or the
absence — of PSM within the public employees: it is essential that the practices and
values of the organization have a good matching with the values of the employees.
The second point is that the very definition of PSM is not totally clear. In par-
ticular, it changed over time, from a public sector motivation to a public service
motivation that can also apply under certain conditions to services provided by the
private sector. In addition, this definition, as well as the components of PSM, can vary
across countries, and across the regions of a same country (e.g the language areas of
Switzerland, or Belgium). This makes it difficult to find a proxy of PSM that can be
applied to different countries and allow cross-country comparisons. However, the lit-
erature shed light on the importance of institutional characteristics on the expression
of PSM, and also on the importance of culture. The consequence is that practices that
are successful in some countries could be totally inefficient in some other countries.
Another important issue that is not taken into account by the existing literature
is that PSM is always considered in absolute terms, and does not take into account
the propensity of the agents to behave in a civic manner, irrespective of whether they
work for the public or the private sector, and irrespective of whether they provide
services with a public-service component or not. Constructing a PSM measure that
allows to control for general civicness will be an important contribution of our next
chapter.
Finally, almost all the empirical literature on PSM considers only public agents
and neglect private workers. Doing so, this literature is not able to draw connections
between PSM and the organizational choices. The goal of the next chapter will be to
tackle this issue.
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Chapter 5
Testing the Public Service
Motivation Channel
In Chapter 3, we have shed light on the fact that culture was the most important
determinant of organizational choices at the local level in Switzerland. Our result
suggested that mission-matching could be this channel of transmission. In Chapter 4,
we have reviewed the literature on Public Service Motivation, in order to determine
how this literature may allow to answer to the questions we want to address. Hence,
the goal of this fifth and last chapter is to provide evidence on the fact that PSM
(and more precisely mission matching) is the channel of transmission between the
culture and organizational choices. Doing so, we will add the last missing piece to the
questions addressed by this thesis.
We show that culture is the most important determinant of organizational choices
for public services because it determines the prevalence of motivated agents that are
aligned with public, mission-oriented organizations. We also provide evidence for the
role of matching the mission preferences of organizations and agents in increasing
productivity.
The remainder of this chapter will be as follows. In Section 5.1 we describe our
empirical strategy. We construct an original measure of PSM, based on the difference
between civic attitudes when the public sector is concerned and civic attitudes in
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general. Doing so, we respond to a lack of the traditional PSM literature. In Section
5.2, we describe our data. In Section 5.3, we present our empirical results. Finally,
Section 5.4 concludes this fifth and last chapter.
5.1 Empirical Strategy
Our goal here is to assess whether German-Swiss and French-Swiss systematically
differ in terms of public service motivation.
To assess whether this channel could explain our results, we use individual-level
data from the Swiss Household Panel that surveys thousands of respondents in Switzer-
land (random sample) assessing a broad range of questions linked to living in Switzer-
land. Among others, in its waves of 2011 and 2014, it asks individuals on scale between
0 and 10 whether they think that it is justified “cheating on tax declaration”, “avoid-
ing a fare on public transport”, “claiming State benefits to which you are not entitled”.
We argue that these three items capture preferences towards civic-minded behaviour
when the public sector is concerned.
However, the problem with relying on these items is that they might capture not
only preferences related to civic-minded behaviour when the public sector is concerned
but also preferences related to civic-minded behaviour in general. Indeed, it is highly
possible that preferences for civicness in the public sector are correlated with pref-
erences for civicness in general, so that they reflect not only preferences related to
public good concerns but also preferences for civicness in general. For preferences
towards civic-minded behaviour in the public sector to reflect only the motivational
channel due to the public good component discussed above, we need to eliminate in-
dividual preferences towards civic-minded behaviour in general. The SHP also asks
individuals on scale between 0 and 10 whether they think that it is justified “lying in
own interest”, “keeping found money”, “failing to report damage to parked vehicle”.
We argue that these three items reflect preferences towards civic-minded behaviour
in general. We then define PSM as the score for civicness in the public sector minus
the score for civicness in general given by the respondent. The difference between
the two scores captures the Public Service Motivation channel, i.e. the
motivation only due to the presence of a public good component. This will
constitute our dependent variable. Doing this way, we also control for differences in
unobservables in our sample.
5.2 Data
We restrain our sample to only Swiss citizens since birth, because specific Swiss cul-
tural traits that are transmitted by family and social networks should be stronger for
individuals with a Swiss family. Indeed, we expect that the cultural traits of people
born outside of Switzerland will be a mix of the culture of the Swiss region in which
they live and of their culture of origin. Hence, considering non Swiss natives might
bias our analysis. For the purpose of our study, we considered only Swiss-French
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and Swiss-German respondents, given by the language of the interview. This yields a
sample of 2790 individuals, among which 79,9 percent are Swiss-German1. For some
of them, we have data for both 2011 and 2014 leading to 4877 observations.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that a large majority of German-Swiss and French-Swiss
think that it is not justified being uncivic when faced with the public sector. But
this fraction is higher among German-Swiss. We reversed these scales, so that larger
values indicate stronger preferences for civic-minded behavior, and summed values
over the three items to create a scale with a 30 point maximum. The average score
given to civic-minded behaviour when the public sector is concerned is higher for
German-Swiss (27,29) than for French-Swiss (26,64) in a 0 to 30 scale.
Figure 5.1: Preferences for civic-minded behaviour when the public sector is concerned
Notes: The question was worded as follows: “For each of the following items, tell me to what extent you think that
it can be justified if 0 means never justified and 10 always justified. ”
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show that German-Swiss have stronger preferences for general
civic-minded behavior than French-Swiss. Most German-Swiss think it is not justified
being uncivic by lying in own interest, keeping found money, failing to report damage
to parked vehicle. While also a majority among French-Swiss thinks this way, a non-
negligible fraction of French-Swiss answers that being uncivic can be justified. In the
same way as for preferences towards civic-minded behaviour when the public sector is
concerned, we reversed these scales, so that larger values indicate stronger preferences
for civic-minded behavior in general, and summed values over the three items to create
a scale with a 30 point maximum. The mean value for general civicness preferences
is 22,98 for French-Swiss and 24 for German-Swiss.
Figure 5.5 highlights that when we differentiate the data about preferences towards
civic-minded behaviour when the public sector is concerned with respect to the score
given to civicness in general, so as to capture preferences purely related to PSM, the
average score among French-Swiss (3,9) is higher than the one of German-Swiss (3,4).
1Note that in the sample of Swiss population, the ratio of Swiss-German since birth over Swiss-
French since birth is 76,13 percent (Swiss Federal Statistical Office).
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Figure 5.2: Preferences for civic-minded behaviour when the public sector is con-
cerned, reversed scale and sum
Note: Pref. for Civicness in the Public Sector = 30 -
∑
Pref. for uncivicness when the public sector is concerned
Figure 5.3: Preferences for civic-minded behaviour in general
Note: The question was worded as follows: “For each of the following items, tell me to what extent you think that it
can be justified if 0 means never justified and 10 always justified”
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Figure 5.4: Preferences for civic-minded behaviour in general, reversed scale and sum
Note: Preferences for civicness in general = 30 -
∑
pref. for uncivicness in general
Figure 5.5: Public Service Motivation
Note: Public Service Motivation = Public Sector Civicness Pref. – General Civicness Pref.
174
The preliminary descriptive statistics (Table 5.1) show a significant difference in
Public Service Motivation (for the public good concern) between French-Swiss and
German-Swiss.
Table 5.1: Public Service Motivation across Culture
Mean CH-German Mean CH-French Mean Total Diff. Pr(Diff 6= 0)
Public sector civicness 27.3127 26.7645 27.2020 0.5482 0.0000***
(0.0580) (0.1310) (0.0534)
General civicness 23.9124 22.8985 23.7076 1.0139 0.0000***
(0.0792) (0.1577) (0.0710)
PSM 3.4003 3.8660 3.4944 -0.4657 0.0036***
(0.0703) (0.1551) (0.0643)
Observations 3892 985 4877
5.3 Estimation Results
5.3.1 Individual Determinants of PSM
When controlling for standard individual characteristics, such as age, age squared,
gender, revenue, union member, married, education, political ideology2 (see Table
5.2 for descriptive statistics of these variables in our sample), the prediction that
French-Swiss are more public-service motivated agents is confirmed.
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics SHP Data
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 43.1484 13.8564 16 85
Log Revenue 10.7430 1.0532 4.4543 13.3371
Political Ideology 4.1367 3.0656 -10 10
French 0.2009
Manager 0.4190
Job Tenure 0.8719
Union Member 0.2950
Been married 0.6604
Woman 0.5155
Children 0.5972
Private sector 0.5872
Religion
Catholic Protestant Other
0.4032 0.4698 0.1271
Educ. Level
Low Mid-Low Mid-High High
0.0694 0.3887 0.2387 0.3032
Table 5.3 highlights that the effect of being French is highly significant on the
PSM score. Taking into account all controls, the isolated estimated effect of the
French variable is around 0,50, that is, the motivation score of French-Swiss is 0,50
2The variable political ideology is captured by the response to the question: When they talk about
politics, people mention left and right. Personally, where do you position yourself if 0 means “left”
and 10 “right” ?
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points higher than the one of German-Swiss, in a (-20, 11) scale. This effect might
appear low. However, as the average score of public service motivation is also low
among German-Swiss, the relative effect seems larger. For example, relative to the
German-Swiss average PSM score, being French improves its score by 14,7 percent
(0,50/3,40), that is, increases PSM by 15 percent.
It is interesting to note that most other personal characteristics (e.g education,
political ideology, religion) are insignificant, confirming the benefit of employing the
difference between scores as our dependent variable. We observe nevertheless that
married people and women are more public-service motivated agents or more mission-
oriented agents, that is, agents more motivated by the public good concern. The
significant negative impact on PSM of having children might be explained by the
fact that having children reinforces the familial structure and the ingroup cohesion,
at the expense of the motivation to behave in way that serves the outgroup interest,
in-line with the studies of Triandis (1989), Jetten, Postmes and McAuliffe (2002) and
Postmes, Spears and Cihangir (2001) presented above.
5.3.2 Cultural Determinants of PSM
In an attempt to explain the cultural determinants of Public Service Motivation, es-
pecially the difference of PSM between French- and German-speaking agents within
Switzerland, we refer to the definition given by Hofstede et al. (1991) of individual-
ism and collectivism: “Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between
individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or
her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which peo-
ple from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which through-
out people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.”
While we could think that individualism leads to a lower sense of public good, the
literature shows that, on the contrary, some societies that can be considered as highly
individualist exhibit at the same time a very strong attachment to the interest of the
Nation. This is the case, for example, of the United States, as well as France. For
instance, in an empirical study on undergraduate and graduate students in the U.S.
(individualist society) and in Indonesia (collectivist society), Jetten et al. (2002) show
a positive relationship between the fact of being individualist and identification with
the national identity. Jetten et al. (2002) and Postmes et al. (2001) explain this pat-
tern by the fact that individualist agents have a strong interest to act in a way that
maintains the integrity of the group while “collectivists automatically obey ingroup
authorities and are willing to fight and die to maintain the integrity of the ingroup,
whereas they distrust and are unwilling to cooperate with members of outgroups”
Triandis (1989).
In our case, knowing that the French society is more individualist than the Ger-
man one (see Hofstede et al. (1991)), we could then explain the positive impact of
the French variable on PSM by the explanation given above. A way to test this ex-
planation, is to interact the cultural variable French with the score for civic-minded
behaviour in general, obtained from the Swiss Household Panel. If the explanation
176
Table 5.3: Individual Determinants of PSM
Dep. Variable : (1) (2) (3) (4)
PSM Non Pooled Non Pooled Pooled Pooled
French 0.385* 0.476** 0.466** 0.509***
(0.229) (0.229) (0.196) (0.196)
Age -0.164*** -0.112***
(0.0499) (0.0419)
Age2 0.00113** 0.000575
(0.000539) (0.000457)
Educ. Level : Mid Low -0.463 -0.373
(0.422) (0.368)
Educ. Level : Mid High -0.555 -0.313
(0.434) (0.380)
Educ. Level : High -0.517 -0.305
(0.444) (0.388)
Manager -0.0988 0.0384
(0.189) (0.161)
Job tenure 0.269 -0.209
(0.304) (0.258)
Catholic -0.338 -0.240
(0.286) (0.238)
Protestant -0.227 -0.112
(0.281) (0.235)
Union member 0.174 0.212
(0.187) (0.161)
Been married 0.756*** 0.923***
(0.287) (0.242)
Woman 0.366* 0.290*
(0.189) (0.161)
Log revenue -0.142 -0.130
(0.112) (0.102)
Political ideology -0.0167 -0.0256
(0.0297) (0.0248)
Children -0.616** -0.732***
(0.255) (0.218)
Year 2014 0.207*
(0.107)
Constant 3.378*** 9.833*** 3.400*** 8.709***
(0.0938) (1.183) (0.0800) (1.042)
Observations 2,790 2,790 4,877 4,877
R-squared 0.001 0.057 0.002 0.049
Notes:∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. OLS regressions. Dependent
variable: Public service motivation. Non pooled data: year 2014. Pooled
data: years 2011 and 2014. Standard errors on pooled data are clustered
at the individual level.
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presented above is right, we should observe that the positive impact of being French
(meaning here more individualist) on Public Service Motivation decreases when in-
dividual preferences for civic-minded behaviour are stronger. The Table 5.4 reports
results that corroborate this explanation.
5.3.3 Individual Determinants of Being Motivated
For organizational choices, it is not the magnitude of motivation of each individual
but rather the likelihood of having motivated agents that matters. This is the reason
why we constructed a dummy variable of motivation that captures whether agents are
motivated or not. As the proportion of negative is too low (12%) when considering the
variable motivation as a dummy being positive or negative, we constructed the dummy
according to the average level of motivation in the whole sample. The dummy takes
the value one if the individual has a motivation above the average and zero otherwise,
leading 53% of individuals in the non-pooled sample and 61% in the pooled sample
being not motivated.
Table 5.5 highlights that the effect of being French is highly significant on the
probability of being motivated. Taking into account all controls, the isolated esti-
mated probability effect of the French variable is 22 percentage points in the pooled
estimation. Recall that on average 39% of individuals are motivated in the pooled
sample, French-Swiss agents are then 56% more likely to be motivated than their
German-speaking neighbours, in line with the marginal effect of the French variable
on the organizational choices.
It is interesting to note that most other personal characteristics (e.g. education,
political ideology, religion) are insignificant, confirming that national fixed effects are
more important than individual characteristics. Being motivated is mainly culturally
determined. We observe nevertheless that married people are more motivated agents
or more mission-oriented agents, that is, agents more motivated by the public good
concern.
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Table 5.4: Why French-Swiss are more mission-oriented agents?
Dep. Variable : (1) (2)
PSM Non Pooled Pooled
French 13.47*** 10.24***
(1.037) (0.806)
French × Civicness in general -0.571*** -0.426***
(0.0414) (0.0327)
Age -0.154*** -0.103**
(0.0475) (0.0406)
Age2 0.00112** 0.000539
(0.000514) (0.000442)
Educ. Level : Mid Low -0.263 -0.279
(0.400) (0.359)
Educ. Level : Mid High -0.401 -0.260
(0.413) (0.372)
Educ. Level : High -0.249 -0.156
(0.421) (0.378)
Manager -0.0867 0.0488
(0.182) (0.156)
Job tenure 0.314 -0.158
(0.293) (0.253)
Catholic -0.263 -0.162
(0.275) (0.231)
Protestant -0.101 -0.0199
(0.272) (0.228)
Union member 0.152 0.183
(0.179) (0.156)
Been married 0.830*** 0.969***
(0.275) (0.232)
Woman 0.473*** 0.355**
(0.182) (0.156)
Log revenue -0.124 -0.131
(0.111) (0.0997)
Political ideology -0.0184 -0.0266
(0.0282) (0.0237)
Children -0.582** -0.684***
(0.246) (0.208)
Year 2014 0.193*
(0.106)
Constant 8.800*** 8.118***
(1.191) (1.036)
Observations 2,790 4,877
R-squared 0.139 0.095
Notes: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. OLS regres-
sions. Dependent variable: Public service motivation.
Non pooled data: year 2014. Pooled data: years 2011
and 2014. Standard errors on pooled data are clustered
at the individual level.
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Table 5.5: Individual Determinants of Being Motivated – Probit
Dep. Variable : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy Motivated Non Pooled Non Pooled Pooled Pooled
French 0.104* 0.130** 0.204*** 0.223***
(0.0592) (0.0619) (0.0512) (0.0531)
Age -0.0407*** -0.0342***
(0.0140) (0.0117)
Age2 0.000219 0.000180
(0.000154) (0.000131)
Educ. Level : Mid Low -0.0670 -0.0273
(0.102) (0.0877)
Educ. Level : Mid High -0.0754 -0.000383
(0.108) (0.0924)
Educ. Level : High -0.0870 -0.0336
(0.109) (0.0938)
Manager 0.0301 0.0443
(0.0558) (0.0472)
Job tenure 0.108 0.0803
(0.0840) (0.0705)
Catholic -0.139* -0.0832
(0.0784) (0.0657)
Protestant -0.101 -0.0681
(0.0773) (0.0647)
Union member 0.100* 0.0767
(0.0544) (0.0468)
Been married 0.234*** 0.224***
(0.0852) (0.0709)
Woman 0.0267 0.0201
(0.0543) (0.0460)
Log revenue -0.0505 -0.0488*
(0.0333) (0.0294)
Political ideology 0.00147 -0.00469
(0.00832) (0.00711)
Children -0.151** -0.150**
(0.0755) (0.0631)
Year 2014 0.0336
(0.0327)
Constant -0.162*** 1.626*** -0.356*** 1.171***
(0.0267) (0.337) (0.0228) (0.298)
Observations 2,790 2,790 4,877 4,877
Notes: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Standard errors on pooled data are
clustered at the individual level. Dependent variable: Dummy taking the value
1 if the respondent’s motivation is bigger than the average.
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5.4 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to provide evidence on the fact that the impact of culture
on organizational choices, that we have highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, is mediated
by a Public Service Motivation channel.
Our analysis based on micro-data from the Swiss Household Panel allows us to
confirm the validity of this hypothesis. We show that this impact of culture on orga-
nizational choices is explained by the fact that culture determines the prevalence of
public-service motivated agents that are aligned with public, mission-oriented organi-
zations.
This result leads to important policy implications. Privatization policies, or more
generally guidelines that favour the involvement of the private sector in the deliv-
ery of public services might be counter-productive in countries where agents have a
higher PSM. In the same vein, New Public Management guidelines that hamper the
alignment between mission-oriented organizations and agents are counter-productive
in countries where agents have a higher PSM.
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Contracting diff. 1.000
Sensitivity 0.191 1.000
Uncertainty 0.343 0.209 1.000
Budget weight 0.648 0.312 0.217 1.000
Income 0.000 0.018 0.050 0.001 1.000
Dep. Ratio 0.001 0.028 0.024 -0.001 -0.103 1.000
Debt 0.000 0.033 0.019 0.002 -0.116 -0.089 1.000
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B.2 Sensitivity of the results to the removal of out-
liers
In order to check whether our results might by biased by outliers, we estimate again
our RDD multinomial model (with city×service explanatory variables), removing suc-
cessively each of our 22 services. The coefficients associated with the variable French
for the choice Private contracting for each of the 22 regressions we ran are reported
in Table B.1. We show that, albeit the coefficients slightly vary from one regression
to another, the cultural impact remains highly significant for each subsample and no
service drives the results.
Table B.1: Robustness check: Removing services
Removed service French Removed service French
Office cleaning -0.1709*** Sewage treatment -0.1622***
(0.0577) (0.0587)
Snow cleaning -0.1297** Child day-care centres -0.1647***
(0.0549) (0.0575)
Road cleaning -0.1604*** School canteen -0.1745***
(0.0569) (0.059)
Road maintenance -0.1645*** Specialized services in school -0.1807***
(0.0579) (0.0605)
Parking control -0.1758*** Maintenance of school buildings -0.1612***
(0.0577) (0.0569)
Refuse collection -0.1535*** Security in public spaces -0.1547**
(0.0552) (0.0603)
Solid waste disposal -0.1374** Local parks and gardens -0.1506***
(0.0581) (0.0577)
Animal carcases removal -0.1478** Cemeteries -0.1632***
(0.0586) (0.0588)
Street lights -0.1768*** Trimming of trees -0.1632***
(0.0577) (0.0579)
Drinking water distribution -0.1618*** Forests -0.1566***
(0.061) (0.0568)
Maintenance of water facilities -0.1563*** Public transportation -0.173***
(0.0571) (0.0567)
Notes: ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Robust Standard errors clustered at the city level
in parentheses. Multinomial Logit. Bandwidth: 20 km with linear trend. Reported coefficients
are the marginal effects of the variable French on private contracting (against base category in-
house provision) when removing the corresponding service from the sample. Other RHS variables:
Distance, French×Distance, Contracting diff. Uncertainty, Sensitivity, Size (3 classes), Urban,
Mountain, Demographic Dep. ratio, Income, Budget weight, Debt, Political ideology (3 classes).
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B.3 Omitted variable bias
If the omitted variable bias is an important issue in a large part of the empirical
research in economics, this issue has an overwhelming importance in studies based on
Regression discontinuity designs. Indeed, the cornerstone of this empirical approach
is that the treatment is the only parameter who changes at the cutoff.
Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005; 2008) provide an indirect way to estimate to
what extent unobserved variables are likely to drive the results. More precisely, they
provide a way to measure how large the selection on unobservables would need to
be to explain away the results. With the underlying assumption that observable
parameters are representative of unobservable ones, the more the coefficient associated
to the variable of interest decreases in absolute terms when (observable) explanatory
variables are added to the model, the more likely we are in presence of an omitted
variable bias.
Table B.2 shows raw coefficients for our multinomial logit model, with different
specifications, at different bandwidths. The first column reports the results of regres-
sions with no RHS variable but the FRENCH dummy. The second column adds a
spatial trend (Distance, Distance × FRENCH). Column 3 adds the sets of Efficiency
and Political variables (Contracting difficulty, Uncertainty, Sensitivity, Political ide-
ology). Finally, the fourth column corresponds to the fully specified model, with all
control variables.
Table B.2: Altonji test for the presence of an omitted variable bias
Bandwidth Spatial trend (1) (2) (3) (4)
20 km Linear -0.0647 -0.374 -0.584 -0.837
25 km Linear 0.0195 -0.235 -0.341 -0.711
30 km Linear -0.0644 -0.0352 -0.125 -0.540
40 km Linear -0.0307 -0.157 -0.200 -0.523
Spatial trend No Yes Yes Yes
Efficiency and political variables No No Yes Yes
Control variables No No No Yes
Notes: Multinomial logit. Reported values are the raw coefficients associated to the variable French, for
private contracting vs. the base category in-house provision. RHS variables: column 1: French; column 2:
French, Distance, Distance × French; column 3: the same as col. 2 plus Contracting difficulty, Uncertainty,
Sensitivity, Political ideology; column 4: the same as col. 3 plus Big, Small, Urban, Mountain, Income,
Debt, Budget weight
We observe that the coefficients increase — in absolute value — when new variables
are added, for all the bandwidths. In line with Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005; 2008),
the fact that the magnitude of the effect increases along with the inclusion of more
variables rules out the risk that our results are driven by an omitted variable bias.
Indeed, if such a bias exists, its effect would be to reduce the magnitude of the results.
In other words, it would lead to underestimate the effect of the cultural bias rather
than to overestimate it.
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B.4 Continuity of explanatory variables at the lan-
guage border
A key issue in regression discontinuity designs is that all other explanatory variables do
not exhibit any discontinuity at the cutoff. In order to check the balance of covariates
at the language border, we estimate the following regression model:
Yi = α0 + α1 · Fi + α2 ·Di + α3 · Fi ×Di + X′iβ + εi (B.1)
where Yi is the variable to test for municipality i, Fi a dummy taking the value 1 for
French-speaking municipalities and Di the distance to the language border. X’i is a
vector of State dummies. For binary variables, we use a logit model with the same
specification.
Results are provided in Table B.3. Column 1 reports the mean of a characteristic
in the French region, column 2 reports the corresponding mean in the German re-
gion, column 3 reports the contrast Swiss French versus Swiss German municipalities,
column 4 provides an estimate of the local contrast with a bandwidth of 25 km. In
columns 1 and 2, standard deviations are in parentheses; in columns 3 and 4, for mu-
nicipality data, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses whereas
for municipality-service characteristics (uncertainty, sensitivity, standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level.
Table B.3: How do border municipalities compare?
Mean Mean Difference Difference
French German All 25 km, linear
Income [1000 CHF]
0.809 0.613 0.196** 0.133
(0.092) (0.046) (0.094) (0.144)
Dependency ratio
66.410 66.689 2.721* 8.710***
(1.063) (0.989) (1.482) (0.028)
Debt
0.038 0.031 0.012 -.010***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.020)
Mountain
0.517 0.512 -0.005 -0.523***
(0.163)
Urban
0.225 0.357 -0.132* -0.128
(0.199)
Small
0.569 0.405 0.164 0.399**
(0.187)
Medium
0.345 0.417 -0.072 -0.244
(0.199)
Big
0.086 0.179 -0.093 -0.156
(0.152)
Uncertainty
0.131 -0.147 0.278*** 0.483**
(0.029) (0.022) (0.043) (0.194)
Sensitivity
-0.069 -0.079 -0.010 -0.154
(0.035) (0.033) (0.049) (0.187)
Number of municipalities 174 225 92
Number of observations 3823 4934 1645
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Results indicate that there are significant but slight differences in age structure at
the language border. Swiss French border municipalities are also most often smaller
than their German neighbours. While there is no significant difference between Swiss-
French and Swiss-German municipalities of the whole sample, there are significant
differences between border municipalities, with a higher rate for private sector com-
petition within French border municipalities. This might be explained by the fact
that there are more German border municipalities in a mountain area than French
ones (which can impede access to markets and make transportation less efficient).
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General Conclusion and Policy
Implications
Reconcile the tight budget constraints while guaranteeing the reliable provision of
high-quality services is an important and complex challenge faced by the public au-
thorities all over the world. In the past decades, many important reforms have been
conducted in order to increase the efficiency of the public sector, both through internal
reforms (New Public Management) and through an increased recourse to the private
sector, using different forms of contracting-out.
In practice, the provision of public services can take many forms. In-house pro-
vision, the provision by employees of the public sector, is still the most frequently
used way of providing services. Contracting with the private sector can take a large
set of arrangements allowing the public authority to have a greater or lesser monitor-
ing on the provided services. These arrangements include in particular performance
contracts and concessions. In addition, contracting with other public authorities may
allow the authorities — particularly at the local or regional level — to take profit
from some of the advantages of contracting (economies of scale) while keeping the
provision in the hands of the public sector and hence maximizing the control.
The choice between one mode of provision or another, the so-called make-or-buy
decision has given rise to a vast literature. However, both the theoretical and the
empirical literature has considered only technical determinants of the organizational
choices. As is ignores the fact that cultural factors may also affect the organizational
choices, the classical literature fails to explain across-country differences in terms of
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organizational choices. On the other hand, the public administration literature sheds
light on the importance of culture to explain cross-country differences in terms of
Public Service Motivation. However, these two fields of research have never been
connected so far. Hence, the goal of this thesis has been to build a bridge
between the economic make-or-buy literature and the public administra-
tion PSM literature, and to investigate for the first time to what extent
PSM influences the organizational choices for the delivery of public ser-
vices. In order to build this bridge, Switzerland is an ideal laboratory, with its
different languages that also correspond to very different cultures, and in particular
with its Roestigraben.
First of all, we studied the make-or-buy decision of Swiss municipalities under the
light of the existing theoretical framework. To do this, we addressed the complete
absence of data regarding the provision of local public services in Switzerland by
running a web-based survey addressed to the municipal secretaries (senior official at
the head of the municipal administration) of all Swiss municipalities, which allowed
us to construct an original database on the provision of a set of 22 public service in
399 Swiss municipalities. Our results partly corroborate the expectations based on
technical variables, which encompass in particular the dimensions described by the
Transaction Cost Theory. In line with this theory, we show that a higher contractual
difficulty is a deterrent for contracting-out, whereas it increases public contracting.
We also show that the size of the municipalities does not affect their propensity to
contract with the private sector: small municipalities take profit from economies of
scale by contracting with other public authorities rather than with the private sector.
By contrast, some of our results diverge from the previous literature. A higher level of
uncertainty fosters the resort to both the private and the public sectors. We explain
this result by the fact that Swiss municipalities, due to their small size, are not in
a position to manage efficiently the demand risk, which leads them to contract-out
in order to delegate the risk to the party that is best able to bear it. Finally, a
higher level of sensitivity of the residents fosters the resort to the private sector. The
most plausible explanation is that the policy makers, due to the small size of the
municipalities, expect the private sector to be best able to provide sensitive services
at a higher quality. Using an original identification strategy based on the analysis of
mispredicted outcomes, we show that cultural factors, proxied by the language, may
also be a determinant of the make-or-buy decision of Swiss municipalities.
In order to provide a robust causal evidence of the impact of culture on organiza-
tional choices, we adopted in the second part of this thesis an identification strategy
based on a regression-discontinuity design (RDD) model, in which we use the Roes-
tigraben — the border between French- and German-speaking areas — as a cutoff.
As a part of this language border runs within three bilingual cantons, this allows
us to run within-canton estimations, by restricting our Swiss municipalities database
to the municipalities in these three cantons, and including canton fixed effects in our
model. Doing so, we are able to consider three accounts for the make-or-buy decisions:
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efficiency-based determinants (which include but are not limited to transaction-cost
determinants), public choice determinants, and cultural determinants. This allows us
to compare the organizational choices of municipalities facing an identical (cantonal)
institutional framework. Our results suggest a significant and substantial effect of cul-
ture: municipalities in the French area are about 60 percent less likely to contract-out
a given service to the private sector than a municipality just on the other side of the
border, but on the German side.
Whereas the marginal effects measured in our study seem to be particularly high,
we observe a strong coherence of the results — and their magnitude — in the different
parts of this thesis, despite the fact that these results are based on different datasets
and on very different empirical designs. Hence, we believe that these results, despite
their very high magnitude, are credible, a fortiori if we expect that the initial effect
of culture can be reinforced by a feedback mechanism.
We finally run a study based on micro-data from the Swiss Household Panel in
order to understand by what channel cultural factors exert an influence on organiza-
tional choices. As we expect that there exist a matching between the organizational
modes and the agents’ public service motivation, and that this matching may lead to
more public provision in communities with a high PSM, we tested whether individuals
in the French- and German-speaking areas differ in terms of PSM. We proposed a new
way of measuring PSM, that allows to control for the level of general civicness, thus
capturing the pure public component of PSM. This approach provides a better an-
swer to our questions than the constructs that had been used so far. In line with this
hypothesis, we observe that French-speaking respondents exhibit significantly higher
PSM than German-speaking respondents, after controlling for individual character-
istics, and in particular political ideology. We infer that the impact of culture on
the make-or-buy decision is driven by differences in terms of alignment between the
preferences of the organizations and the agents, which increases the productivity of
the public sector.
189
The main contributions of this thesis are : (1) to show that culture is a
major determinant of the organizational choices, even more important than
technical factors, which may explain why countries that seem a priori to be
very similar in terms of economic environment make very different choices
regarding the delivery of public services; (2) to show that the impact of
culture on organizational choices is mediated by systematic differences in
the level of Public Service Motivation; (3) to provide a new way to measure
PSM, which allows to disentangle PSM from a general level of civicness;
4) to provide evidence that mission matching leads to productivity gains.
This thesis also leads to important policy implications. As it shows a significant
relationship between PSM, organizational choices, and efficiency of public service pro-
vision, it sheds light on the fact that culture should not be neglected when making
choices related to the provision of public services. Some organizational measures will
lead to a significant improvement of the efficiency of the provision when applied to
some cultures with which they perfectly fit, whereas applying the same measures to
jurisdictions with other cultures will lead to a deterioration of the quality or the effi-
ciency. This is important in more than one respect. First, this means that just copying
the practices that seem to be successful in other contexts, e.g in other countries —
as many countries did with New Public Management, as well as with privatizations
— is not appropriate. This may explain why some policies, for example the New
Public Management as well as privatizations, lead to very different results across the
countries. This also may call into question the fact that some international organiza-
tions (IMF, World Bank) promote the application of identical policies in all countries.
Secondly, in the case of a strongly multicultural country like Switzerland (but also
Belgium, or Canada), it is essential that the specificities of the different cultural areas
are properly considered. This also applies to supra-national entities like the Euro-
pean Union. Finally, our results suggest that small municipalities are less sensitive
to transaction cost arguments due to a lack of competencies. Hence, an increase of
the size of the municipalities would allow to increase their productive efficiency in
the delivery of public services. This result is hence in line with the public finance
literature in Switzerland. This makes a case for strengthening the policy of incentives
aiming to foster mergers of municipality.
As this dissertation strived to build a bridge between two research fields that
had never been connected before, it provides a foundation for several future paths of
research.
In addition, albeit the literature has identified some cultural determinants of PSM
— e.g. religion, risk aversion, or the collectivist or individualist nature of the Society
— much remains to be done to understand how the prevalence of motivated agents
is culturally determined. The literature suggests that these factors influence PSM,
however it does not provide any evidence on the relative impact of these factors.
Furthermore, the literature has not addressed yet the question of how these factors
affect PSM, and how they affect actual behaviours. This opens the door for interesting
190
research in behavioural economics, which might take the form of lab studies.
As our study focuses on the Swiss case, an important limit of our research is its lack
of external validity. Hence, a further path of research would consist in generalizing
our findings at a cross-country level, and/or in other multicultural (multi-ethnic or
multilingual) countries.
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